

CURRENT HISTORY

A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

NOVEMBER, 1985

Property of
ADAM COLLEGE LIBRARY
Big Sandy, Texas



East Europe, 1985

Dissent and the Contra-System in East Europe— <i>Robert Sharlet</i>	353
The Warsaw Pact: From Here to Eternity?— <i>John Erickson</i>	357
Albania's New Beginning— <i>John Kolsti</i>	361
Hungary: A Malaise Thinly Disguised— <i>Ivan Volgyes</i>	365
The Politics of Division and Détente in East Germany— <i>Melvin Croan</i>	369
Czechoslovakia in the 1980's— <i>Michael Kraus</i>	373
Stalemate and Apathy in Poland— <i>David S. Mason</i>	377
Bulgaria's Role in East Europe— <i>Frederick B. Chary</i>	381
Book Reviews— <i>On East Europe</i>	384
The Month in Review— <i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	394
Map— <i>East Europe</i>	Inside Back Cover

Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

NOVEMBER, 1985
VOLUME 84 NUMBER 505

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Managing Editor:

WILLIAM W. FINAN JR.

Consulting Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

University of South Dakota

O. EDMUND CLUBB

U.S. Foreign Service Officer (retired)

DAVID B. H. DENOON

New York University

JOHN ERICKSON

University of Edinburgh

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Case Western Reserve University

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

CARL G. JACOBSEN

University of Miami

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame, Emeritus

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

RAJAN MENON

Vanderbilt University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

JAN S. PRYBYLA

Pennsylvania State University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford, Emeritus

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

AARON SEGAL

University of Texas

VACLAV SMIL

University of Manitoba

RICHARD F. STAAR

Hoover Institution

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College, Emeritus

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Coming Next Month

JAPAN

December, 1985

What are the issues of the United States-Japan trade debate? Is a solution possible? These questions are among the topics discussed in our December issue.

The United States and Japan

by HIDEO SATO, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan

The Japanese Economy

by DICK K. NANTO, Congressional Research Service

Japan's Foreign Policy

by MICHAEL MOCHIZUKI, Yale University

Political Developments in Japan

by SHIGEKO FUKAI, Auburn University

Japanese Technology

by LEONARD LYNN, Carnegie-Mellon University

Japan's Education System

by WILLIAM CUMMINGS, National Science Foundation, and VICTOR KOBAYASHI, University of Hawaii

Japan and China

by HONG N. KIM, West Virginia University

\$2.95 a copy • \$21.00 a year

Canada \$23.00 a year • Foreign \$23.00 a year

Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

Current History (ISSN-0011-3530) is published monthly (except June, July and August) for \$21.00 per year by Current History, Inc. Publication Office, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127; Editorial Office, 3740 Creamery Rd., Furlong, Pa. 18925. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: send address changes to *Current History*, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, *The Abridged Reader's Guide*, *ABC Polsci*, *PAIS*, *SSCI* and *America: History and Life*. Indexed on-line by *DIALOG*, *BRS* and *Information Access Magazine Index*. Microfilm: University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright © 1985 by Current History, Inc.

Current History

NOVEMBER, 1985

VOL. 84, NO. 505

Forty years after the end of World War II, the Soviet Union's domination of East Europe continues. This issue examines the relationship between the Soviet Union and East Europe: how does it affect East European political and economic life? Is political liberalization possible? Our lead article notes that the East European "opposition is growing while the official systems appear to be stagnating. More problems lie ahead as more and more crossborder television transmissions from the West hook into the video revolution going on in virtually every East European country. . . . The personal computer . . . [and] the emerging countercultures [will] create the kind of 'systemic' subversion that the police, law codes and repressive machinery cannot even begin to contemplate, no less cope with effectively."

Dissent and the Contra-System in East Europe

BY ROBERT SHARLET

Professor of Political Science, Union College

FOUR decades after the end of World War II and the inception of Soviet-type systems throughout the region, societal opposition—a "contra-system"—in most of East Europe is alive and well.¹

Needless to say, this opposition varies from one country to another. It flourishes in post-martial law Poland, shows steady growth in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and East Germany, and remains less developed (or at least less observable to the Western eye) in Romania, Bulgaria and especially Albania.²

The strength and viability of the various components of societal opposition also differ from country to country and over time. For instance, the "second economy," the largely illegal network of individual and corporate transactions in competition with and complementary to the planned economy of the state, is visible in varying shades throughout East Europe, most clearly in the Romanian

and Polish societies of scarcity, where the consumer public must cultivate survival skills to ensure basic daily needs. By contrast, political dissent, an elitist and specialized expression of societal dissent, has a more episodic character. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, periodic protests issue from time to time; but dissent is rarely glimpsed in Bulgaria and Romania.

Between dissent and the second economy stretch various signs of societal unrest. Obviously, ethnic nationalism is strong in multinational Yugoslavia, but the ongoing struggle of the ethnic Hungarians to preserve their cultural identity in Romania and the desperate plight of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in the face of the recent forced Bulgarianization campaign cannot be ignored. Unsanctioned religious activity is also visible throughout East Europe. In Czechoslovakia, where the Catholic Church is legally registered but severely constrained, a veritable church of the catacombs exists, complete with underground seminaries, secretly ordained priests, and bishops leading double lives as laymen by day and clergy by night.

Beyond the legal pale, there are also the Basic Communities or fundamentalist Catholics in Hungary, the Lord's Army—an unregistered orthodox sect—and a host of evangelical Protestant groups in Romania, and scattered pockets of increasingly restive Muslims in Yugoslavia, especially in the Bosnian region. Conversely, well within the purview of the legislative framework for

¹I am speaking here of societal opposition in the broadest sense and not merely political dissent, its most conspicuous manifestation. See Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and the 'Contra-System' in the Soviet Union," in Erik P. Hoffmann, ed., *The Soviet Union in the 1980s* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984), pp. 135–146.

²See Robert Sharlet, "Varieties of Dissent and Regularities of Repression," in Jane Leftwich Curry, ed., *Dissent in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1983), chapter 1. See also the country studies in the Curry volume and Rudolf L. Tokes, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

organized religion inside an atheist state, the Lutheran Church in East Germany has seized the peace issue and mobilized thousands, especially young people, in nonviolent demonstrations for East–West disarmament.

An emergent youth counterculture is becoming evident throughout East Europe. The waves of the international youth culture in terms of music, dress and behavior have washed over East Europe's ideological dikes for some time. Party censors have long since been outflanked and overwhelmed by the steady flow of Western tourists and the endless torrents of rock music pouring over the Western airwaves into the East. The emerging youth counterculture is given technological assistance by the inexpensive, easily portable sound cassette, facilitating the uncontrollable diffusion of Western music with its "subversive" beat and its often provocative lyrics.

The range of countercultural activities is diverse. The Plastic People of the Universe, an unofficial Czechoslovak rock group of the mid-1970's that synthesized rock, liturgical music and religious imagery, was broken up by the police on orders from the cultural commissars. This repression of the Plastic People in 1976 was one of the major catalysts in the 1977 creation of "Charter 77," which continues to serve as the cynosure of dissent in Czechoslovakia.³ The Plastic People's sound lives on in cassettes passed hand to hand, and in a record cut in the West and smuggled back into the country. In 1985, Czechoslovak counterculture comes complete with a martyr-hero in the person of the late John Lennon of the Beatles, killed by an assassin's bullet. At the "Lennon Wall" in Prague, the young mourners scribble all kinds of graffiti, including peace slogans. Periodically whitewashed by the police, the graffiti artists continue to redecorate the wall surreptitiously.

Elsewhere in East Europe, youth behavior ranges from the earnest but violent demonstrations in the Kosovo section of Yugoslavia in 1981 on behalf of greater ethnic Albanian autonomy within the federation to the frivolity of protesting beer prices in Bulgaria.⁴ Somewhat more typical of the mainstream of the youth counterculture are the punk rockers of Hungary, the conscientious objectors of East Germany, and the teenagers and young adults of Poland. In Poland, the distinctions between counterculture, religion and dissent are blurred; Polish youth frequently find themselves in the midst of the "war of the crosses" in the schools, or participants in the mostly peaceful and largely symbolic street demonstrations on behalf of the outlawed Solidarity trade union.

The rise of societal opposition to the regimes of East Europe has four main sources. First, the postwar period of Soviet-style people's democracies in East Europe (fol-

³See H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), chapter 1.

⁴The ethnic Albanian student protest apparently began peacefully but became violent following police intervention. See Amnesty International, *Yugoslavia: Prisoners of Conscience* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1985), pp. 12–14.

lowed by the Stalinization of individual societies until Stalin's death in 1953) was too short to complete the goal set by the Soviet Union: the systematic disruption and transformation along Soviet lines of East European social systems. In effect, the East European regimes did not in all cases accomplish the penetration and hence the remodeling of the prerevolutionary society. As a consequence, the seeds of societal opposition (the contrasystem), such as the entrepreneurial spirit, the persistence of a dual or parallel high culture, and a penchant for privatism, were left relatively undisturbed. Given different national traditions and diverse indigenous political cultures, the Stalinization process proceeded on varying timetables in East Europe. A notable success was the political penetration of Bulgarian society while a conspicuous failure occurred in Poland. Several decades later, these two countries represent polar opposites in terms of societal opposition.

A second source of opposition was the process of de-Stalinization triggered by Stalin's death and led by his successor, party First Secretary and Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev, along with the eventual waning of the process under the next leader, President Leonid Brezhnev. On the one hand, Khrushchev actively promoted reform and change before some East European Communist parties had fully consolidated their power and control, hence raising expectations of relief from Soviet-inspired practices among both intellectuals and the masses in the street. Conversely, before reform was seriously attempted by reluctant East European Stalinist and neo-Stalinist leaders, Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. Although the Brezhnev team did not reverse the major accomplishments of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, it slowed and gradually wound down the process, hence taking pressure off the fraternal parties in East Europe.

As a result, in the salons and on the streets and farms of East Europe, although the worst excesses of Stalinism had been abandoned, the popular expectations for an improvement in the quality of life were dashed by the aborted de-Stalinization program. East Europeans began to look to the second economy for their material needs and to the parallel culture, subterranean religion and, in certain countries, a sub-rosa "free" educational system to meet their spiritual needs.

Needless to say, de-Stalinization did not occur uniformly in the region. For instance, Yugoslavia underwent de-Stalinization first, because of Stalin's break with Marshal Josif Broz Tito in 1948 and the latter's subsequent disillusionment with the Soviet model. Czechoslovakia, which entered the Soviet bloc last in 1948, experienced both the zenith and the nadir of de-Stalinization very late—from January, 1968, until the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968.

The third source of opposition has been modernization and its shortcomings. The political system imposed by the Soviet Union on East Europe was essentially a party-directed program of rapid socioeconomic modernization.

Its goals included eliminating illiteracy, raising the minimum for compulsory schooling, industrializing and urbanizing society, and creating a large pool of better educated personnel to operate the new system. In theory, the party leadership assumed that these processes would eliminate parochialism and particularism, raise civic and collective consciousness, and secularize and supranationalize the population (i.e., shifting a Serb's or Croat's allegiance to a Yugoslav identity or a Bulgar's loyalty to "proletarian internationalism").

In fact, modernization in East Europe has produced unintended and unwanted consequences. Literacy and higher education led to hopes, demands and, in some instances, dissent, and stimulated ethnic and indigenous nationalism rather than supranationalism. The politicization of civil society generally encouraged privatism rather than collectivism, as well as a countercultural reaction among the younger generation. Secularization, in turn, failed to extirpate religiosity which, given the people's loss of faith in the civil religion of Marxism-Leninism, has been gaining new adherents, including younger people, who thereby risk any chance of career advancement. In brief, modernization in East Europe has inadvertently nurtured the growth of societal opposition; in this process, Hungary is clearly the leader in modernization and Albania is the laggard.

The fourth and final source of societal opposition was the rise of East-West détente in the 1970's and its subsequent demise. When Soviet-American relations improved in the early 1970's, East Europe as a whole (and especially those citizens engaged in various forms of contra-activities) were the beneficiaries of the improved political climate. As the Soviet Union and its allies acquired a greater stake in a positive image in the West, the cost-benefit ratio of certain types of opposition shifted. Détente had a stimulative effect on the growth of dissent—political, religious, and ethnic. And greater exposure to the West fostered the youth counterculture as well.

As for contra-system development, the high-water mark of détente was the 1975 Helsinki accords in which signatories from East and West agreed on principles governing the exercise of human rights. The Helsinki spirit had its most discernible impact in East Germany, where it generated a vast continuing emigration movement; in Poland, where it contributed to the creation of KOR, the Worker's Defense Committee (in response to government repression of the 1976 strikes);⁵ and in

Czechoslovakia, where it was an important factor in the formation of Charter 77. In the late 1970's, Charter 77 became the model for a more modest unofficial civil rights undertaking in Romania and sparked some fresh political dissent in Hungary.

When détente declined and superpower relations cooled, the East European regimes began to step up the pressure against their unwanted Helsinki offspring. The Romanian civil rights group did not survive, but even its ephemeral existence afforded vital international visibility to the contra-religious and contra-ethnic movements in Romania which, in this the tenth anniversary year of the Helsinki Final Act, remain viable. Political dissidence has proved durable in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where it has facilitated the emergence of full-scale (and, in Poland, large-scale) contra-systems.

ROLE OF DISSENT

Political dissent occupies a special place in the constellation of societal opposition. Where dissent has survived the vicissitudes of repression over time, a contra-system tends to be more fully articulated. A second economy can operate in the absence of dissent, but many other opposition activities can arise and thrive more easily given the existence of a native dissident movement. Such a movement performs three key functions. First, political dissidents (frequently although not exclusively intellectuals), who express their differences with the party publicly, are addressing the general human condition. By breaking the bonds of fear that immobilize the individual, the dissidents serve as role models for others.⁶

This is especially true in East Europe, particularly in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the ranks of dissent frequently include ex-party officials, banned cultural figures and former regime intellectuals. The example of the political activist often emboldens religious and ethnic dissidents to step forward. Inevitably, religious and ethnic activism is more broadly based and deeply rooted in the society and is therefore less easily repressed. This has certainly been the case in Romania; long after the tiny civil rights group headed by the novelist Paul Goma was crushed, evangelical Christians and ethnic Hungarians continue their struggles in the face of heavy government pressure.⁷

Second, by speaking out on public issues and circulating their opinions through *samizdat* (self-publication), political dissenters have broken the state's monopoly on spoken and written information by establishing an alternate, unofficial communication system. In its simplest form, the medium is a carbon-copy typescript, but for some years now in Czechoslovakia beautifully printed uncensored books have been published by "underground" presses that supply the parallel culture and provide ecclesiastical texts for the subterranean religious system.⁸

The Polish "second" communication circuit produces microfilms and video cassettes as well, and underground

⁵See Peter Raina, *Independent Social Movements in Poland* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science/Orbis, 1981), chapter 9.

⁶For a study of this phenomenon in the U.S.S.R., see Stephen F. Cohen, ed., *An End to Silence: Uncensored Opinion in the Soviet Union* (New York: Norton, 1982).

⁷See Helsinki Watch, *Violations of the Helsinki Accords: August 1983-September 1984* (New York, 1984), pp. 72-76 and 78-81.

⁸See H. Gordon Skilling, "Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 34, no. 1 (January-February, 1985), pp. 38-40.

Solidarity's radio and television have devised ways of projecting Solidarity's messages on television viewers' screens during programs transmitted by the official state television network.⁹

Without the independent flow of information set up by the dissident community, the underground "free" educational system would be far more difficult to operate. In its minimal form, this alternative to the state-controlled curriculum requires little: a teacher and a large private apartment if it is the Hungarian "flying kindergarten" or a speaker or lecturer if it is Belgrade's biweekly "free university." There are special private seminars in Czechoslovakia and an extensive "flying university" in Poland. With underground textbooks and taped lectures, the range of uncensored education is greatly amplified. In addition, there is a symbiotic connection between the subterranean media and the second economy, since the underground media can circulate their products while the second economy is able to add a profitable line of cultural "goods" to its offerings.

Finally, political dissent in a controlled system initiates the gradual reprivatization of social life in a form more responsive to man's needs. Thus, the citizen becomes a kind of social amphibian, able to live in two very different environments. He or she works in the first economy and frequently shops in the second to fill everyday needs the state fails to satisfy. The consumer invariably opts for "b legality," shuttling back and forth between the norms and customs of his or her dual realms. For example, an ordained but unlicensed underground Catholic bishop in Czechoslovakia moonlights by day as a milkman to earn his daily bread.¹⁰ Countless other examples could be cited.

Poland best exemplifies the fully articulated social structure of a developed contra-system. Although Poland has been fertile ground for contra-development since the establishment of the Communist regime, the suppression of Solidarity has greatly strengthened the contra-system. Thousands of activists took Solidarity and its socioeconomic support structures underground. There is the underground Solidarity trade union, political parties of liberal and radical persuasions, and organized farmers' resistance groups. There are single-issue groups like the fledgling peace movement and human rights groups like KOR, the Polish Helsinki Committee, and a recently established national network of committees against violence and for the defense of legality.

Independent cultural activities are coordinated by an unofficial national council, which schedules actors, ar-

tists, and musicians nationwide to perform and exhibit independent of the state. The national council subsidizes the arts, runs cultural competitions, and awards prestigious "Solidarity Cultural Awards." There is also private theater in apartments and churches and private art galleries, which in 1984 held 53 independent exhibitions. Underground popular culture is more decentralized. "New Wave" rock groups hold "garage performances" and bear names reflective of contemporary Poland: "The Fifth Rock Column," "SS-20," "Crisis," "Verdict," and "Shortage." By mid-1984 there were about 70,000 video cassette recorders (VCR's) in Poland and private video clubs specializing in American Westerns, science fiction, and X-rated films have sprung up in the cities.

Poland's extensive independent publishing movement has 10 major publishers, such as NOWA (Independent Publishing Workshop) and CDN (To Be Continued), and 24 smaller houses. By early 1985 these publishers had brought out some 600 titles of fiction, verse, memoirs and the social sciences. The most popular books have print runs of 10,000 to 20,000 copies. Actual underground readership is obtained by multiplying copies in circulation by 10 to factor in the hand-to-hand, informal sharing of uncensored reading materials. Private publishers and other groups also publish journals and newspapers. The underground estimates that at least 2,000 periodicals are published; some have huge circulations while others expire after only a few issues. Independent libraries attached to large industrial enterprises augment the audience for the contra-books and periodicals.

An extensive system of independent education resembles an underground version of Western academe. There is an administrative structure of several committees, stipends for students, research grants for dismissed scientists, textbooks series, materials for the popular self-education circles, and, of course, the famous Society for Academic Courses, better known as the "flying university." Finally, the Church operates "above ground" and has its own enormous sociocultural infrastructure that complements the social structure of Polish societal opposition. At the same time, the many churches provide sanctuary for diverse contra-activities throughout the country.¹¹

OPPOSITION AND THE REGIME

The East European regimes have not remained in passive in the face of opposition. On the contrary through trial and error they have evolved a rather sophis-

(Continued on page 386)

⁹See Teresa Hanicka, "Underground Video Tape Production," *Radio Free Europe Research*, vol. 10, no. 22 (May 31, 1985), pp. 23-24. This is the first part of a three-part series.

¹⁰See Mark Brandenburg, "Under the Ice," *The New Republic* (April 15, 1984), p. 15.

¹¹For information on the contra-system in Poland I have drawn on the post-martial law issues of the periodicals *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin* and *Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports*.

Robert Sharlet, a specialist on East European and Soviet politics, law and political justice, has published four books and many articles. He recently contributed to the *International Journal of the Sociology of Law and Soviet Politics After Brezhnev*, edited by Joseph Noyce (New York: Praeger, 1985). He has twice testified before Congress on dissent and repression in East Europe.

"The dissolution of the Pact at this juncture is inconceivable; it will continue as a useful political framework, though there seems to be little encouragement to improve its performance as a natural alliance. On the contrary, the stringency of Soviet demands and requirements seems to preclude such a development. The recent Pact renewal papers over the cracks."

The Warsaw Pact: From Here to Eternity?

BY JOHN ERICKSON

Director of Defense Studies, University of Edinburgh

OTEMPORA! O MORES! Cicero's well-founded imprecation might find a ready reflection in the present state of affairs in the Warsaw Pact formally the WTO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization—*Organizatsiya Varshavskogo dogovora*) if the rather dispirited and sparsely publicized events surrounding the thirtieth anniversary of the Pact and the circumstances of its renewal for another 20 years are any testimony. Almost simultaneously, at the august level of the senior military command of the Pact, the present commander in chief of the Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, must be reflecting ruefully on the temper of the times. He has reportedly been consigned to head a military academy and has been replaced by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov. This marks an ironic twist to the events of almost a decade ago, when Ogarkov replaced Kulikov at the Soviet General Staff in January, 1977, and Kulikov proceeded forthwith to his post with the Pact. There is more to this, however, than a game of military musical chairs.

Although few observers doubted that the Pact would be renewed, the road toward the requisite summit proved tortuous. The meeting planned for January, 1985, in Sofia did not materialize, no doubt because of the growing physical incapacity of Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko.

A surprising coyness prevailed for several weeks, with humor taking precedence over hard fact. Finally the Pact summit did convene on April 26, 1985, in Warsaw, a meeting of surprising brevity—taking up less than a day—for all the attendance of government, state and party leaders. The murkiness of the East European media's pronouncements (or lack of pronouncements)

was momentarily pierced by East German Chairman Erich Honecker, who intimated to an Italian journalist not only the date of the summit but also its likely outcome: an extension of the Pact for 20 years with an automatic prolongation for an extra 10 years (save for those countries choosing to withdraw one year before the expiration of the prescribed 20-year term).¹

The Protocol of Prolongation (with its 20-year extension, plus the 10-year additive) is identical with Article 11 of the original treaty signed on May 14, 1955.² The only fresh features are the signatures of party leaders of the contracting states, a bow in the direction of the Pact as a "military-political alliance." This immobilism is all the more surprising in that it does not recognize the fact that the Pact has evolved, albeit haltingly, in the direction of a more natural alliance, because of both internal and external pressures—the Romanian obduracy in resisting supranationalism, the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Polish debacle, to mention some of the more prominent difficulties. Flexibility, or at least a sign of flexibility, might have seemed the order of the day, but bilateralism appears to be stalking abroad once more.

The signal that all was not well with the socialist fraternity came in the summer of 1984 with a Soviet blast by Oleg Rakhmanin in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Questions of History of the Communist party of the Soviet Union); Rakhmanin argued against any assertion of "national interests" as opposed to the overriding priorities of "socialist internationalism," a diatribe preceded by Czechoslovak criticism of other Pact nations (presumably East Germany, Hungary and Romania, the latter with its pronounced maverick behavior). In essence, Rakhmanin's article indicated that deviations would not be tolerated, whatever their guise, and that the socialist camp must fend off attempts at "divide and rule," instigated by the Chinese among others.³

The subterranean rumblings continued, not entirely divorced from the forthcoming renewal of the Pact. For all Romania's act as the prima donna, pouting over the terms of renewal, it could not be seriously argued that this issue was or would be the cause of grave disruption; in fact, Romania seems to have fallen meekly into line when all was said and done. What cannot be denied, however, was the force of economic constraints and economic con-

¹See BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts* (WB), *Eastern Europe* (hereafter EE) 7930 (April 20, 1985) for the announcement of the Summit; also EE 7396 (April 27, 1985) on extension of the Warsaw Treaty.

²See *Organizatsiya Varshavskogo dogvora. Dokumenty i materialy, 1955–1980* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980), p. 10, and Robin Alison Armstrong, *The Warsaw Pact* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), Document 1, p. 204.

³For details see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Soviet East European Report*, "Soviet Union Joins Warsaw Pact Debate on National Interests vs. Internationalism," vol. 1, no. 17 (June 1, 1984).

striction embracing East Europe, which—issues of stability apart—gave rise to grumbling about the economic burdens of the military effort, the cost of Pact maneuvers, the implications of the forward deployment of more Soviet missiles, and “burden-sharing” in general. None of this (save for the emplacement of more missiles) is new, a point reinforced by Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Istvan Roska, who did not deny the existence of differences over “the methods of socialist construction,” differences that should be resolved through a recognition of “mutual interests” (an affirmation subliminally cheered in East Germany); still, Roska did not suggest that new ground was being broken.

Few if any hopes could rest on an overt restructuring of the Pact and hence the Soviet Union's relations with its East European allies. To leave the text of the Pact intact (which is what has happened) was the least of all evils; above all, it avoided legally codifying Soviet suzerainty. Yet the text of the Warsaw treaty, promulgated 30 years ago and now extended, no longer corresponds to the political realities of the situation or to the gradual evolution which the Pact itself has undergone, beginning with actions taken by Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev after 1956 and continued by President Leonid Brezhnev in 1969, investing the non-Soviet Pact members with greater representation and a slightly more pervasive voice.⁴

To see the Pact as merely an instrument of Soviet “internal” policing of the East European client states is nevertheless a misleading oversimplification. True, policing is an important component of the Soviet operation of the Pact, but that same Pact affords obvious value as a mechanism to coordinate key foreign policy initiatives and strategies, whether they touch directly on military problems or extend further afield. The collective imprimatur of the Pact does carry weight and is preferable to a jumble of separate pronouncements, which might disclose in their wake a variety of differences. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact campaign for a European conference on security was ample evidence of the utility of this “collec-

tive” pressure and “collective” presence, though the outcome was other than its progenitors perhaps imagine—complicating rather than simplifying security problems.

Reverting to form, a long-established form in speeches at the renewal meeting, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (and Polish General Wojciech Jaruzelski) called for the “simultaneous dissolution” of both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); but nothing of political or military substance resides in these ritualistic phrases. On the contrary, if Gorbachev is to be believed, NATO's nuclear and conventional rearmament effort will require further enhancement of the Warsaw Pact.

What is meant by “further enhancement?” This seems to be the very opposite of dissolution, but it will be enacted against a deteriorating economic situation. During the renewal proceedings, no one, not even Gorbachev himself, talked about the economic burdens implicit in present and planned Warsaw Pact military programs. The surprise package may well be unveiled at the projected meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Sofia in the autumn of 1985, although military and operational necessities may not wait upon that gathering.

There is a paradox here. Nothing appears to have changed, judging by the texts of the renewal agreement, but changes, considerable changes, appear to be in the offing. A hint of things to come has been supplied by Army General A. I. Gribkov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces and first deputy commander in chief, writing in both Soviet and East European journals. Predictably, General Gribkov emphasizes the need for increased “combat readiness,” a theme constantly reiterated by Soviet sources, with the further organization of joint exercises, joint training (including exchanges within the Pact's several military educational centers) and, more pertinently, the coordination of military doctrine among the staffs of the several national armies.⁵ Coordination is the most pointed requirement, for this means moving the national armies' ground, air and naval elements with their command under the *direct* subordination of the Pact a move that will probably first affect air defense units.

Coming from the chief of staff of the Pact Joint Forces Gribkov's statements have more than symbolic significance, for the staff is the main seat of authority; it works with East European officers ranked as deputy chiefs furnishing the “working organ” of both the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council.⁶ As a coordinating agency, the staff pushes through an extensive program of exchanges and consultations, activities that necessarily intrude into the key sections of the several East European Defense Ministries.⁷

Military doctrine and military-technical development also form part of this structure of agencies and organs providing a mechanism to supervise cooperation among the political organs in the national armies. Nor has Gribkov neglected to mention the training of cadres, which

⁴For background see Remington, op. cit.; Andrzej Korbon-ski, “The Warsaw Pact After Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or Empty Shell?” in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes and Military Means* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1982), pp. 3–25.

⁵General A. J. Gribkov, “30 let na strazhe mira i sotsializma,” *Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal* (Moscow), no. 5 (1985), pp. 82–91; also *Tribuna* (Prague), no. 17 (April 24, 1985).

⁶For an excellent summary see Christopher D. Jones, “The USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and NATO,” in FOA Symposium, *Unity and Conflict in the Warsaw Pact* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defense Research Institute, November, 1982), pp. 108–121. On structures see also Lieutenant Colonel Adam Marcinkowski (Polish Army), “Uktad Warszawski 1955–1985,” *Wiedza Obronna* (Warsaw), Rok XIII, 2(132), pp. 7–14.

⁷See under “Chronik,” “Militärpolitische und militärische Ereignisse aus der Geschichte des Warschauer Vertrages” in *Militär-geschichte* (East Germany) (Teil 7: May 5, 1980–December 28, 1984), no. 3. (1985), pp. 247–256.

involves military-educational exchanges between the East European states and the Soviet Union. A hand-picked elite of East European officers with the rank of colonel and higher enter the Soviet General Staff Academy for a two-year course, while the Frunze Academy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy also accept East European officers.⁸

Although statements like those by General Gribkov might appear bland, even opaque, they do give some insight into the inner logic and the military-political imperatives of the Pact. The formal emphasis is on coalition warfare; yet the very existence of permanent Soviet dominance in actual command positions and the incursions made into the national command of national military establishments—by earmarking specific formations for particular operations and by using the military-educational system to furnish a Soviet-trained elite—diminish a member's ability to conduct actual war operations. On the other hand, both the control of military doctrine and the supervision exercised by the several political administrations are designed to prevent East European "reliance on one's own forces." This principle spreads into joint exercises, which effectively scramble the East European military omelette, and the military-technical component that further curtails indigenous defense efforts.

In this context, it is impossible to disagree with Christopher D. Jones's comment that the Pact is a military alliance of Soviet and East European political elites "directed against their common East European opponents" and at NATO states capable of supporting anti-Soviet forces in East Europe.⁹ The military reality of the situation was perhaps best illustrated by the major Soviet exercises at the end of June and the beginning of July, 1984, when Soviet forces alone, moving all the way down

the command and operational ladder from the General Staff to regiment and battalion, exercised under severe constraints of time and space. For all practical purposes, the Pact members were ignored, evidently taking no part in this exercise in the coordination of Soviet theater forces.¹⁰

Pact affairs, however, may be set for a sea change, if General Gribkov's observations are relevant and are augmented by the implications of Marshal Ogarkov's putative appointment as Pact commander in chief. General Gribkov's shopping list is the harbinger of further and future Soviet demands on its East European allies. The imperatives of modernization in the non-Soviet military establishments and Marshal Ogarkov's projections of the role of high technology in both weapons and battle management may produce fresh tensions, if not actual crisis.¹¹

PACT MODERNIZATION

Without making this a catalog of hardware, it is relevant to point to the requirements of modernization in East European military establishments and the relationship between modernization and militarization. Indeed, Czechoslovak sources have suggested that militarization is inescapable, reaching into all aspects of the economy in the name of defense of the homeland and embracing the public, which must learn to undergo "all kinds of hardship and suffering . . ." This military-economic design emphasizes an augmented military potential, the adjustment of the economy to meet military requirements, restructuring in command organization, intensifying civil defense and public instructional programs in pre- and para-military training. One feature, the rapid turnover of the state apparatus to a war footing, is certainly a reflection of the points made with a certain urgency by Marshal Ogarkov in the Soviet context: a "command in being" is presumably ensured by the existence of the Czechoslovak State Defense Council (set up in 1969), not unlike the Soviet Defense Council.

Not that the Czechoslovak initiative has met with unqualified approval. For example, the Hungarians recently took a rather jaundiced view of modernization as a process that piles weapons on weapons (and more Soviet-produced weapons). Rather, a more rational way of approaching modernization would be to make better use of what is available, by improving troop training and intensifying military-scientific and military-technological cooperation, although the question to be resolved—as much in NATO as in the Warsaw Pact—is the "proportionate distribution of burdens," a problem compounded by the cost and complexity of advanced conventional weapons systems. To an old, long-running list of grievances, expertly illuminated by Michael Checinski,¹² must be added the strains imposed by the impact of advancing technology.

Even without "hi-tech" there is a case for extensive modernization within the Pact. The very substantial Polish drive for modernization in the 1960's (which brought

⁸See Jones, op. cit. Also see V.G. Kulikov, ed., *Akademiya General'nogo shtaba* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), *Voennaya Akademiya imeni M. V. Frunze* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), and *Akademiya imeni V.I. Lenina* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), on Soviet and East European officer education.

⁹Quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 121.

¹⁰The exercises lasted from June 28 to July 5, 1984. The 11 Guards Army, 28th Army (Belorussia), 38th Army (Carpathian MD), and Soviet forces in Germany took part in the exercises, which included airborne drop and "combined arms" (land, sea, air force) assault landings in the eastern Baltic. This pattern confirms the prediction by A. Ross Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, July, 1981), p. 46—there is less rather than more Soviet reliance on East European military forces.

¹¹See the interview with Marshal Ogarkov in "Zashchita otssializma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 9, 1984, pp. 2–3.

¹²Michael Checinski, "The Military-Industrial Complex: Planned and Non-Planned Consequences of CMEA Defense Spending," in *The CMEA Five-Year Plans (1981–1985) in a New Perspective: Planned and Non-Planned Economics* (NATO: Economics and Information Directorates, 1982), pp. 237–255. See also Stephen Larrabee, *The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary, East Germany*, R-3190-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, December, 1984).

it into the front rank of non-Soviet forces) has fallen away, leaving the Polish army woefully short of modern battle tanks (only 50 T-72 modern tanks) and short of modern infantry combat vehicles. Obsolescence is rapidly overtaking artillery holdings, and there is a pronounced weakness in divisional air defense assets.

Comparisons must be made not only in the context of the norms and performance of Soviet combined arms operations but also in the context of any opposition mounted by German, Dutch and Danish units in a thrust aimed along the Baltic coast.

Although somewhat recovered from the trauma of 1968, the Czechoslovak army exhibits weaknesses not dissimilar to those in the Polish army—a shortage of modern main battle tanks, a lack of adequate artillery holdings, weaknesses in battlefield air defense against a high air threat. My own view is that Czechoslovak forces would be used not as a component of the first echelon but simply as cannon fodder in tackling American and West German formations.

In the front rank of non-Soviet armies are the divisions of East Germany's NVA (*National Volksarmee*), with two tank divisions and four motor-rifle divisions, a compact force that lends itself to selective modernization. However, the pace of modernization in the NVA still does not correspond to the rate achieved in Soviet armies stationed in East Germany, the Group of Soviet Forces/Germany (GSFG).¹³

The Soviet exercises of June and July, 1984, were perhaps a portent that the utility of the non-Soviet armies had been strenuously reviewed, that the operational thinking of the 1960's had been revised and that East European military units had been removed from a first echelon role. And as a further brake on modernization within the Pact there is the pattern of bloc arms exports, with the modernization of Arab armies providing much needed hard currency through military deals.

There remains, as ever, the case of Romania. Although it is possible at times to overdramatize its flagrancy, the Romanian deviation has not lost its significance, not in Romania's firm adherence to the view that the Pact is a military alliance in the accepted sense rather than a military fraternity of like-minded socialist states. Moves toward integration and suggestions of supranationalism have been regarded as anathema by the Romanians; hence their carefully constructed barriers against both, whether the special Defense Law that places Romanian forces inalienably under national command or the doc-

trinal view that emphasizes popular defense, not unlike the Yugoslav model.¹⁴ The Romanians also understand the implications of joint exercises that cut into national command cohesion. Not even a form of infiltration is permitted; during the Pact exercises in 1982 involving East German, Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet units, the Romanians abruptly turned down requests for the air transportation of troops for Bulgaria, forcing all forces to rely on rail transport to Odessa and a ferry to Varna. Romanian representation at the exercises was limited to staff officers.

In addition to calculated indiscretions, the Romanians have vigorously pursued contacts with the Chinese, the Yugoslavs and the "capitalist West," partly in an effort to develop an indigenous arms industry (alone among the East European states Romania has developed a substantial aircraft industry). British and German civilian aircraft are produced under license, as are Chinese torpedo boats. Romanian obduracy has both military and political consequences (although the Romanians have not withdrawn from Warsaw Pact deliberations); the Romanians insist on the relevance of the dissolution of the military blocs and challenge the Soviet position on the further and forward deployment of theater missiles. For all practical purposes, Romania has opted out of the Warsaw Pact military coalition system and intends to remain outside.

The Pact has failed to provide the kind of integration that its military arrangement and organization might have promised, and from a military-diplomatic point of view the record is equally unimpressive. Certainly the very existence of the Pact eliminated the prospect that the Soviet Union would have to face NATO alone and unaided and allowed it to mount a bloc voice with respect to questions of European security, arms control and disarmament. Once the euphoria over the early dissolution of the blocs dissipated, the Warsaw Pact got down to the serious business of working out arrangements for continental security. Soviet objectives, shared in varying degrees by East European states, centered on legitimizing the territorial status quo in East Europe, urging acceptance of the norms of peaceful coexistence, encouraging technological cooperation between East and West, discouraging moves toward greater integration in NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), working for the eventual transformation of Western pluralist systems from within and, more recently, complicating Western modes of "flexible response."

The campaign has been marked by a reluctance to discuss the military aspects of European security and reservations about the mutuality of commitments with

(Continued on page 387)

¹³See P. A. Zhilin, ed., *Stroitel'stvo armii evropeiskikh stran sotsialisticheskogo soдруzhestva 1949–1980* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984); Colonel Richard C. Martin, "Warsaw Pact Force Modernization: A Closer Look," *Parameters*, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 3–11.

¹⁴For the most recent exposition see Admiral Branko Mamula, *Savremeni svijet i nasa odbraba* (Beograd, 1985). See also Alex Alexiev, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1 (March, 1981), pp. 5–18.

John Erickson is the author of numerous books and articles on Soviet and East European military history and military affairs. His latest book is *The Road to Berlin* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

"Judging from what little information there is on its make-up after Hoxha, Albania's new leadership is off to a sure start, a new beginning."

Albania's New Beginning

BY JOHN KOLSTI

Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature, University of Texas

ON April 11, 1985, Enver Hoxha, the last surviving member of Albania's first Communist government, died of heart failure at the age of 76. He had served as the First Secretary of the Albanian Communist party (the Albanian Party of Labor, APL) since he set up the new government in Berat, in Central Albania, in October, 1944. His 41 years in power mark the longest period of rule of any Communist leader; they also span the longest period of independence for the Albanians. No other Albanian has had such an enormous impact on the lives of a people divided for centuries by religious rivalries superimposed on them by Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman conquerors. No Albanians have witnessed more fundamental political, economic, social and cultural changes, changes that have all but buried the last vestiges of five centuries of Turkish rule.

The transformation of Albanian society over the past four decades has been realized in part because of Enver Hoxha's restraint in dealing with his non-Muslim Slav and Greek neighbors, particularly his dealings with Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito, who had inherited the problem of integrating Albanian Muslims into the political as well as the economic life of the Yugoslav federation after World War II. His cautious policies probably have had a stabilizing effect on a corner of southeast Europe no less a "cat's cradle of local enmities" in 1985 than it was in 1914 or in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which saw the emergence of nation states in European Turkey.¹ Partly because of the area's postwar stability, Enver Hoxha's death received little notice outside the Balkans.

Enver Hoxha had evidently picked his successor before 1982, when Ramiz Alia, the party's leading ideologist, publicly assumed the day-to-day running of the country. Hoxha had seen to it that his choice, unlike Tito's, would not be blocked by dissident voices in the APL or by regional loyalties in the country's administrative districts. There would be no political vacuum at the center, no "rotating presidency" as there is in post-Tito Yugoslavia. The "steel-like unity" between the party and the people and the party's monopoly of power would remain un-

broken; the principles of "democratic centralism" and the "right of revocation" would operate to assure Hoxha's successor the loyalty of those appointed to top party and government posts.

The orderly transfer of power from Hoxha to Alia surprised no one inside or outside the country. Shock waves from the events of April 11-13 may have reached Belgrade, but they were probably not felt any farther from Tirana. Albania after Hoxha, after all, would for the foreseeable future remain basically unchanged, charged as the regime was by his widow, Nexhmije Hoxha, to protect her husband's "sacred trust."² However Enver Hoxha may be remembered outside Albania, this "unrepentent Stalinist to the end" should also be credited with leaving behind a new nation state confident enough to rediscover its European roots and even its American shoots (not the least of which is the Albanian Orthodox Church), while at the same time cultivating its centuries of contact with the Muslim world in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

HOXHA'S LEGACY

In the spring of 1985 Hoxha could look back over four decades and feel he had little to repent. The suicide of his long-time number two man, Mehmet Shehu, in 1981, and the subsequent purge of his relatives and supporters, only cleared the way for Hoxha's 59-year-old successor. Continuing unrest in Albanian districts in Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia, following the violent student demonstration in 1981 that left some Albanian "irredentists" dead in the streets, had begun to turn against Belgrade the joke that it was better to be an Albanian in Yugoslavia than in Albania itself. When young Albanians in Yugoslavia began to see themselves as "specific targets for political persecution and prosecution, economic neglect, and educational and social discrimination," they could more easily accept the fact that Hoxha's fortress on the Adriatic had undergone a far-reaching social as well as political and economic transformation.

Albania's rigidly centralized political and economic structure had succeeded after the war where Yugoslavia's worker-management system, as unemployed Albanians in Kosovo understood it, had failed. Albania's economic revival after 1945, Ramiz Alia reminds his audiences, is only one benefit derived from the fact that Albania emerged from centuries of national humiliation and the ruins of the war as an independent country with the

¹There are two excellent articles on Albania in *The Economist*, April 20, 1985, pp. 15-16.

²The phrase *amanete te shenjta* appears in Nexhmije Hoxha's remarks directed at her late husband's "extended family," over which he had ruled as *kapedan* (chieftain) as much as First Secretary. *Shqipëria e Re*, May, 1985, p. 2.

proven capacity not only to survive but also to plan its economic strategy "relying on its own resources," regardless of the personal sacrifices Hoxha's policies demanded.

Hoxha's ultimate goals, the physical survival of Albania as a state and the Albanians as a nation, were worth the risks the APL had taken. The risks were almost continuous: Albania survived Hoxha's break with Tito in 1947–1948, with Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev in 1960–1961 and with Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong's successors in the mid-1970's, when absolute self-reliance became a reality, not merely a slogan. Five-year economic goals could no longer depend on foreign loans or credits.

Hoxha could, with some justification, equate his commitment to the building of an independent, socialist state based on Marxist–Leninist principles with the still unrealized visions of an ethnic Albania that had motivated Albanian revolutionaries in the second half of the nineteenth century: that is, a nation united by a common language, no longer divided by its two Muslim and two Christian communities. Hoxha had little reason to regret the disappearance from the Albanian landscape of the pastoral and bucolic scenes permeating the poetry of the country's cultural and political "Awakeners." Gone also were the swamps that in 1938 spread malaria to nearly 60 percent of the country's schoolchildren, what few of them there were. In the 1980's, Hoxha could boast, Albania's schoolchildren were the products of a cost-free health service; their cost-free education was a guarantee of full employment after graduation from compulsory eight-year schools, vocational training programs, or the university.

Over 46 percent of the labor force were women, some having risen to ministerial rank in sectors they all but dominated (e.g., education, agriculture).³ That their grandmothers or mothers had little or no chance for schooling or work outside the home before 1945 was a fact not lost on the first generation of Albanian women who had been spared the worst abuses of a patriarchal, predominantly Muslim society. The impressive achievements of Albania's youth organizations and Soviet-model schools between 1945 and 1965 gave Hoxha nothing to apologize for.

The government's drive to transform Albania's countryside had made the "poorest country in Europe" self-sufficient in energy and food. Annual statistics and economic growth charts evoked new images of an Albania in

the mid-1980's far removed from the mid-1930's. Regardless of how they are presented or interpreted, the statistics nevertheless attest to real changes. Albania's economy is dynamic enough to meet the needs of its population which, by 1980, was more than double the population of 1950.⁴ Families with two or three children remain the norm. Thirty percent of the country's inhabitants are less than 15 years old. (However, these statistics do not tell the entire story: the World Bank estimates the 1981 Albanian GNP [gross national product] per capita at US\$820—the lowest in Europe.)

In Tirana, the prospect of a population of over four million by the year 2000 (up from 2.6 million in 1979) was welcomed, not dreaded, by Hoxha. The continuing capacity of the country to cope with its high birthrate has created a society whose social, if not economic, development may be measured as much across borders as across time. More important to Hoxha's successor than the fact that new hydroelectric stations enable the country to generate 427 times the electrical energy it did in 1938 is the reality that life in New Kukës,⁵ situated on the shore of a power lake created by the Fierza dam in the North Albanian Alps, is as far removed from the oriental marketplace of the old village now under water as it is from towns to the east in the Dukagjini Plain (Kosovo, or Old Serbia), whose bazaars are still overshadowed by the minarets that surround them.⁶

The minarets, like the malarial swamps, are missing today from the Albanian landscape. In the 1960's, Albanian schoolgirls who volunteered for agit-prop teams had little difficulty in convincing their sisters in the more backward regions of the country that the creation of the world's first atheist state, given the harsh realities of the life they all knew all too well, was nothing less than what Nexhmije Hoxha said it was, namely, a moral act. Twenty years of indoctrination in the youth organizations and in the schools greatly minimized the risks taken by the leadership of the APL when it eliminated the clergy Muslim and Christian, from the mainstream of Albanian life. The women who supported the APL in the 1960's and who began in the 1970's to move into high-level party and government posts, owe no small part of their "great leap forward" to Ramiz Alia, who headed Albanian youth organizations for 10 years after the war. Hoxha left his successor a ruling party in which one member in three is a woman, a ratio, high as it is, that still lags behind the general acceptance of women in the work place. But the ratio will no doubt continue to climb as long as the APL equates the emancipation of Albanian women with the success of the social revolution orchestrated "from above" in the 1960's.

As traditional religious barriers in the country began to disappear, so did regional and cultural differences, particularly in the country's expanding educational, agricultural and industrial centers. The drive toward modernization has not been felt more than in Central Albania where rail links between Tirana and Durrës, the country's

³For an extensive study on the status of women in Eastern Europe, with a chapter on Albania, see Alfred Meyer and Sharon Wolchik, editors, *Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985).

⁴*Radio Free Liberty Research*, Background Report 216 (November 30, 1984), p.3.

⁵*New Albania*, no. 5 (1984), pp. 10–11.

⁶See Hartmut Albert's article, "Kosova 1979, Albania 1980: Observations, Experiences, Conversations," in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds., *Studies on Kosovo* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1984), pp. 103ff.

try's major port, have been joined by tracks reaching north and south into new grain-growing and oil-refining districts. In the new settlements the distance separating the son of a Muslim shepherd in the North Albanian Alps from the daughter of a Christian schoolteacher in South Albania has been reduced to an aisle in the classroom or a hall in an office building.

Dialectical differences between North Albanians (Gegs) and South Albanians (Tosks) have been reduced, because of the mobility of the labor force and the adoption of a standard literary language. In rural areas, to be sure, old antagonisms may linger. But even there a leveling of wages and benefits, to say nothing of the generating of electricity, has reduced the social as well as the economic disparity that once separated the country's urban and rural population. Hoxha left behind no regional elite, no "new class," no Old Guard at the top of the party; the Central Committee is no longer dominated by foreign-educated Tosks.

RAMIZ ALIA: ALBANIA'S NEW KAPEDAN

On April 13, 1985, the APL Central Committee elected Ramiz Alia its second leader. His nomination by the Politburo was not unexpected. For several years before his death Hoxha had left much of the speechmaking to his "relatively younger alter ego," who had emerged as the party's leading ideologist.⁷ Alia was frequently accompanied by Nexhmije Hoxha (who had probably played a role in the selection of her husband's successor) and by some members of the government who had been removed from their posts after Shehu's suicide. His audiences included former political detainees who had benefited from the general amnesty declared by Hoxha in 1982, when the country celebrated 70 years of independence.⁸ In the same year Hoxha and Alia further enhanced their public images by creating an investigator's office under the direct control of the People's Assembly, headed at the time by Alia, to end the abuses of the country's internal security forces.⁹ As a result of actions taken in 1982, Alia's reputation sharply contrasted with that of his most dangerous rival, Mehmet Shehu, who had been both respected and feared by anyone opposing him.

If some choose to regard Hoxha as "brutal and paranoid and, in a crazed way, a brilliant survivor,"¹⁰ what kind of assessment might these sources make of his successor? Ramiz Alia was born in North Albania, some suggest Kosovo, in 1925. His family was Muslim. It is significant that the new First Secretary of the APL is a Geg, as are approximately two-thirds of the Albanians living in the Balkans, half of them in Macedonia, Serbia

(Kosovo) and Montenegro. In the more tradition-bound Albanian districts in Yugoslavia, the rise of a North Albanian to power in Tirana can hardly go unnoticed.

In 1948, when the first serious internal threat to Hoxha and Shehu was crushed, Alia, a World War II medal winner, was elevated to the party's Central Committee. Alia's loyalty to Hoxha was rewarded a second time in 1960–1961, when pro-Soviet factions were purged from the APL after Hoxha's confrontation with Khurshchev. In 1960, Alia replaced Liri Belishova, a woman, in the Secretariat of the party, and one year later he was appointed a full member of the Politburo, in which he had served as a candidate member since 1956. Although the party's drive to industrialize the country in the 1960's was slowed by the loss of Soviet aid, the country's economy did not collapse. Hoxha's Albania survived its second major crises in part because of help from Beijing. That it had sufficient and significant resources of its own, human as well as material, cannot be overlooked.

The human factor, much of which was a product of Albania's youth organizations and schools—Alia had been named minister of education in 1955 at the age of 30—was appreciated by the party's top leadership in the late 1960's when support "from below" made possible the social and cultural revolution. Alia had helped reduce the risks the APL took in the 1960's; at the same time he helped the population to prepare for the eventuality that (should the party's hardline economic policies remain unchanged) Albania would have to survive alone, eschewing all foreign loans or credits. That eventuality became law on December 28, 1976, when the country's new constitution was approved by the People's Assembly.

The purges that immediately preceded the Assembly's unanimous acceptance of Hoxha's "sacred trust" affected nearly every ministry in the government. Alia emerged once again as a "winner," and no doubt he played an active role in the removal of a third wave of "traitor groups" that challenged Hoxha. This time, however, the foreign-trained Cabinet ministers were replaced by men and women who had received their ideological as well as technical or professional training in Albania itself.

Although the purges of the mid-1970's were extensive, they evidently did not eliminate all dissident voices inside the party. Alia still echoes his mentor's attacks against the "number one fire-extinguishers of the revolution," pointing his finger at Polish and Yugoslav revisionists who have brought two Communist states to the brink of political chaos and economic bankruptcy; and he reminds his listeners that opportunists in the APL will not be allowed to jeopardize the country's political independence or its debt-free economy.

Alia's wife, Semiramis Xhuvani, who is dean of the college of natural sciences at the University of Tirana, comes from a Greek Orthodox family. Her name links Alia to earlier periods of the Albanian revolutionary movement. Her father, Aleksandër Xhuvani, was a lead-

⁷Louis Zanga's background reports for *Radio Free Liberty Research* provide what little information there is on Ramiz Alia and other top party leaders in Tirana (and Kosovo).

⁸*Radio Free Liberty Research*, Background Report 93 (April 29, 1983), p. 2.

⁹*Radio Free Liberty Research*, Background Report 166 (July 13, 1983), pp. 6–7.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

ing educator before 1912, and after the war supported the establishment of the Albanian Orthodox Church in the country. Thus, through his wife's family, Alia is connected with Albania's cultural and political awakening at the end of the nineteenth century. Belgrade has perhaps less reason to be concerned about Alia's ideological ties than about his "spiritual" links with Albania's first revolutionaries.

A Serbian scholar at Belgrade University warns that Albanian nationalism, no less "romantic" today than it was a century ago, has moved into its "aggressive and explosive phase."¹¹ Perhaps it would be more reasonable to suggest that Albanian nationalism (with a North Albanian whose family roots reach into Kosovo as a leader) could, if necessary, be fully exploited to destabilize the already tense situation in Yugoslavia's Albanian and Muslim districts.

ALBANIA AND KOSOVO

Unlike Albania's newly laid railroad tracks that reach only as far as its borders, Alia's influence extends well into Yugoslavia. Albanians living in Yugoslavia's Kosovo (and in Montenegro and Macedonia, where they are in fact a "national minority") need no daily reminding from Tirana that they do not control their own future.¹² Not that it is any great consolation to them that Enver Hoxha would certainly have lost any "kitchen debate" with Fadil Hoxha¹³ in Prishtina. Tirana lacked private automobiles, not political sovereignty. Nor do Albanians need to be reminded that in gaining the status of an "autonomous province" in the Serbian republic they have in all probability lost any chance of becoming the Yugoslav federation's seventh republic (a right, evidently, reserved only for South Slavs).

Alia shows little hesitation in pressing the question of human rights for ethnic minorities in the Balkans. As he points out, one does not have to look too hard or to wait too long to run across attacks aimed at the Kosovars. A random glance at a recent newspaper, for example, catches the heading, "People are returning to Kosovo."¹⁴ The article celebrates the return of Slavs, not Albanians, to the country's most economically depressed and racially tense regions. It implies that the danger of losing Serbia's medieval heartland to non-Slav nonentities has been averted: no more political concessions will be made to

¹¹*The New York Times*, November 11, 1984, as reported from Belgrade, that "center of Albanian misinformation" routinely ridiculed by Tirana.

¹²See an excellent study by Adi Schnytzer, "The Economic Situation in Kosovo: Notes on a Comparison with Albania's Economy," in Pipa and Repishti, op. cit., pp. 167-184.

¹³No relation. The name, from *hoca* (priest) in Turkish is fairly common among the Albanians, Europe's only predominantly Muslim nation.

¹⁴"Ljudi se vraćaju," in *Sedam Dana-Vjesnik*, 15 Ožujka (March) 1985, p. 4.

¹⁵Albert, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁶*Radio Free Liberty Research*, Background Report 19 (March 13, 1985), p. 2.

meet the "unreasonable demands" of the country's most backward and abrasive Muslim minority.

Alia warns that the Yugoslav federation's strategy for the area is an extension of Slav racial prejudice and Serbia's centuries-long policy of "cultural genocide" aimed at the Albanians. His warnings will no doubt be taken more seriously by the Kosovars if anti-Albanian feelings get out of hand in Yugoslavia, or if Belgrade fails to address the economic and social problems that persist in its poorest regions, whose Albanian inhabitants have the highest birthrate in Europe. Alia's moves toward blunting Prishtina's criticisms of Tirana's failure to respect the human rights of its own citizens can only make Albania more attractive to Albanians living under martial law in Yugoslavia, hoxhas or no hoxhas.

Kosovo today, one recent visitor has remarked, is Albania "thirty years ago," insofar as its social and cultural development is concerned; that is, it is an area in which the influence of the hoxhas and priests is still felt.¹ Folk customs and rituals preserve a traditional way of life and a language that reminds them of their roots but offers little hope for the future. (In Albania itself, the same rituals have been declared crimes against the state, their public condemnation serving the same function as the publishing of "dreary" statistics.) Tirana has nothing to lose in its cautious defense of Yugoslavia's Albanians who, by the year 2000, will number over two million.

The more Serbia's autonomous province lags behind the rest of the country in economic development, the more Albanian it becomes, although Albanians as well as Serbs leave to seek a better life elsewhere. If Albania under Alia can attract unemployed Kosovars, and if the religion of the region's moderates as well as "irridentists" becomes Albania, an unavoidable political crisis will occur in the Yugoslav federation, and the attention of Europe will once again focus on the Balkan peninsula and on its poorest, perhaps most ignored, inhabitants.

ALIA'S FORTRESS

As the political authority of Kosovar leaders declines, Alia's authority increases. There is no doubt that the First Secretary of the APL intends to be the spokesman for Albanians in the Balkans. His message is clear. First, the state, in which there is "one ideology and one policy, one way of thinking and one social consensus," will survive. There is no leadership crisis in the APL, no "political vacuum" in Tirana. Proof of this lies in the purges that have safeguarded the "steel-like" bonds between the party and the people. Second, the nation, soon to number

(Continued on page 386)

John Kolsti has contributed to several studies on the folklore and politics of East Europe, most recently "From Courtyard to Cabinet: The Political Emergence of Albanian Women," in Alfred Meyer and Sharon Wolch eds., *Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985).

"Outwardly, all is well in Hungary. There is a functioning economy, food in the stores and goods on the shelves; and the second economy has been fully institutionalized. There is a relatively liberal, politically stable social system. And yet there are signs of deep and serious problems."

Hungary: A Malaise Thinly Disguised

BY IVAN VOLGYES

Visiting Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, Camden

THERE is a popular riddle making its way in Hungary. Question: "Why was Janos Kadar reelected head of the Hungarian Communist party one more time in 1985?" Answer: "So he could hand the state back to the people in exactly the same shape he inherited it after the revolution of 1956." It is a brutal joke, if indeed one can consider it anything but black humor born out of frustration and worry, but it reflects accurately the feeling of the body politic in Hungary today.

To the tourist and to most Western journalists only superficially familiar with the country, the signs of prosperity are still there. The shops are full of every conceivable consumer goods: French perfume and cognac, American jeans, Czech crystal. The markets are loaded with fruits and vegetables, meat of every variety including calf's liver and veal, plump geese and freshly slaughtered quail. Newspaper advertisements show dizzying heights of consumer availability: a 1983 Mercedes for sale for a mere half a million forints; a villa overlooking the city for F12 million; or a private café in the booming tourist town of Szentendre for F23 million.

Outwardly, there is political stability as well. The recent parliamentary elections allowed some choice among candidates and, yes, some of the official candidates were defeated. The bases of the political compromise between the people and the party still hold: there are no open demonstrations against the party, but the party does not place Moscow-type political demands on the citizenry. Kadar is still a relatively popular father figure and people believe him when he says he is trying to get the best possible deal he can within the confines of the Warsaw Pact alliance system to which Hungary remains firmly tied.

Thus 40 years after the end of World War II and nearly 30 years after the trauma of Hungary's national revolution of 1956, all seems well in Hungary. Yet there are problems ahead. Indeed, for the first time in decades the economic, social and political life of the country is very close to a major crisis.

An analysis of Hungary's problems begins with the economic sector, because the legitimacy of the regime—such as it is—rests on the economy, e.g., as long as the regime continues to deliver economic progress and visible prosperity, the people tend to concede that the party has a

legitimate right to lead the nation. Hungary's economic system is unique among the East European states; it is "market socialism" that is characterized by a minimal amount of central planning; a flexible price structure that reflects some elements of the interplay between supply and demand; a role for a consumer market and a somewhat lesser role for the nationally owned large firms; relative freedom of economic enterprise for private individuals; and a blossoming and booming second economy.

The system is known officially as the New Economic Mechanism. Begun as a series of liberalizing reforms in 1968, it moved ahead deliberately during 1968 and 1972, was considerably slowed down between 1972 and 1979 and has taken off once again with fits and starts since 1980. The shape of the present system was not predetermined and has never had a controlling blueprint; rather the system emerged as a result of slow, incremental steps. It is permeated by "privatization"—a mixing of the state-ownership system that is characteristic of a socialist system with major incentives given to people to enrich their own economic existence privately and directly and to enrich the state, at least indirectly.

Consequently, in the largely collectivized or state-owned agricultural units (cooperative or state farms), along with Western styles of crop management or animal husbandry systems, there is plenty of room for individual enrichment. The large farms have integrated the "loose" labor available in the agricultural sphere that accounts for less than seven percent of the nation's full-time labor force. Because it allowed everyone to engage in small-scale household-plot or auxiliary agricultural production, Hungary has improved its food-productive capacity enormously; the stores are full of food products and agricultural exports remain Hungary's major foreign trade commodity. Wherever one travels there are small plots of land cultivated from dawn to dusk to produce peppers and fruits, and to raise livestock; "foil-tents" and private fruit stands dot the roads.

And even if the factories are owned by the state, they have slowly felt the impact of privatization. Many managers of the socialist sector are elected by factory councils rather than appointed by the party's cadre division; they are chosen on the basis of suitability and not on grounds of political reliability. Thus a new life has been breathed

into the state-owned systems. Enterprising managers, like the director of the Skala Supermarket Firms, have branched out and incorporated a Harvard Business School mentality if not yet its operational principles.

By allowing workers to hire out their labor after hours to the factory where they work during regular work hours in Economic Work Associations (*gazdasagi munkakozosseg*), the factories more than fulfill the targets of production—and enrich the workers, whom they pay two to three times the officially allowed wage. “Nonprofitable” firms face the threat of unemployment through the dismantling of a bankrupt unit; in this way a “stick” is used to increase profitability. And even if to date only about 40 such firms have actually been closed, at least the threat of unemployment exists.

Privatization has been most noticeable in the housing and service industries. Uncharacteristically for a “socialist” state, in Hungary more than 85 percent of the housing units today are built privately; the state has effectively withdrawn from the housing market. Where possible even the state-owned apartment houses are sold as condominiums (*oroklakas*) to their occupants in the hope that the state will not have to spend more than the bare minimum on repair and maintenance. Most repairs or maintenance activities are undertaken privately anyway, by small electrical, plumbing, or other repair services outside the state sector.

Consumer shops and service firms are a major part of the Hungarian economic landscape. Every small shop is occupied; new *butiks* spring up in every free storefront. Selling T-shirts and junk, folk art and cigarettes, toys and flower vases, the enterprising shopkeeper tries to strike it rich as quickly as possible. Some are bound to fail, but many succeed in Hungary’s own *Wirtschaftswunder*. And the successful come in all sizes and varieties: restaurant owners and hot-dog entrepreneurs, bakers and pastry chefs, fruit and vegetable retailers and art gallery owners vie for the loose money and the demands of the consumers.

But there are serious problems in Hungary’s economy, and they are not easily cured. Hungary’s industries have not (and often could not) have followed agriculture’s path to modernization. Most industries remain cumbersome. While the state has indeed eliminated price supports from most consumer goods privately produced and sold on the open market, industrial products are still price-supported both at home and abroad; otherwise they would not be even minimally competitive.

Moreover, in a socialist state the threat of unemployment and bankrupt factories remains only an idle threat. For obvious ideological reasons, a socialist regime cannot lay off thousands and thousands of workers even if they work in unprofitable firms. But for practical reasons also the state is forced to maintain the white elephants of industry; without housing where employment demands are higher, it cannot uproot people to force them out of a precarious existence for the sake of “greater profitability.”

Hungary’s industrial modernization also appears to be halted in midstream. Lacking energy and raw materials, the state is forced to rely on the Soviet Union for imports of these commodities. During the winter of 1984 Hungary’s energy needs were barely met; this often caused tremendous hardship and forced the state to cut back on daily television broadcasting hours because of energy deficiency. In order to pay for energy and raw resource imports, Hungary has been forced to ship even larger amounts and better quality goods to the Soviet Union prompting many Hungarians, even among the national leadership, to question the value of Hungary’s continued membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

Yet Hungary’s ties with the Western powers, to which it owes some \$8 billion, are limited because it can produce little that is in demand in the West at a price that is competitive with Western market prices. Consequently, even with Hungary’s membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank assured, Hungary cannot take advantage of the enormously important microchip revolution in the electronics industry, which will propel the next generation of productive change.

Finally, Hungary’s income (price and wage) policy is totally awry. The new system was originally designed as a first move to assure hard-currency convertibility. With the dollar valued at around 50 forints, the value of the forint is maintained at a rate perhaps 15 or 25 percent above a normal free market rate. Consumer convertibility has not yet been achieved, but the changed income structure has created a socioeconomic nightmare.

What has happened is that prices and wages rose sharply, bolstered by an inflationary spiral estimated at between 8 and 10 percent per year for the last four years. Those with entrepreneurial abilities or convertible skills who work in the secondary economy have prospered. As one of them said, “As an electrician, today I work not 40 but 80 hours a week, but finally I can pay for an apartment for myself and my family. It is true that for a family of four to live acceptably today, one must have 15,000 to 20,000 forints a month and, yes, it is true that the price for making a living has been the merciless exploitation of both my wife and myself, but at least we can make it.” And at least for those individuals—now estimated at about 50 percent of the total labor force—who are engaged in some way in the second economy (or as the officials like to call it, the secondary distribution network), these policies have paid off.

For others who have been unwilling or unable to participate in the second economy, the changes in the wage and price structure have been catastrophic. Retirees whose pensions increase only by one or two percent a year, people without convertible skills, like office personnel or postal employees, and women raising families alone face a frightening inflation. Another riddle that is making the rounds in Budapest illustrates public sentiment: “Why does the rat have four legs? So it can get to the

garbage cans faster than the person in retirement.”

And this is not a mere joke. Beyond the glitter of prosperity there is a society deeply divided between the rich and the poor, a social segregation between the haves and the have-nots. The rich and the poor alike come in many forms and from various social strata; this is not a “class-struggle,” certainly not in the classic Marxist sense. The rich have their villas and BMW’s, their second homes and their vacation houses (or they can vacation in the Bahamas or in Tokyo). The poor buy one chicken for a week; some beg; some become bag-people, shuffling carefully along the outskirts of the cities lest they openly offend the authorities. The number of suicides increases each year; already Hungary has the highest per capita suicide rate in the world. The rising suicide rate, like the increase in the number of divorced people and alcoholics, illumines a social malaise caused by the impoverishment that has taken place during the last five years. And the authorities must begin to worry about the political potential emerging among those left behind by the *enrichissez vous* policy—the potential support of a more orthodox, more egalitarian and more dictatorial political course in the years ahead.

POLITICAL LIFE

In the political life of the country, once again, outwardly everything seems to be on course. After the revolution of 1956 had been crushed and the voice of dissent had been squelched, Janos Kadar was instated to run the country according to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Surprising both Moscow and his countrymen, Kadar consolidated his power, embarked on a cautious political liberalization and for the past nearly 30 years has maintained a rule characterized by a generally liberal policy at home and a faithful adherence to the Soviet lead in foreign affairs.

Within these limits, however, Kadar’s policies have been as different as night and day from those of his neighbors in the Communist bloc. Kadar’s policies have three major characteristics. First, the party has reserved the elite’s right to establish major policies and thus has maintained the cardinal tenet of Communist rule: the leading role of the party. Second, in the so-called alliance policy, the party has welcomed the influence of nonparty individuals. And third, the party has depoliticized public life.

With its typical zigs and zags, Kadar’s policy has meant that the population has not been pressured to participate in politics and has been allowed to deal with most major issues—e.g., economics, education, birth control—on the basis of other than purely political considerations, so long as there was no direct and open challenge to party rule. As a result, political dissent has been minimal and political repression has been less necessary, less visible and less brutal than in neighboring states; consequently, the country’s political life has been characterized by surprising stability.

In spite of repeated pressures from Hungary’s allies, Kadar and his associates did not really deviate from these policies in the 1960’s and the 1970’s. By the end of the 1970’s, however, as the world’s major postwar economic crisis began to affect Hungary, the regime looked for ways to control and manage political life. Because it was faced with newly emerging public dissatisfaction, the regime decided to “broaden public participation.” In reality, this meant that the Popular Front (*Hazafias Nefront*), the party’s mass organization, was to be rejuvenated and allowed to develop as a forum to discuss public issues. Mechanisms were also brought into play to allow for multiple elections for such legislative posts as members of local councils or representatives in Parliament.

Initially, these steps were largely meaningless. The people referred to the elections with contempt and did not see any difference between a candidate of the party and a candidate who *could be* nominated by the Front.

Unexpectedly, political life has been altered by economic necessity. As the economic crisis deepened, the party realized that it had to make room for economic professionals. In short, the party had to stop controlling economic affairs and give autonomy to specialists. In 1985, the party maintained only 35 of the some 120 seats in Parliament for those candidates whom it wished to elect without opposition. In all other districts, multiple candidate elections were mandated with surprising results; party secretaries at the county level—the regional potentates of the party—and even five Central Committee members were soundly defeated.

This development did not herald the introduction of pluralism or even the emergence of a real political opposition, for there was no possibility of an alternative platform. In fact, the party employed political tricks, like packing the halls with faithful followers and harassing “opposition” candidates to prevent the election of members of the “democratic opposition” it did not wish to see in Parliament. The party elite realized that political decisions affecting the fate of the nation would continue to rest with a very narrow party elite. And yet the trends in “democratizing” public life indicate that the party elite has become aware that the policies it maintained for a quarter of a century need to be revamped.

The major issues in domestic political life center around three major intertwined areas: Kadar’s succession, the political vacuum, and the question of dissent. While clearly the first issue is most significant and will affect the other two, the question of succession is not simply a domestic problem. Kadar is 73 years old; he has been in power for 29 years and was imprisoned under both Fascist and Communist regimes. Perhaps the best politician Hungary has had for more than a century, he stays close to the middle of the road, cautiously edging now to the left, now to the right, balancing the interests of his party and those of the nation.

But Kadar suffers from emphysema; he spends less and less time in the office; his attention span is limited by age

and illness; and the course of politics that so clearly bore the imprint of his views and style is no longer clear. Although Kadar was elected in 1985 for another five-year term as Secretary General of the party, day-to-day political affairs have been transferred to Karoly Nemeth. Nemeth, a colorless apparatchik and former head of the powerful Budapest party organization, is a compromise candidate, an interim choice. Below Nemeth, the newly elected first secretary of the party, younger men in their fifties are chafing to try their own hands at the helm.

Do they represent truly different views? Are there "liberals" or "conservatives" among them? In this respect, past political performance has not been a helpful guide, because party discipline and "collective" decision making is a very powerful tool in the hands of the leading elite. And yet the performance of Ferenc Havasi, currently in charge of the economy, and Karoly Grosz, currently in charge of ideological purity, seems to indicate the presence of two rival views.

Havasi's "line" suggests that Hungary's need for economic survival demands greater liberalization, decentralization and economic differentiation. Grosz and his supporters seem to hold that the reforms have gone too far; the party has lost too much power and there is too much differentiation. In their view, a strong recentralization is necessary in order to reach the "ideal socialist community." Grosz's position seems to have been bolstered during the May, 1985, party Congress; nonetheless, the reform leadership has thus far maintained both power and Kadar's personal blessing.

Partly as a result of the succession crisis and partly as a result of the evolution of political life, the Hungarian Communist party is operating today in a political vacuum. Its middle-level leadership is deeply divided between those who want to maintain the reform course and those who would like to maintain their entrenched positions. The party seems to have opened up the channels of political participation, but it has been unwilling to grant participation to organizations and autonomous institutions. Consequently, although the party is no longer the omnipotent administrator, interest groups or institutions have not replaced it, and the result has been a political vacuum.

To some extent, the organs of coercion have attempted to fill this vacuum. Policemen today speak to the public with an authority and unparalleled rudeness, but much of their activity can be attributed to a zealotry in enriching themselves. More fines levied for traffic violations are finding their way into police pockets. The police administer "on-the-spot-justice" and the growth in their power during the last five years has been noticeable.

Harder policies can also be observed in the handling of dissent. Although Hungary allows far more dissent than its neighbors, growing harassment of dissenters, occasional police brutality, and the use of administrative measures to curb the influence of dissenters are observable. Dissent is focused in five areas: political, economic, intel-

lectual, nationalistic and ecological. Political dissenters would like to move Hungary toward a more pluralistic society, with greater democratization and more open popular participation. Their underground or semilegal publications, like *Beszelo*, *Hirondo* or *Dunataj*, or their publishing house, AB Kidado, have been harassed recently, but very few political dissenters are actually in jail or under house arrest.

Economic dissenters are more acceptable to the regime, either on the "right" or on the "left." Thanks to the process of depoliticization, their arguments—seeking greater liberalization and the enhancement of reform or greater centralization and the limiting of the reform—are couched in economic language and can be discussed relatively openly.

Intellectual dissenters, by and large, seek greater access to the West, greater freedom of experimentation and the elimination of censorship. Endorsing the liberal wing of the party elite, and joining the nationalist and ecological dissenters, during the last year many an intellectual expressed openly the view that the party has not been successful in joining the aspiration of the people, and thus it has outlived even its earlier usefulness.

Nationalist dissent is strong in Hungary and it takes many forms, ranging from public dissatisfaction to open acts of defiance. Hungarians protest the treatment of the large Hungarian minorities who live in Romania and Czechoslovakia. These minorities number around three million people, nearly one-third of the population of the Hungarian state, and they are allegedly mistreated by the highly personalized dictatorial—and in the case of Romania—Stalinist-totalitarian regimes, who want to destroy the cultural identity of the Magyar people within their borders. The party's inability to ameliorate their plight is taken by the people of Hungary as a further proof that the party has outlived its usefulness as Hungary's leader.

The ecological dissenters are joined by the nationalist and intellectual dissenters on the issue of the new hydroelectric dam being built in Slovakia near the villages of Boc-Nagymaros. Aside from serious ecological damage to the Danube River and its surrounding areas, the dam—already nearly finished on the Czechoslovak side—is likely to cost Hungary too much in view of its limited increase in power-generation capacity, and almost all Hungarians believe it to be against the interests of the Hungarian state. An unprecedented public appeal—in which respected academicians joined the well-known dissenters—failed to halt the Hungarian authorities, who

(Continued on page 388)

Ivan Volgyes is a professor of political science at the University of Nebraska. He is the author or editor of more than 25 books and scores of articles on East Europe and the U.S.S.R. His most recent book is *The Politics of Eastern Europe* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, forthcoming 1986).

"Given the irreconcilable East and West German positions on the national question and the [East German government's] well-deserved reputation for Soviet-style ideological orthodoxy, how can one explain East Germany's tenacious embrace of inter-German détente . . . ?"

The Politics of Division and Détente in East Germany

BY MELVIN CROAN

Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

FOUR decades after the collapse of Hitler's Reich, Germany still bristles with arms. Across the line that has divided East from West since 1945, the alliance systems led by the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other with an imposing array of nuclear and conventional weapons. Resolution of the perennial German Question—the country's division between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany)—appears nowhere in the offing. Each German state is now aligned against the other as its respective superpower's strategically most important European ally.

Yet, over the last dozen or so years the Germans have managed to transform their erstwhile cold civil war into an indigenous version of coexistence, often troubled but basically peaceful and, on occasion, conspicuously cooperative. It is doubtful whether the limited reassociation achieved between the two German states could survive any further escalation of Soviet-American hostility. Thus far, however, inter-German détente has evinced a surprising capacity to withstand overarching tensions between the superpowers.

The goals of West Germany's *Deutschlandpolitik* (policy toward East Germany) are relatively clear. They include improving the lot of fellow Germans in East Germany, ameliorating the personal hardships engendered by national division on both sides of the border and, last but not least, fostering the essential unity of the German nation. Beyond these objectives, West Germany remains

officially committed to eventual national reunification in keeping with the "constitutional commandment" enshrined in the preamble to the FRG's Basic Law. Although most West Germans realize that any such reunification presupposes an overall East-West settlement in Europe and might not occur even then, the present government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, like all its predecessors, insists that the German Question must remain open "until all Germans have had a chance to freely exercise their right to self-determination."¹

For their part, the leaders of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity party (SED) disavow any interest in national reunification, except perhaps in the hypothetical and highly unlikely eventuality of a prior Communist takeover in West Germany. In the official East German view, history has rendered its judgment: Germany's post-World War II division into two sovereign states with antithetical political systems and mutually exclusive socioeconomic orders is permanent.² Accordingly, all talk of an unresolved German Question is typically dismissed as mischievous nonsense and is often denounced as "revanchism," a favorite Soviet code word designed to conjure up the specter of West German aggressive designs against the East.

Given the irreconcilable East and West German positions on the national question and the SED's well-deserved reputation for Soviet-style ideological orthodoxy, how can one explain East Germany's tenacious embrace of inter-German détente, a stance that produced last year's remarkable rift between East Berlin and Moscow?³ The answer is far from simple; it involves a deviation based neither on traditional nationalist considerations, nor on pacifism (a sentiment abroad in the land but anathema to its Communist rulers), nor on calculations of economic self-interest in any narrow sense, as has been implied in some of the best-informed Western reportage.⁴ At stake rather is a complex process in which, contrary to the initial expectations of the SED leadership, détente has become a cornerstone of East Germany's internal political stability and the virtual centerpiece of the SED's continuing quest for legitimacy.

FROM THE WALL TO DÉTENTE

The origins of this process can be traced back to the

¹Walter Leisler Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 2 (1984–1985), p. 317.

²For the current attitude of the SED elite, see Theo Sommer, "Mit der Geschichte auf dem Buckel," *Die Zeit* (Overseas edition), August 10, 1984.

³A valuable collection of relevant materials may be found in *East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute*, compiled and introduced by Ronald D. Asmus, RFE Occasional Papers, no. 1 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1985). See also Christian Schmidt-Häuer, "Der lange Papierkrieg der roten Brüder," *Die Zeit* (Overseas edition), August 17, 1984, and Wolfgang Seiffert, "Konflikt zwischen Ost-Berlin und Moskau," *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 17, no. 10 (October, 1984), pp. 1043–1059.

⁴For example, Elizabeth Pond, "Finding Détente in Unlikely Places," *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 22, 1984.

erection of the infamous Berlin Wall in August, 1961.⁵ By arresting a damaging massive exodus of refugees to the West, the Wall consolidated Communist rule and helped pave the way for East Germany's economic growth. During the 1960's, the SED concentrated on the domestic tasks of socialist construction, experimenting with previously unthinkable economic reforms. The problem of national division, while never entirely forgotten, was relegated to second place.

In West Germany, on the other hand, the Wall brought about an agonizing reassessment of West German foreign policy. The protracted search for new and more effective approaches culminated in fresh initiatives toward East Germany in conjunction with the conciliatory *Ostpolitik* (policy toward the Soviet Union and East Europe) adopted by Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic (SPD)–Liberal (FDP) government in late 1969. Bonn's innovative concept of "accepting the status quo in order to change it" constituted a direct challenge to East Germany's entrenchment.

At that juncture, the challenge loomed larger in East Berlin than in Moscow. When the Kremlin opted to reciprocate Brandt's overtures, it had to contend with the opposition of East Germany's veteran Communist boss, Walter Ulbricht. In his view, the Soviet demarche toward the West—the new four-power agreement on Berlin that the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate and the novel inter-German arrangements it was prepared to countenance—compromised East Germany's "sovereign rights" and threatened its internal security. Ulbricht's attempts to obstruct Soviet diplomacy, buttressed by his extraordinary ideological presumption in elevating East Germany to the status of a "model" socialist society, prompted the Soviet leadership to engineer his downfall. In May, 1971, Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker, the current SED General Secretary and East Germany's head of state.

Under Honecker, East Germany fell back into line behind the Soviet Union and its championing of détente. Adjustment to East–West détente enabled East Germany to score a decisive breakthrough: almost universal diplomatic recognition and membership in the United Nations. But East Germany also had to accept a "special relationship" with West Germany. The 1972 Basic Treaty (*Grundlagenvertrag*) between West and East Germany

⁵This is the case even though a distorted version of the connection between the Wall and détente has been made into a major theme of Communist propaganda. For the official East German line, see Erich Honecker, *From My Life* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), ch. 16, "The Thirteenth of August 1961," especially p. 213.

⁶Melvin Croan, *East Germany: The Soviet Connection* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 44–52. In discharging its "internationalist" obligations, East Germany readily joined forces with the Soviet Union in adventures further afield, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. That the GDR was later to attach such value to the East–West détente to which these Soviet thrusts did such substantial damage must surely be accounted one of contemporary history's minor ironies.

fell far short of de jure acknowledgement of Germany's division. Together with a package of related agreements, it provided for ongoing contacts between the two sides in various fields and opened East Germany to influence from the West in the form of restored lines of communication and a large-scale influx of visitors. East Germany then had to deal with the potentially disruptive domestic consequences of a limited rapprochement with West Germany.

With obvious Soviet endorsement, the Honecker regime pushed a policy of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation) designed to erect internal ideological-political barriers against Western inroads. There were restrictions on personal contact between categories of the East German population and visiting West Germans. In addition, a massive propaganda campaign was mounted to underscore the ostensibly unbridgeable differences between East and West Germany. The other side of the propaganda coin was the emphasis on East Germany's integration into the socialist camp and its ties to the Soviet Union.

Both these themes were featured prominently in the 1974 amendments to the East German constitution, the Soviet–East German Friendship Treaty of 1975, and the new SED party program adopted in 1976. In the realm of practical policy, the Honecker regime eagerly cooperated with Moscow in forging a host of bilateral bonds, military, political and economic, with a view to linking the Soviet Union and East Germany almost organically.⁶

The East German leadership probably never harbored great illusions about the viability of Soviet-centered "socialist internationalism" as a basis for domestic legitimacy. In any case, from the very beginning of his tenure in office, Honecker laid major emphasis on raising the East German standard of living. Heralded as the SED's "main task" (*Hauptaufgabe*), domestic socioeconomic policy became consumer-oriented in the early 1970's and so it has remained. In fact, a kind of consumerist authoritarianism—the satisfaction of popular demands for consumer goods and social services without the sacrifice of central planning or any relaxation of political control—has served as Honecker's overall governing formula. Effective implementation of the formula came to depend on a modicum of good relations with West Germany, an increasingly indispensable source of economic support. East German dependence goes a long way to explain the Honecker regime's inexorable if almost imperceptible conversion to the cause of inter-German détente.

By the late 1970's, the Honecker regime had gained considerable experience in handling the burgeoning inter-German relationship; it had also grown confident of its ability to guard the domestic ramparts against any "subversive" influences that might emanate from West Germany. For its part, in pursuit of the humanitarian objectives of its *Deutschlandpolitik*, Bonn had forsworn any intention of destabilizing the GDR.

In 1979, however, the picture changed dramatically.

Although East Germany did not dare criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it had good reason to fear the repercussions in Europe. Inter-German relations stagnated. To make matters worse, the stagnation dovetailed with the challenge posed by the 1980–1981 crisis in Poland. By exacerbating East Germany's economic difficulties, which had already dictated a program of domestic austerity, the Polish crisis threatened further to erode the East German standard of living; at the same time, it offered an object lesson in the importance of the economic underpinnings of regime stability. And even when East German industrial labor displayed little sympathy for Poland's Solidarity movement, East Germany's geopolitical isolation between its traditional rival to the west and a newly unreliable "ally" to the east remained. Small wonder that the East German leadership took a predictably tough line toward Poland. But Honecker soon realized that bloodshed in Poland was likely to sound the death knell for détente.⁷

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND POLITICAL DISALIGNMENT

The Kremlin also expected East Germany to take a hard line on the issue of Western deployment of advanced intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Until the approach of the deadline for initial United States deployment, East Germany appeared to be playing the part assigned to it with considerable verve. The East German authorities lent moral and possibly even material support to West German antinuclear protest groups, while simultaneously riding close herd on the unauthorized and unwelcome peace "movement" that had sprung up inside the GDR, largely under religious auspices.⁸ Moreover, East Berlin faithfully echoed Moscow's threats of dire consequences for West Germany and for inter-German relations, in particular, unless North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plans were canceled. However, as the West German peace protest ebbed, the Honecker regime began to shrink from the implications of its previous pronouncements. This was evident in the barely disguised official dismay that marked its acknowledgement of the preliminary installation of Soviet countermissiles on East German soil. Dismay probably also lay

behind the unprecedented gesture of opening up the columns of the SED's daily newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, to an expression of otherwise taboo church views on disarmament.⁹

Once the initial United States deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles was actually under way, the divisive question of how or even whether to punish West Germany came to the fore. Honecker lost no time in signaling his reluctance to bear the brunt of any punitive countermeasures. Although he had previously warned of an "ice age" in inter-German relations, Honecker now publicly urged a "limitation to the damage" done to détente. He continued to appeal to Bonn for a "coalition of reason" and a "community of responsibility" for the benefit of "the German people," the very same phraseology that he had employed immediately before the installation of NATO's Euromissiles. Finally, instead of suspending the inter-German dialogue, he tried to step up East German–West German negotiations. As an earnest of its good intentions, in early 1984 the East German regime began to grant permission for mass emigration to West Germany—the first such permission since the erection of the Wall. In return for this and other lesser concessions, East Germany was able to book a major \$333-million loan from West Germany that was announced at the end of July, 1984.

Throughout this period, Honecker received timely and sustained support from the Hungarians, but he was indirectly criticized by the Czechoslovaks.¹⁰ Moscow joined the fray in the spring of 1984 with a series of denunciations of alleged West German "revanchism," an accusation that the East Germans had come to downplay. By midsummer, 1984, *Pravda* was openly attacking inter-German relations and lacing its diatribes with oblique but ominous references to Honecker.¹¹

The denouement of the 1984 minidrama occurred in early September, with the announcement of the "postponement," on the flimsiest of pretexts, of Honecker's scheduled visit to West Germany—the second such cancellation in two years. The following month, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was thought to have masterminded the Soviet chastisement of the East Germans, came to East Berlin for ceremonies commemorating East Germany's thirty-fifth anniversary. The occasion was marked by the unveiling of a joint GDR–Soviet program for cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and production to run to the year 2000 and, no less significant, the publication of a joint communiqué calling for more effective foreign policy "coordination" between the two states.¹²

Immediately thereafter, East German spokesmen began to employ harsher language toward West Germany and subsequently continued to fault the West German government on a number of issues, notably its overtures to groups representing expellees from Silesia, a former German territory that has been part of Poland since 1945. But traces of the earlier East German–Soviet disalign-

⁷Klaus Bölling, *Die fernern Nachbarn* (Hamburg: Stern-Buch, 1983), p. 83.

⁸See Pedro Ramet, "Church and Peace in East Germany," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 33, no. 4 (May–June, 1984), pp. 14–57.

⁹*Neues Deutschland*, October 22–23, 1983, as quoted and analyzed in Ronald D. Asmus, "Neues Deutschland Prints Dissenting Views on Arms Control," *RFE Research*, RAD Background Report, no. 254 (October 31, 1983).

¹⁰For the relevant Hungarian and Czech pronouncements, see *East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute*, pp. 11–24; 25–30; 49–50; 55–56; 69–70.

¹¹"In the Shadow of American Missiles," *Pravda*, July 27, 1984, and "On the Wrong Track," *Pravda*, August 2, 1984, both reproduced in *East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute*, pp. 46–49; pp. 53–54.

¹²"Chronik," *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 17, no. 11, p. 1230, and *East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute*, p. 15.

ment also persisted, if only in such marginalia as the reprinting by *Neues Deutschland* of yet another Hungarian statement in defense of the sovereignty of the smaller socialist countries and their right to pursue their own special foreign policy interests.¹³

HONECKER'S SURVIVAL

In view of the Soviet Union's overwhelming military dominance and East Germany's reliance on Soviet backing for its continued existence as a separate German state, there was never any real doubt that East Berlin could be effectively pressured into compliance with Moscow's wishes. The really interesting questions are what emboldened Honecker to venture out on his own in the first place and what enabled him to survive in office in the face of the Kremlin's subsequent displeasure.

In the first instance, it is important to bear in mind that, for all its novelty, Honecker's departure was not particularly daring. He had not suddenly become a champion of reunification, nor did he harbor any sneaking patriotic sentiments of the broader, all-German variety; his entire political biography was marked from the outset by steadfast allegiance to a Soviet-oriented German Communist party and, in recent decades, by an unflinching determination to consolidate the internal East German foundations of Germany's postwar division. Honecker never aspired to break loose from the fetters of the Warsaw Pact, nor to liberalize the East German regime domestically, nor to pose any ideological challenge to the Soviet leaders. Rather, he sought their support for somewhat greater leeway to maneuver in behalf not only of East German interests but of Soviet interests as well.

In the turbulent context of politics at the apex in Moscow, where the long-debilitated President, Leonid Brezhnev, was followed by two sickly short-term successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, Honecker may have had (or believed he had) important backing inside the Kremlin itself. He may have been encouraged by the removal of the veteran Soviet ambassador to East Germany, Piotr Abrasimov, in June, 1983, following top-level East German-Soviet consultations in Moscow. Throughout his long tenure in East Berlin (1962-1971 and 1975-1983), Abrasimov had behaved like an old-fashioned imperial viceroy. He always supervised as closely as possible all contacts between East and West Germany and regarded them, as he once remarked to a high West German official, as amounting to "too

much, too quickly." That Honecker resented being treated much like a junior employee of the Soviet embassy was common knowledge; he may well have urged Abrasimov's transfer. In any event, with Abrasimov, whom East Germany's own Communist elite privately called the "governing ambassador"¹⁴ (*Regierende Botschafter*), out of the way, East Germany clearly enjoyed greater autonomy than it had known before.

Honecker's hand was further strengthened by his uncontested personal control of East Germany's domestic power structure. More important than his position as Chairman of the GDR State Council and its Defense Council was the leverage that he was able to exert as General Secretary of the SED. At the eighth SED Central Committee plenum in May, 1984, three of his key backers, Werner Jarowsky, Günther Kleiber, and Herbert Häber, were elevated to full membership in the party's Politburo. The earlier seventh plenum, meeting in November, 1983, had already awarded similar advancement to the youthful Egon Krenz, Honecker's personal protégé and rumored heir apparent.

All told, the assurances given to Western journalists to the effect that on questions of GDR foreign policy, there were no appreciable differences within the top leadership,¹⁵ had the ring of truth. Moreover, Honecker had unmistakably grown in popularity with the East German population.¹⁶ As a result, while the Russians retained the power to oust Honecker, they could do so only at the potential cost of unhinging the entire East German system, a risk grossly disproportionate to the rather circum-spect challenge they confronted.

THE CURRENT SCENE

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist party on March 11, 1985, Honecker sent him an exceptionally warm and apparently heartfelt message of congratulations. Perhaps Honecker was hoping for clearer directions and more vigorous leadership from the Kremlin and was anticipating a fresh approach to East-West relations that would provide greater scope for East Berlin's views. If so, the meeting that took place between the two leaders in Moscow on May 5, 1985, must have proved a disappointment. A terse but tough joint statement pointedly declared that "the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. resolutely reject each and every concept of an 'open German question.'" The statement also castigated West Germany in language that appeared to have been deliberately chosen to contradict the positive formulations contained in the joint communi-

(Continued on page 388)

¹³James M. Markham, "Sovereignty Made Soviet Bloc Issue," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1985.

¹⁴On Abrasimov's role in the GDR and Honecker's attitude toward him, see Bölling, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-263.

¹⁵Sommer, *loc. cit.*

¹⁶James M. Markham, "East German Public is Beginning to Pay the Party Chief Subdued Respect," *The New York Times*, September 19, 1984, and Günter Gaus, "Der Mann, der nicht von drüben kam," *Die Zeit* (Overseas edition), September 21, 1984.

Melvin Croan has written extensively on German, Soviet and East European affairs. He has visited East Germany several times, most recently in June, 1984, as a member of the subcommission on United States-East German relations of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).

"In the past two years, Czechoslovakia's domestic and foreign policy orthodoxy has appeared increasingly at odds with intrabloc tendencies, spearheaded by the minicoalition of Hungary, Romania and East Germany. . . . Having purged the word 'reform' from their vocabulary, Prague's hardliners may find themselves on the defensive for the first time since August, 1969."

Czechoslovakia in the 1980's

BY MICHAEL KRAUS

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College

THE pattern of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations has closely paralleled the rise of Soviet power in Central Europe. Before the mid-1930's, Prague and Moscow were neither bound by overriding common interests nor torn apart by burning conflicts. Unlike the Russian-Polish dialogue, the dialogue between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was free of territorial conflict; and in contrast to the Poles, the Czechs and Slovaks had no historical reason to harbor enmity toward the Russians. In fact, pan-Slavism and sentimental Rus-sophilism represented powerful intellectual currents in nineteenth century Bohemia and Slovakia.

The rise of Nazi Germany provided an impetus for closer cooperation and led to the 1935 Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance, committing both parties to assistance in the case of unprovoked aggression. Significantly, the operative provision of the treaty was contingent on the fulfillment of a similar pact Prague had signed with Paris that same year. In the following years, Soviet-Czechoslovak ties expanded to include a substantial arms trade as well as joint intelligence operations against Germany. By 1938, the Soviet Union enjoyed better relations with Czechoslovakia than with any other country. Though Munich—because of France's failure to implement its obligations to Czechoslovakia—did not test Moscow's commitment to Prague, Soviet behavior during the crisis contrasted favorably with the actions of Prague's Western allies.

Crises of survival play a seminal role in shaping a political culture for years to come. For democratic Czechoslovakia, Munich was a shattering experience—if for no other reason than because Prague was, "in the last resort, a victim of democracy."¹ If Munich was a prologue to war, the war and its outcome fundamentally transformed the nature of the Soviet-Czechoslovak relationship. To answer the question of how the Soviet Union came to dominate postwar Czechoslovakia one needs to differentiate the impact of two separate yet related spheres of wartime activity.

On one level, the advance of the Red Army into Central Europe gave Stalin the kind of leverage that no Western diplomatic pressure could dislodge. The fate of

Poland illustrates the point. But on another level, war-time diplomacy also played a role in the emergence of the Communist governments in postwar Europe. Historians point to the Teheran and Yalta Conferences where implicit—or, as the case of the Stalin-Churchill October, 1944, "percentage agreement" suggests, explicit—bargains were reached that ultimately contributed to the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence in Central and East Europe.

It may be argued that the Czechoslovak case does not conform to the "standard version" of the Sovietization of East Europe, even though the eventual outcome, namely, the seizure of monopoly power by the Communist party, fits the larger picture. At least in two respects, the Czechoslovak road to communism differed from that traveled by the rest of the region. First, from the time it renewed relations with the Soviet Union in June, 1941, the Edvard Benes government-in-exile in London conducted a policy of friendly relations with all the Great Powers. Compared to the bitter Russian-Polish wartime dialogue, the relations between the London Czechs and Moscow flowed smoothly, at least until the end of 1944 when the Russians seized Carpathian Ukraine. Second, the shape of the first postwar government took place following the four-year dialogue between the London Czechs and the Moscow-based leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist party. The latter had been a visible force during the interwar democracy, but during the elections its share of the vote hovered around 10 percent.

As a result of various concessions granted by Benes—in part because of the Soviet Army's presence on Czechoslovak territory—the coalition government that returned to Prague in May, 1945, was already dominated by the Communists, although the real extent of that domination was deliberately understated. Moreover, the agreements made between the London and the Moscow-based exiles circumscribed the postwar system in several important respects, especially in regard to the role of opposition. Nevertheless, in 1946, in free and unfettered elections, the Communists obtained 38 percent of the vote, i.e., a plurality. (In fact no Communist party has ever done any better in any national elections.) Paradoxically, the only government in the region that appeared to fulfill the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe was both

¹Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1979), p. 1003.

pro-Soviet and Communist-dominated. Having extensively penetrated the institutions of state, especially the police and the army, the Communists, with Moscow's backing, seized power in a coup d'état in February, 1948.

Since 1948, the history of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations has been the story of the vicissitudes accompanying Moscow's rule in the region as a whole. While in the early 1950's, the excesses of Stalinism reached greater extremes in Czechoslovakia than perhaps anywhere else, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent haphazard policy of reformation had only a limited effect on Prague. In that sense, the 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia can be understood as a delayed de-Stalinization.

FROM REFORM TO NORMALIZATION

Led by Alexander Dubcek, the reformist Communist leadership set out to introduce greater pluralism into the political system: to grant more autonomy to state bureaucracies and the Parliament; to curb the arbitrary powers of the police; to provide a wider scope for intraparty democracy; to carry out far-reaching economic reforms; and to restore civil rights, including freedom of the press. The goal was "socialism with a human face." Though the Communist party retained control and though the Dubcek leadership pledged no change in Prague's commitments to the Warsaw Pact alliance, in Moscow, Berlin and Warsaw, the Czechoslovak developments were viewed with growing alarm. Mounting pressure on Czechoslovakia culminated in August, 1968, with the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact.²

In the aftermath of the occupation, Czechoslovakia was in the throes of counter-reformation, or "normalization," i.e., the process of restoration of authoritarian practices. Its main aspects included political and economic recentralization; a massive purge of the party and wholesale turnover of personnel in all institutions; the restoration of censorship, a renewed emphasis on ideology in mass media, the arts and scholarship; and repressive measures directed against all nonconformists and their families. These policies, implemented after April, 1969, under the leadership of Gustav Husak, define Czechoslovak society today.

ECONOMY

In the aftermath of Soviet intervention, the Husak

²For an unsurpassed study of the Prague Spring see H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³Richard F. Staar, "Soviet Relations with East Europe," *Current History*, vol. 83, no. 496 (November, 1984), p. 356.

⁴Otto Ulc, "Czechoslovakia in 1984," in *ibid.*, p. 366.

⁵For a discussion of the new method and for best estimates of economic performance see Radio Free Europe (RFE), *Situation Reports* (Czechoslovakia) March 15, 1985, pp. 13-18. Most of the following data on the economy and energy are from various RFE situation reports.

⁶Jan Kavan and Mark Jackson, "The Czechoslovak Economy: An Unofficial View," *The East European Reporter*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1985), p. 19; *Tribuna*, July 10, 1985, p. 15.

leadership repudiated the planned economic reform and set itself firmly against change. Benefiting from generous Soviet subsidies, especially cheap energy (in the form of Soviet oil and gas), and from an improved agricultural performance, the Czechoslovak economy showed a sustained rate of growth, registering an average annual growth rate in national income between 1971 and 1975 of 5.6 percent, and of 3.7 percent for the 1976-1980 period.³ Thus the ruling party could supplement the ideologically zealous strategy of normalization with the tactic of pacification by consumption.

Unlike Poland, Prague resisted the temptation to acquire modern technology by means of Western credits. The effect of this policy was threefold: Czechoslovakia was insulated from the Polish predicament of having to repay extensive loans by exports to Western markets; some 70 percent of Czechoslovak industrial plants began to age; and the country's share of world trade dropped from two percent in 1974 to less than one percent a decade later.⁴ By the early 1980's, Soviet subsidies to East Europe had declined sharply, however, and the economic strategy of the post-invasion regime unravelled completely: the economy registered zero to negative growth in 1981 and again in 1982. Along with Poland, Czechoslovakia experienced the worst economic decline in the Warsaw Pact.

Although an improved economic performance in 1983 and 1984, including a bumper crop in 1984, produced growth rates of 2.4 and 2.8 percent, respectively, the structural deficiencies of the economy, rising energy costs, and the low morale of the labor force suggest that no reversal in the process of economic stagnation is in the offing. Nonetheless, Czechoslovakia reduced its already low indebtedness to the West to less than \$3 billion by the end of 1984. Symptomatically, instead of tackling the issue of economic reform, the authorities have invented a new method for measuring economic growth that inflates the actual results.⁵

Another trend in the making is the growing Czechoslovak dependence on trade with the Eastern bloc countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), especially the Soviet Union. In 1981, 71.9 percent of Czechoslovak trade was conducted with the socialist world and 28.1 percent with the capitalist countries; in 1984, the corresponding figures were 78.3 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. In 1984, 45 percent of Czechoslovakia's trade was with the Soviet Union, which represented 10 percent of total Soviet foreign trade.⁶

In 1985, Czechoslovak military specialists have openly acknowledged the dilemma created by the countervailing demands of a stagnating economy, on the one hand, and of alliance burden-sharing, on the other. Pressure to meet the latter obligation is evidenced in the projected rise in military spending in the 1985 budget, when it is expected to rise by 4.5 percent over its 1984 level. Torn between its domestic problems and its alliance commitments, the Prague leadership appears uncertain and hesitant about

which way to turn in the era of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

ENERGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The energy situation is the Achilles' heel of the economy. Because of Czechoslovakia's specialization within the CMEA as the manufacturer of heavy machinery and industrial equipment, its energy consumption per capita is one of the highest in the world, ranking behind the United States and Canada and exceeding the consumption of Hungary, Austria, France and Japan by between 50 and 80 percent. The local supply of low-grade brown coal, once abundant, is expected to run out within the next 30 or 40 years. Hydropower will provide only 7 to 8.5 percent of the total power production between now and the year 2000. Czechoslovakia imports about 40 percent of its energy and fuels; a lion's share comes from the Soviet Union, which gives Moscow formidable leverage. Because of upward price adjustments in imported Soviet oil as well as the projected decline in Soviet oil exports, Prague has embarked on one of the most ambitious programs of nuclear energy in Europe. In 1980, the share of nuclear power in total energy production amounted to 6.2 percent; but the figure is expected to rise to 32.2 percent by 1990, and to 61.6 percent by the end of the century. By then, the plentiful supply of nuclear power is to reduce the nation's reliance on coal and oil to 30 percent of total power production.

Predictably, the plans have gone awry, and construction delays of up to five years have played havoc with the 10 nuclear power plants on order or under construction. While today it is already evident that the planners have overestimated the contribution nuclear power can make in the short run, the availability of huge investment resources required for what are the most expensive projects ever built in Czechoslovakia is also in question.

In the meantime, Prague pays dearly for its continued dependence on Soviet oil imports. In 1983, the oil bill from Moscow came to 2 billion rubles; by 1984, the figure rose to 3 billion rubles for roughly the same amount. Yet the short-term alternative of utilizing coal reserves to the fullest extent is fraught with problems of its own.

A precarious energy supply also fuels some initiatives of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Back in the mid-1970's, when the Shah of Iran was an unwelcome figure on most American campuses, the Husak regime welcomed him in Prague, conferring an honorary doctorate of law on the Shah and a doctorate of philosophy on the Empress. The degrees were symbolic of the Czechoslovak quest for diversified energy suppliers. Prague's burgeoning relationship with Libya in the 1980's has been motivated, at least in part, by the same objective. For the Husak regime, Libya is also a major source of hard currency. Conservative estimates suggest that about 1,000 Czech

and Slovak "experts" live in Libya. They include construction workers, teachers, health and technical assistance specialists, and air force instructors.

In May, 1984, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal made his third visit to Libya in less than a decade. A communiqué issued by Strougal and Libyan strongman Colonel Muammar Qaddafi emphasized "the need to proceed in unity against imperialist forces."⁷ Agreements were signed to expand economic ties, and more personnel from Prague is scheduled to go to Libya. Although the exact nature of Czechoslovak-Libyan trade is not disclosed by either country, it is no secret that the Czechoslovaks supply Tripoli with weapons in exchange for oil. Equally disturbing are warm expressions of Prague's support for Libya's foreign policy.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

Environmental deterioration is not a new problem in Czechoslovakia. Several decades of industrialization favoring the development of heavy industry, mining and chemicals went hand in hand with government disregard of the environmental impact of these measures. Historically, heavy manufacturing in Czechoslovakia has relied on low-grade domestic coal as the main source of fuel energy. But brown coal is high in sulphur content and, in combination with poorly equipped fossil-burning plants, the sulphur dioxide emissions have proved especially deadly for the nation's forests. By the early 1980's, the scope of the ecological disaster, especially in the northern region of Bohemia, was an open secret. On those grounds, in 1981 and again in 1983, the dissident group Charter 77 addressed the issue of environmental deterioration, urging the government to take immediate action. Moreover, with the spillover effects into neighboring Austria and West Germany, the problem had acquired transnational dimensions. Thus in June, 1982, the government of Bavaria informed Prague that 22.4 percent of the Bavarian pine forests had been damaged by Czechoslovak pollution.

Faced with heightened domestic and international concern, the Prague government commissioned a study by a research team of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. The results of the "Analysis of the Ecological Situation in Czechoslovakia," completed in 1983, were politically so explosive that they remain unpublished. Nonetheless, Charter 77 obtained a copy of the report and made it available both at home and in the West.⁸ According to the study, an unhappy mix of intensive industrialization, depletion of most natural resources, and unfavorable climatic conditions meant that Czechoslovakia had to spend "considerably greater" financial resources than most developed countries in order to maintain the same environmental standards. As the authors point out, however, not only had Prague been investing less in environment-related projects than most industrial countries, including the Soviet Union, but the amount—as a percentage of the gross national product—had actually

⁷*Rude Pravo*, May 8, 1984, pp. 1, 7.

⁸Issued as a supplement to the Rome-based Czech publication *Listy*, February, 1984.

Table 1: Comparative Sulphur Dioxide (SO₂) Data

Production of SO ₂ in thousands of tons		Emission of SO ₂ in tons per square kilometer		Emission of SO ₂ per capita	
United States	27,000	East Germany	36.9	East Germany	0.234
U.S.S.R.	24,000	Czechoslovakia	25.0	Canada	0.23
Canada	5,500	United Kingdom	21.53	Czechoslovakia	0.21
United Kingdom	5,250	West Germany	15.26	United States	0.12
East Germany	4,000	Poland	7.98	U.S.S.R.	0.094
West Germany	3,800	France	5.85	United Kingdom	0.093
France	3,270	United States	2.88	Poland	0.073
Czechoslovakia	3,200	U.S.S.R.	1.09	West Germany	0.062
Poland	2,500	Canada	0.55	France	0.061

declined in recent years. While during the 1970–1975 period expenditures on environmental protection had amounted to 1.2 percent of total government spending, the corresponding figure for 1975–1980 was 0.85 percent. The report characterized the current ecological situation in Czechoslovakia as “very serious” and, in comparison to world standards, “very unfavorable.”

The total volume of all gas emissions in Czechoslovakia, the report noted, has more than doubled between 1960 and 1980. Similarly, the production of solid waste has grown to the staggering figure of 35 tons per capita per year. Especially revealing are the comparative statistics on the emission of sulphur dioxide, a key component of “acid rain” (see table 1).

In the Academy’s evaluation, sulphur dioxide emissions alone directly affect between 3 million and 4 million people, one-third of all forests, and over ten percent of all agricultural land. Moreover, the Academy team predicts that if existing trends continue, between 45 and 60 percent of Czechoslovakia’s forest will be damaged by the end of the century. Furthermore, three-fourths of especially protected national parks—covering about 11.4 percent of the republic’s territory—have already been affected by the emissions, and 25 percent have been “seriously damaged.” As a consequence of environmental pollution, entire populations of birds and wild game have “collapsed,” and about one-third of all fish and mammals are endangered. The report notes that over 60 percent of “forced” animal slaughter (mostly cattle and pigs) can be attributed to “various kinds of poisoning and dietary disturbances.” In fact, the study identifies the agricultural system, especially the heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides, as a major source of pollution.

In the final section, the Academy’s researchers examine the accompanying health problems, especially in North Bohemia, where mining activity and therefore the sulphur dioxide and related pollution are the greatest. In this region (populated by about three million), infant mortality was running 12 percent higher than the nation-

al average in 1980, while the average life span was 3 or 4 years lower than in the rest of the country. But equally compelling is the study’s finding that in many regions of the country and in several large cities the technology for the purification of (polluted) water is so inadequate that supposedly drinkable water is a serious health hazard. On a separate note, the study singles out health-hazardous noise levels that affect about 40 percent of the population. The report concludes that environmental deterioration is one of the reasons why the rate of “work disability” on account of illness increased by over 48 percent between 1960 and 1980.

Though not intended as such, the Academy’s study is a devastating indictment of government neglect of a problem whose transnational scope has now reached alarming proportions. That is, of course, why the Husak regime chose to suppress it. Over the past two years, the official media have outlined some aspects of the ecological crisis, paying increasing attention especially to the environmental deterioration of the Bohemian forests.⁹ What undoubtedly added to Prague’s discomfort was a 1984 report submitted to the Hungarian Parliament identifying Czechoslovakia as the main source of sulphurous pollution in Hungary. During his December, 1984, visit to Prague, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also brought up the subject of acid rain, including suggestions for bilateral measures to address the problem.

Earlier in 1985, Prague evidently relented. In March, Josef Kempny, a member of the party Politburo, talked about doubling government spending on “ecological problems” during 1986–1990. In July, without details, an article in the party-controlled press disclosed that the Czechoslovak government had signed an agreement to reduce the 1980 levels of sulphur dioxide emissions by 30 percent by 1995.¹⁰ The seriousness of the environmental damage is evident from the fact that the State Commis-

(Continued on page 392)

⁹Recent articles addressing the subject include *Tvorba*, July 3, 1985, pp. 12–13, and July 10, 1985, p. 14; *Tribuna*, July 10, 1985, pp. 4–5.

¹⁰*Tvorba*, July 10, 1985, p. 14.

Michael Kraus has published several articles on East European affairs, and he has also translated and published Czech prose and poetry. He revisited his native Czechoslovakia in 1983.

"The Jaruzelski regime claims to have achieved a degree of stability and 'normalization' since 1981, but it has not been able to achieve political legitimacy. The issues of democracy, political participation, and justice raised by Solidarity have not been resolved and continue to haunt the government. . . . In 1985, most Poles do not want to address such issues and have turned their attention to family and Church."

Stalemate and Apathy in Poland

BY DAVID S. MASON

Associate Professor of Political Science, Butler University

FOR Polish society, the last five years have been, in turn, exhilarating, chaotic and depressing.¹ The dockworkers' and miners' strikes of August, 1980, forced the government to sign the Gdansk Agreements, the first of which allowed the formation of the independent self-governing trade union Solidarity. During the 16 months of Solidarity's legal existence, Poland had the most democratic environment in its postwar history. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Prime Minister and party leader, brought this to an end with the declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981. Martial law was formally lifted in July, 1983, and most of the interned Solidarity leaders were released in July, 1984. But many martial law restrictions were continued, and Poland remains a society that is sullen, pessimistic and divided.

Solidarity's impact on Poland was remarkable. The union attracted some nine million members—one-third of Poland's adult population. The universal appeal of this independent, free-spirited organization extended into the Polish United Workers party (Poland's Communist party), one-third of whose members joined Solidarity. The openness of political debate in Solidarity forced a democratization of virtually every other institution in the country, including the party. The flood of independent publications issued by Solidarity groups opened the official press and led to the implementation of a new and vastly more liberal law on censorship. Solidarity's popularity, its programs, and its charismatic leader, Lech Walesa, forced the party and the government to compete for the people's allegiance.

Thus, during 1981, the regime conceded a number of popular issues: legalizing Solidarity and its right to strike; allowing the Sunday radio broadcast of Roman Catholic mass; granting work-free Saturdays and dramatic increases in wages; and permitting Solidarity to publish its own national weekly newspaper, *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*. New legislation provided greater autonomy for universities, decentralized economic reform, and established a system of enterprise self-management in which the work-

ers would share in the governance of the workplace and select its director.

There was, however, a dark side to these concessions. The relationship between Solidarity and the regime was bitter, distrustful and conflict-prone; neither side adjusted to the compromise necessary for democracy. Solidarity accused the government of reneging on the Gdansk Agreements (it remains a popular myth in Poland that the government never implemented any of the 21 demands). Not trusting the government to accede to its demands through negotiation, Solidarity often resorted to the only tactic that had brought results: strikes, or the threat of strikes.

The regime, on the other hand, claimed that Solidarity had exceeded the boundaries set in August, 1980, making demands that were more political than economic and threatening the constitutional principle of the "leading role of the party." To complicate matters further, the Polish economy continued the nose dive that began in 1979, causing serious shortages of basic products like bread. All this contributed to the crisis atmosphere of late 1981. When Jaruzelski declared a "state of war" (there was no provision in the Polish constitution for martial law), he claimed that he did so in sorrow; Poland was "on the edge of the abyss" and his action was necessary to save the country from civil war and chaos.²

The speed and effectiveness of the crackdown were extraordinary. Several thousand Solidarity leaders and activists were "interned" and others went into hiding. The flood of Solidarity publications, banners, posters and buttons disappeared, declared illegal by the military authorities. All organizations, demonstrations and assemblies (except religious ones) were temporarily banned. The regime imposed a curfew, put restrictions on travel, and blacked out communications. The spontaneous strikes and demonstrations launched by workers and miners were starved out or broken up, often violently, by "ZOMO," the motorized riot police.

Jaruzelski's professed task during this period was "normalization" with the promise of a continuation of the process of "renewal" begun in 1981. The apparent stabilization led the regime gradually to relax the restrictions of martial law, while formally eliminating the new and reformed institutions and weakening the laws that

¹The author would like to thank Robert Sharlet and David Ost for their helpful comments and suggestions on this article.

²For an excellent account of the Solidarity experience and the early months of martial law, see Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Scribner's, 1984).

emerged in 1981. In October, 1982, Solidarity was formally banned, with a law providing for the establishment of new unions. In November, Walesa was released from internment and allowed to return to work in the Gdansk shipyards. In July, 1983, martial law was lifted, though many of its restrictions remained in force. In July, 1983, and in July, 1984, the regime proclaimed an amnesty for Solidarity activists under arrest or in hiding.

While the regime may claim some success with "normalization" in the two years since the lifting of martial law, and while it may claim to be on the road to economic recovery and political renewal, in reality the situation is less rosy and more complex. Popular defiance and open resistance may not be so prevalent as they were two years ago, but the regime has not been able to achieve the legitimacy it desires, nor has it mobilized the population toward its economic and political goals.

THE REGIME'S EFFORTS AT "NORMALIZATION"

When martial law was lifted, Prime Minister Jaruzelski told the Sejm (the Polish Parliament):

Our intentions are sincere. They are demonstrated by the implementation of socialist renewal. They are confirmed by the democratization of social life, the strengthening of the position of the working class, the rebirth of the trade union movement, the development of the class-based, independent and self-governing trade unions, by the consolidation of the practice of seeking advice and consultation, and by the far-reaching economic reform.

At the same time, he asserted that "anarchy will not return to Poland. Efforts to undertake antistate activity will be repressed no less resolutely than during martial law."³ These words exemplify the two-track policy the regime has followed: efforts to elicit controlled participation, advice and support, and forceful suppression of dissent and underground activity. Neither track has been entirely successful.

In its effort to channel and control the participatory spirit bred by Solidarity, the regime has dissolved most of the old institutional structures and has created new ones under the party's supervision. As might be expected, none of these has generated the enthusiasm or participation that Solidarity enjoyed. The regime-sponsored Patriotic Committee for National Rebirth (PRON), established in July, 1982, was to act as a coalition of all social forces, but it has attracted little interest or support. It is widely and openly criticized for not reflecting public needs.⁴

New regime-sponsored organizations for artists, writ-

ers, journalists and students have been unable to recruit as many members as their more independent predecessors. The new Polish Students' Association, for example, has enrolled only about 10 percent of all students. These new organizations find it difficult to attract members partly because of a continuing Solidarity-sponsored boycott of all "official" organizations.

The regime's main hope seems to lie with the reconstituted trade unions. These organizations, as defined by the law of October, 1982, were to be "independent" and "self-governing" (terms used to describe Solidarity) and were to have the right to strike, which pre-Solidarity unions had not had. But they are limited by a number of restrictions. At first, they could exist only at the factory level, not at the regional or national levels; when they did expand, they were organized by branch of industry, rather than region, as Solidarity had been; and, most critically, there was only one union organization in each enterprise until 1985, though this restriction has been repeatedly extended.

Despite a Solidarity boycott, the new unions now number about five million members, considerably fewer than the Solidarity or the pre-1980 union members but probably more than either Solidarity or the regime expected. In fact, a number of surveys show that about one-third of the new members are former members of Solidarity. Most workers, however, have adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the new unions, and so far they have not seen very much. The new unions have been short on both resources and legitimacy, and they have been visible mostly in complaints about price increases. In the spring of 1984, national union officials publicly complained that government decisions on price increases had been taken "without any consultation with the trade unions."⁵ In 1985, the government actually scaled down price increases, ostensibly in response to union complaints.

To boost the visibility and attractiveness of the new unions and to create central organizations with which the government could "consult," the government allowed accelerated development of national union structures, culminating in the establishment of a centralized Trade Unions' National Agreement (OPZZ) in November, 1984. And in July, 1985, the Sejm passed an updated trade union law that strengthened the factory-level unions by granting them responsibility for all employees (not just union members) and extending their responsibilities, especially in the area of social welfare.⁶ While this may have been helpful for the new unions, it struck a double blow at Solidarity: the new legislation extends the ban on multiple unions in a workplace, frustrating Solidarity's demands for trade union pluralism, and it transfers to the unions some of the functions held by enterprise self-management councils, where many Solidarity supporters had directed their support.

In many ways, the trade union issue illustrates the wider dilemmas and paradoxes of post-martial law Poland. A strong and vocal minority, including the most

³Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Przemowienia 1983* (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1984), pp. 167-168.

⁴See, for example, the roundtable discussion titled "An Attempt at Dialogue," in *Polityka*, January 5, 1985; translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *East Europe Report*, no. 85/27 (February 28, 1985).

⁵*Trybuna Ludu*, April 27, 1984.

⁶For the draft of the new legislation, see "Ustawa o zwiazkach zawodowych," *Zwiazkowiec*, May, 1985.

active Solidarity supporters, refuses to support the new structures and brands those who do as collaborators or opportunists. On the other hand, many Poles believe that the unions provide the only real opportunity to defend the interests of the workers, given domestic and "geopolitical" realities.⁷ A broad middle group refuses to identify with either position, preferring to "wait and see" or simply to turn away from public and societal affairs altogether. This roughly equal tripartite division has paralyzed Polish society, making it impossible for either the regime or the opposition to muster enough support to carry through its programs.

The regime has used other methods to pursue "normalization," but these too have had mixed results. In June, 1984, the government staged elections to the local and regional people's councils. There were two candidates for each position, and voters could reject the first in favor of the second candidate. Solidarity's underground Interim Coordinating Committee (TKK) called for a boycott of the elections and arranged for Solidarity supporters to monitor polling places for an accurate reading of the turnout.

The final results allowed both sides to claim a victory. The government claimed a 75 percent turnout which, in government spokesman Jerzy Urban's words, showed "that the public supports stabilization, peace and socialist development in Poland."⁸ Solidarity said the government's figures were inflated by between 12 and 15 percent, meaning that some 10.5 million people boycotted the elections—a victory for the banned union.

In an effort to portray an atmosphere of stability and normalization and to assuage Western governments, the government proclaimed major amnesty programs on the official national holiday of July 22 in both 1983 and 1984. The 1983 amnesty was broader, covering "almost 3,700 people guilty of political offenses, and over 1,100 who turned themselves in of their own accord,"⁹ but it did not include the most important opposition leaders. The 1984 amnesty did. According to official figures, of 652 political prisoners, 630 were freed; included were 7 members of Solidarity's National Commission and 4 prominent members of KOR, the Workers' Defense Committee. Since the amnesty, some of these people have been arrested again; nevertheless, the amnesty presented a paradoxical situation: an authoritarian Communist state freeing its most prominent opponents.

⁷This is the Aesopian term used in both the official and unofficial press to describe the constraints on Polish action imposed by the Soviet Union.

⁸*Rzeczpospolita*, June 18, 1984.

⁹*Zycie Warszawy*, July 24, 1984.

¹⁰For example, Lawrence Weschler, "Poland: Three Years After," *Harper's*, December, 1984, p. 18; and Marian Kostecki and Krzysztof Mrela, "Collective Solidarity in Poland's Powdered Society," *The Insurgent Sociologist*, vol. 12, nos. 1-2 (1984).

¹¹Solidarity poll reported in *Słowo Podziemne*, May 27, 1984; cited in Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFER), "Polish Situation Report," January 23, 1985. Official poll in *Polityka*, July 27, 1985, p. 6.

This is not to say that the Jaruzelski regime has relied only on the carrot. The authorities have periodically cracked down on those who strike, demonstrate, publish illegally, or plan these activities. On February 13, 1985, police broke up a Gdansk meeting of opposition activists organized by Lech Walesa. Walesa was subsequently ordered not to leave Gdansk without prior permission from the police. Three of his colleagues, Wladyslaw Frasnyniuk, Bogdan Lis, and Adam Michnik, were arrested and tried for planning a strike (which never took place), and each was sentenced to two to three years imprisonment.

The authorities have also attempted to rein in the country's intellectuals and the universities which, even under martial law, had been among the most outspoken and autonomous in East Europe. In April, 1985, for example, history professor and Solidarity adviser Bronislaw Geremek was dismissed from the prestigious Academy of Sciences apparently for public lectures critical of the Polish government and its relationship to the Soviet Union. The universities have also been subject to increased pressure. In July, 1985, the Sejm passed a new law on higher education restricting the autonomy of the universities, over the objections of the the university senate and a number of government advisory commissions.

THE PULVERIZED SOCIETY

In the short term, the regime probably does not need to worry about another round of insurgency. After the excitement and disruptions of 1980 and 1981, the depression of 1982, and the economic hardships of the last five years, many Poles are apathetic and withdrawn from public life. The apathy and hopelessness are heightened by the loss of the sense of "solidarity" that characterized the early months after the Gdansk strikes. While most Poles objected to martial law, some did support it and only a minority of the population now backs the protest activities of the Solidarity underground.

Most Solidarity supporters and many writers¹⁰ suggest that the regime has deliberately promoted this sense of hopelessness and division in Polish society because it is the best protection against rebellion. Whether or not this is true, apathy and privatism are typical of societies that have just been through great upheavals; people turn to personal and family matters for a sense of relief and calm.

The sense of despair is as much a result of economic as political factors. Both official and underground public opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of Poles think that the government's policies will not end the economic crisis and that the economy will deteriorate even further.¹¹ Other polls show that while almost everyone blames the party and government for the "current crisis," many also blame "the political opposition." In fact, both public opinion polls and conversations with Poles reveal that the only institution in Poland with widespread support is the Church. Even among Solidarity activists, "the underground opposition" is rated favor-

ably by a bare majority (54.6 percent) of the respondents, while the Church is at the top of the list with 74.5 percent.¹² As usual in these polls, the Polish United Workers' party is at or near the bottom of these lists, and other official institutions fare almost as badly.

Frustration, apathy and alienation are particularly evident among the young, who constitute about half the population and who were the driving force behind Solidarity. A report by the Primate's Social Council on the Situation of Young People found "an overwhelming and increasing passivity on the part of most young people who, tormented by futile anger, turn away from the pressure of schools and organizations and seek refuge in individualism and in the passivity and exclusiveness of small groups of friends."¹³ This report also noted the increased incidence of religious belief among young people and the increasing support for the Church as both a moral and a political authority.

Even official publications admit that young people have little confidence in "new sociopolitical institutions," do not participate in officially sponsored organizations, and "distance themselves verbally from the socialist system and question its achievements."¹⁴ A survey of Gdansk high school students in 1984 found only 2 percent declaring themselves Marxists; and support is not much higher among university students.¹⁵ Only 11 percent of Polish United Workers' party members are less than 30 years old, the lowest percentage in the party's history. The party also suffers from a steady decline in membership (from 3.1 million in 1980 to only 2.1 million in mid-1985).

There are grimmer aspects to Polish society. According to official sources, alcoholism, drug abuse and crime (including violent crime) are on the increase, and the visitor to Poland is struck by the number of drunks and drug addicts encountered in the streets, many of them young people. This and the attendant alienation and frustration have led two Polish sociologists to describe their country as "a pulverized society."¹⁶

THE UNDERGROUND

Underground activity remains widespread in Poland, but Solidarity activists have almost the same difficulty as the regime in penetrating the pervasive apathy and passivity. As one underground publication argues, "society is not with us, nor is it with the authorities—it is keeping to

¹²*Slowo Podziemne*, op. cit.

¹³Cited in RFER, February 15, 1985.

¹⁴*Glos Szczeciński*, July 2, 1984.

¹⁵*Polityka*, August 11, 1984. In the 1970's, similar surveys in different cities found 10 percent or more of young people identifying themselves as Marxists.

¹⁶Kostecki and Mrela, op. cit., p. 135.

¹⁷*Mysli Nieintemowane*, January-February 1984; translated in RFER, "Polish Samizdat Excerpts," July 6, 1984. Italics in original.

¹⁸See his article in the leading underground weekly *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, March 22, 1984; translated in RFER, "Polish Samizdat Excerpts," September 7, 1984.

itself."¹⁷ There are probably tens of thousands of people involved in various kinds of underground activity, but most of this is local and decentralized. The "underground society" permeates the country, but it is not controlled by the persecuted and divided Solidarity leadership.

In the early months of martial law, the underground TKK was able to organize major national demonstrations against the government. But harassment by the police and ZOMO and the fatigue of Solidarity supporters eventually cut down the size of these demonstrations. Of the seven initial members of the TKK, all but Zbigniew Bujak have either surrendered or have been apprehended (although each of them has been replaced by someone else on the TKK). The July, 1984, amnesty added to the ranks of the "above-ground" Solidarity leadership, formally led by Lech Walesa. While most Solidarity leaders have apparently met with Walesa on an individual basis, there have been few group meetings. A meeting was held in September, 1984, at Jasna Gora Monastery in Czestochowa, but another meeting in February, 1985, was broken up by police and led to long prison terms for three of the participants. The authorities continue to harass Walesa and restrict his movements, and refer to him as a "private person" and "the former leader of a former trade union."

Walesa nevertheless remains a popular figure in Poland, his reputation enhanced by the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize. He continues to make cautious statements to Western reporters and the underground press about the future of the movement and the country. He has argued in favor of carving out "relatively independent fields" of activity, including participation in the employees self-management councils in enterprises.¹⁸ In fact, self-management has become the major focus for the national Solidarity leaders, who contend that the self-management councils, with sufficient participation from Solidarity supporters, can effect positive changes. Partly because of Solidarity's increasing interest, the regime has tried to fortify the new trade unions, which often compete with the self-management bodies in the workplace.

Most large enterprises have underground Solidarity structures to which, on average, one-fifth of the work force continues to pay monthly dues. Local Solidarity activities focus on providing financial aid to those persecuted by the authorities and the printing and distribution of Solidarity bulletins and other underground publications. This *samizdat* has reached unprecedented dimensions, with as many as 2,000 regular publications. Some of these are simply 1- or 2-page bulletins (some of which are printed

(Continued on page 390)

David S. Mason has written many articles on contemporary Polish affairs. He conducted research in Poland in both 1982 and 1984 under grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). He is the author of *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

"In the past two decades, although Bulgaria remains close to Moscow, it has been more open to the West in the fields of culture and economics. Bulgarian trade with the European Common Market and, to a lesser degree, with North America has increased, and Bulgaria's role as a supplier of technology and manufactured goods to the third world continues to grow rapidly."

Bulgaria's Role in East Europe

BY FREDERICK B. CHARY

Professor of History, Indiana University, Gary

ALONE among the countries of the "Southern Tier" Bulgaria, the Soviet Union's closest ally, has a particularly significant friendship with the Soviet Union. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany are forced by geopolitical necessity to toe Moscow's line, but the states of the Southern Tier, e.g., Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, are remarkably independent of Moscow. Bulgaria's friendship with the Soviet Union lies partly in historical tradition. The great statue of Alexander II, the Czar Liberator, still guards Parliament Square. Close by is the Alexander Nevski Cathedral, whose golden cupolas dominate Sofia's skyline. Named after one of Russia's most famous saints, the church was built by the Russophile Progressive party in the early 1900's. The cultural affinity of the brother Slav nations is always noted in public pronouncements. But perhaps more important today is Bulgaria's economic reliance on the Soviet Union, and its strategic importance. In exchange for their cooperation, the Bulgarians have received a great deal of financial aid over the past 40 years. Furthermore, with the dissatisfaction of Yugoslavia and Albania and the state of tension between Romania and the Soviet Union, the role of Moscow's ally in the Balkans is conveniently vacant. Sofia has filled the position for its own political and economic advantage.

If it chose, Bulgaria could distance itself from Moscow. Its leaders choose to do otherwise. It is in these circumstances that the cultural affiliations between Russians and Bulgarians are emphasized. Since World War II, attempts to challenge this relationship in Bulgaria have always been defeated. In the economic field, however, as long as an unbreakable relationship between the two is publicly maintained, Sofia has sometimes been able to travel a different road. General Secretary Todor Zhivkov's 30-year tenure in the party leadership is based in part on his commitment to friendship with the Soviet Union. The genuine popular support he has been able to win in his country is evidence that this commitment is also accepted by the people.

In public foreign policy, Bulgaria fully supports the Soviet Union. Bulgaria was the first East European country to join the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games, and at Moscow's request Zhivkov canceled an important state visit to West Germany in 1984. Both of these actions disappointed Sofia, but friendship with

Moscow is its cardinal principle. It is true that, particularly in affairs regarding the Balkans, the policies of the two governments are not always the same. Bulgaria's relations with countries like Albania and Romania differ from Moscow's. But some observers argue that Bulgaria's policy, although it differs from that of the Soviet Union, in fact benefits Moscow and that Sofia is still under Moscow's control.

Indeed, it helps Moscow to have a close ally with an embassy in Tirana and to have a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans in light of the two-tier Soviet defense strategy. In the Ninth of September celebration of 1984, before his nomination to the leadership of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a major speech in Sofia supporting Sofia's Balkan policies. Yet there are signs of tension between Sofia and Moscow, e.g., the Macedonian question and Bulgarian-West German trade.

In the past two decades, although Bulgaria remains close to Moscow, it has been more open to the West in the fields of culture and economics. Bulgarian trade with the European Common Market and, to a lesser degree, with North America has increased, and Bulgaria's role as a supplier of technology and manufactured goods to the third world continues to grow rapidly.

The increasing trade reflects the rapid rise of living standards in Bulgaria in the past five years. The shops are filled with abundant domestic and foreign goods (measured by previous Bulgarian and East Bloc standards), and even the remotest villages seem to be faring well. Shortages are more a result of internal distribution problems or seasonal shortages than a lack of goods. Ten years ago, when the country was adjusting to worldwide recession, consumer items were difficult to find. Coffee, almost beyond the reach of an average Bulgarian household only a few years ago, is now found everywhere. Bananas, oranges, pineapple juice, even brussels sprouts and asparagus—never seen in Bulgarian markets before—are available. Every household has access to appliances like televisions, refrigerators and washing machines. Almost every family in Sofia has a car and many have villas outside the city. Travel abroad is more common.

However, because of an increase in the allotments of private and cooperative farming, agricultural goods are often more available in the country than in the cities, and a reverse snobbery has occurred. A decade ago, Bulgar-

ian city dwellers hid their recent rural background. Now a family home in the country is a prized possession for city folk—both as a place to vacation and a way to obtain coveted farm produce. Only within the last year has there been a downturn in the availability of goods, and the 1984–1985 winter was especially severe. Whether or not this is just a temporary setback time will tell.

With the quantity of Bulgarian goods reaching high levels, in 1984 the Bulgarian Communist party launched a major campaign to improve the quality of production, with an eye to export. The April, 1956, plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party—Bulgaria's de-Stalinization—marked Zhivkov's commitment to a consumer-oriented economy, including imports. Bulgarians still refer to the April Plenum as a major turning point in the contemporary history of their country.

MACEDONIA

Macedonia remains a source of tension between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, its western neighbor. At the government level relations between Belgrade and Sofia are more friendly today than they were five years ago; but the war of words among scholars has not abated. The Yugoslavs charge that Bulgarian historians and linguists deny the reality of the Macedonian nation; the Bulgarians countercharge that the Yugoslavs are stealing the Bulgarian past.

The question of Macedonian nationality is complex and to large extent insoluble, because of the region's dozens of nationalities, including Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs (Romance-speaking people), Jews (now few because of the Holocaust), Serbs and Turks. The creation of a state or an autonomous region on national lines is impossible; there are no accurate ethnicity statistics. The great debate among the Slavs—Serbs and Bulgarians—is whether a separate Macedonian nationality exists and if it does, when did it begin.

Before World War II, both Sofia and Belgrade insisted that there was no Macedonian nation, but Bulgaria maintained that the South Slavs of the region were Bulgarians; the Yugoslavs said they were Serbs. After the war, the Marxist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acknowledged the existence of a separate Macedonian nation, whose national region was one of the constituent republics of the federation. This may have been a first step in a Socialist Balkan Federation—a dream of various left-wing politicians in the turbulent period between the wars. In fact, at that time Sofia also acknowledged a distinct Macedonian nationality with claims to land in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. However, since then plans for the romantic Balkan federation have disappeared. The Bulgarians still acknowledge that there is a Macedonian nation, but trace its existence only since 1945. (Many Bulgarians, particularly those with roots in Macedonia, do not even concede this.) Furthermore, the

"Macedonians" listed in the Bulgarian census of the 1950's became Bulgarians in the census of the 1960's, and since then census records have not listed figures according to nationality at all.

For their part, the Yugoslavs claim that Sofia is forcing their Macedonians to adopt a foreign nationality, charging that the Bulgarians want to incorporate Yugoslav Macedonia into Bulgaria. Sofia denies this and declares that Yugoslavia wants to incorporate Bulgarian territory—the small corner of Macedonia it retains.

In the current war of words between the two scholarly communities, the battle focuses on two points. "Is Macedonian an authentic separate language or a dialect of Bulgarian?" and, second, "When did the Macedonian nation originate?" The Bulgarians insist that Macedonian is a Bulgarian dialect and that the Macedonian nation was created in 1945 by the Yugoslav government. The Yugoslavs counter that Macedonian is in fact an independent South Slavic language equal to Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian and that the Macedonian nation has existed at least as long as the other Slavic nations of the Balkans. The Bulgarians have correctly demonstrated that the heroes of Macedonian liberation—Gotse Delchev, Iana Sandanski and others—were Bulgarians, at least in the sense that they thought of themselves as Bulgarians and wrote their appeals to their people and the world in literary Bulgarian. The early revolutionaries wanted to be part of the Bulgarian state. Later, the Macedonian freedom movement developed an alternative plan, a separate Bulgarian state called Macedonia.

THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

Sofia has tried to improve cultural and commercial relations with the rest of the world. But the major issue on which the foreign press has dwelt has been the alleged involvement of the Bulgarian secret service in the 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II by the Turkish terrorist Mehmet Ali Agca. The involvement of Sofia (the so-called "Bulgarian connection") appears at this writing to be an elaborate fabrication fostered by the Italian secret service and a group of extreme anti-Communist Western journalists, although the case is not yet resolved and additional revelations may come to light.

The popular American and Italian media have reported that the Bulgarian secret service, at the request of the Soviet Union, arranged for the assassination of the Pope through Turkish and Bulgarian agents in order to stop the growth of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In the long process of investigation—almost four years—key documents and related charges concerning the Bulgarian authorities have proved to be false or nonexistent. The allegations hinge solely on Agca's testimony, but the press has reported that he was able to give significant details about his alleged Bulgarian accomplices.

Nevertheless, in his public 1985 trial, Agca proved to be an unstable witness, contradicting himself and often

acting irrationally in court. His supposed knowledge of his Bulgarian co-defendant's habits and living quarters—the key to the prosecution—has been damaged by the revelation that, in fact, he was coached by Italian security officers before he implicated the Bulgarians in 1981.¹ The issue is further complicated by a possible link between the Italian security service and organized crime in Italy; organized crime might have its own reason to murder the Pope because of Vatican banking scandals. Nevertheless, despite the vagueness of the conspiracy charges, Bulgaria's reputation has been severely damaged by Agca's allegations.

Another charge involving Bulgaria concerns alleged discriminatory legislation and actions by the Bulgarian government against the Turkish minority. These charges were published in the Turkish press in the spring of 1984, although rumors were circulating earlier. The facts are still unclear, and do not appear to be related to the Agca case. The Turks claim that Bulgaria is forcing Turkish citizens to adopt Bulgarian names and that the authorities are obstructing Muslim religious practices. The Bulgarians have denied all these charges, although they admit that some Turks have adopted characteristic Bulgarian names of their own accord. The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has circulated a statement by the leaders of the Bulgarian Muslim community insisting that Turks are under no pressure to change their names nor have they suffered any harassment in the practice of their religion or discrimination in their daily life.

There are reports that the Bulgarian Turks have staged demonstrations and that a number of protesters have been imprisoned. On September 9, 1984, while Bulgaria celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the coming to power of the Fatherland Front, bomb explosions in Varna and Plovdiv caused fatalities. The perpetrators remain unknown, but they were probably ethnic Turks reacting against the alleged anti-Turkish measures taken by the government.*

It is difficult to discover why the Bulgarians might want to assimilate the Turkish minority.² Bulgaria has long been known as a land tolerant of national minorities.

*Editor's note: Between 1950 and 1978, 280,000 ethnic Turks were returned to Turkey. However, in a speech in March, 1985, a Bulgarian Politburo official declared that ethnic Turks who wanted to emigrate to Turkey would be forcibly resettled within Bulgaria instead. In early August, senior Turkish officials alleged that at least 1,000 ethnic Turks had been killed and several thousand had been imprisoned by the Bulgarian government because of their refusal to adopt Turkish names. See *The New York Times*, August 5, 1985.

¹Alexander Cockburn, "Beat the Devil: The Gospel According to Ali Agca," *The Nation*, vol. 24, no. 1 (July 6, 1985), pp. 1, 6–7.

²Since World War II, there has been at least one other occasion when it was charged that Bulgaria was harassing the Turks. In the early 1950's, the government was accused of expelling Turkish citizens from Bulgaria against their will. Sofia claimed that those who left were voluntary migrants. The exact number is hard to determine because of the lack of reliable census data.

Like most countries in East Europe, it is not homogeneous; historically, it has had a minority population of almost 20 percent. There are over 50 different ethnic groups in Bulgaria, but most of them number less than 1,000 and in some cases less than 100. (Today the estimates of minority population run as high as one-third.) The Turks have always constituted the overwhelming majority of the non-Bulgarian nationalities. They are particularly concentrated in the northwestern part of the republic. However, other significant groups number in the tens of thousands—gypsies, Greeks, Jews (less than 10,000 now as most of them have moved to Israel), and other less numerous groups. Even the two groups—Turks and Greeks—who were victims of Bulgarian political and cultural oppression before 1878 were treated fairly well by the population after 1944. This is not to deny that there are clashes, official discrimination, and nationality riots, but some ethnic unrest is present everywhere in Europe, indeed it is present throughout the world.

In fact, Bulgaria has a history of toleration that is surprising in view of the picture of national conflict in other parts of East Europe. The reasons for this tolerance lie in the cosmopolitan traditions of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires—Bulgaria's cultural ancestors—and the relatively high percentage of ethnic Bulgarians in the nation state. For example, even though Bulgaria's Jewish community of about 0.8 percent of the population suffered anti-Semitic discrimination during World War II because of the Sofia–Berlin alliance, virtually the entire community survived the Holocaust.

Tolerance, however, requires an acknowledgement of ethnic diversity. This is what is so puzzling in the current case. In modern Bulgaria ethnicity has meant linguistic ethnicity. The few Bulgarian Catholics are considered Bulgarians. Even the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Pomaks, are recognized as Bulgarians (although unlike the Catholics, they themselves generally do not have a Bulgarian national consciousness) and there have been various attempts since 1878 to force them to assimilate. The Macedonians are also considered actual or potential Bulgarians. However, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Turks, and gypsies are not Bulgarians; with regard to these groups, a policy of assimilation would represent a new departure.

Another issue may be playing a role—the demographic crisis. For the last decade, there has been great concern in official circles about the declining birthrates of

(Continued on page 387)

Frederick B. Chary is the author of *The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940–1944* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1972) as well as other publications relating to Balkan history and current affairs. He has often visited Bulgaria, and has lived there for extended periods over the past two decades. He is president of the North American Bulgarian Studies Association.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON EAST EUROPE

THE EAGLE AND THE SMALL BIRDS: CRISIS IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE FROM YALTA TO SOLIDARITY. *By Michael Charlton.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 192 pages, photographs, and index, \$14.95.)

Charlton, a commentator for the British Broadcasting Corporation, has marshaled a group of important behind-the-scenes players—diplomats, soldiers, journalists and academics—to reminisce about the Soviet Union's role in East Europe. Charlton's skillful questioning accounts for the provocative comments (former United States National Security Council member Richard Pipes's view that the Soviet Union "is the last large empire—white man's empire—in the world") and the detailed eyewitness accounts of Soviet intimidation and terror. The book's only failing is the restricted range of opinion: a longer book that included views from those who are less hardline than the people interviewed here would have given a more nuanced account of the Soviet Union and East Europe. W.W.F.

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST: HUNGARY AND THE ILLUSIONS OF PEACEMAKING, 1945–1947. *By Stephen Kertesz.* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984. 299 pages, notes, photographs and index, \$20.00.)

Kertesz was a key player in Hungarian foreign policy both during and after World War II. *Between Russia and the West* thus reads more like a memoir than a narrative history. His account of the intricacies of Hungarian foreign policymaking after the war gives a detailed picture of one East European country's subjugation to Soviet-backed rule. W.W.F.

LIBERATED CINEMA: THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE. *By Daniel J. Goulding.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. 190 pages, notes, photographs, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

This is the first book to analyze Yugoslav feature films produced since the end of World War II. Although the requisite film analysis is here, there is also a discussion of the political and social debates that surrounded the films discussed. W.W.F.

POLAND'S POLITICIZED ARMY: COMMUNISTS IN UNIFORM. *By George C. Malcher.* (New York: Praeger, 1984. 287 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$32.95.)

General Wojciech Jaruzelski's position as head of

the state and the party in Poland are unprecedented in the Eastern bloc, where the military has traditionally been subordinate to the party. Malcher argues that the Polish army has always been deeply involved in party affairs and easily stepped into authority during Solidarity's rise in 1980–1981. He also considers Jaruzelski a simple Soviet puppet. Much of Malcher's argument is based on military newspaper articles, on conjecture and on anti-Communist metaphysics; as a result, most specialists on Poland will dismiss his work. W.W.F.

PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN POLAND, 1980–1982. *By David S. Mason.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 256 pages, notes, appendix and index, n.p.)

Most accounts of Poland and Solidarity have focused on the leaders and policymakers in the party and Solidarity. Mason uses public opinion poll data to look at the attitudes and concerns of those most affected by the clash between Solidarity and the state: the citizens. Mason points out that the polling was remarkably free for a Communist country—even Solidarity published public opinion polls. His analysis of the polling data offers a new perspective on Solidarity and the government's and the people's responses to it. W.W.F.

POLAND, 1980–1981: SOLIDARITY VERSUS THE PARTY. *By Nicholas G. Andrews.* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985. 351 pages, notes, chronology and index, n.p.)

Andrews was deputy chief of mission at the United States embassy in Warsaw from 1979 to 1981. His proximity to the events surrounding the rise and fall of Solidarity and his objective rendering of those events make this a useful history of party–Solidarity action and reaction. W.W.F.

THE CONSUMER UNDER SOCIALIST PLANNING: THE EAST GERMAN CASE. *By Phillip J. Bryson.* (New York: Praeger, 1984. 207 pages, notes and index, \$26.95.)

This is an economist's study of the East German economy. The focus is on how the East German economy compares to West Germany's, especially on the questions of economic planning, policy and performance. There is a wealth of detail from East German source material. W.W.F.

GDR SOCIETY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FACTS AND FIGURES. *By G.E. Edwards.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 244 pages, notes and index, \$27.50.)

Edward's book is just what its subtitle says it is: a

straightforward collection of facts and figures on the family, women, youth and elderly in East Germany. Much of the material has not appeared in English before, so it will be of value to the specialist.

W.W.F.

SMALL-STATE SECURITY IN THE BALKANS. *By Aurel Braun.* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983. 334 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$23.50.)

The author looks at how the six Balkan states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia—interact and cooperate in their quest for security.

W.W.F.

MISCELLANEOUS

BLACK BOX: KAL 007 AND THE SUPERPOWERS. *By Alexander Dallin.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 130 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$14.95.)

Dallin, a Soviet specialist and historian at Stanford, pieces together the events surrounding the shooting down of the Korean commercial airliner by the Soviet Union in September, 1983. He does an admirable job of sifting through the available evidence in order to show how and, insofar as it is possible, why the Soviets shot down the plane; along the way he dismisses the crank theories (that the Soviets knew right-wing Congressman Larry McDonald was on board or that the United States deliberately planned the plane's flight into Soviet airspace). Dallin's most telling comments are on how the superpowers reacted to the incident; as he concludes, "In the absence of the real 'black box' from KAL 007, each side filled its mental, imaginary black box with opposite and incompatible assumptions about the adversary—assumptions which, each believed, were validated by the so-called facts in the case."

W.W.F.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. *Edited by Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984. 455 pages, notes, appendix and index, \$12.95, paper.)

This was one of the first books to examine in depth President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) and it remains required reading. Most of the contributors are critical or very skeptical of Star Wars. There are chapters on the technical needs of the leakproof system the President originally proposed and on the strategic and diplomatic problems the system would create. There is also a detailed review of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile defense program by Sayre Stevens.

W.W.F.

USSR FOREIGN POLICIES AFTER DÉTENTE. *By Richard F. Staar.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 300 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$10.95.)

Believing that the men in the Kremlin "seek con-

frontation" and that "the USSR is still guided by a dogma that remains messianic in its very nature," Richard Staar discusses Soviet foreign policy in detail. He analyzes the Soviet world outlook, Soviet propaganda and Soviet foreign relations from the viewpoint of an American conservative who believes that the "self-perpetuating elite in the Kremlin looks upon the United States as the main enemy. . . ." O.E.S.

DIRECTORY OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. 4th edition. *Edited by the Central Services of the European Consortium for Political Research, University of Essex.* (Munich: K. G. Sauer, 1985. 627 pages and index, \$75.00.)

This is an alphabetical listing of over 2,500 West European political scientists. Each entry provides essential information such as current position, address, major publications, and areas of interest and research. The index is broken into 130 headings, making it possible to find political scientists by field or regional area of interest.

O.E.S.

BIOGRAPHY AND GENEALOGY MASTER INDEX, 1981–1985 CUMULATION. *Edited by Barbara McNeil.* (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1985. 4,177 pages in 8 volumes, \$750.00.)

This index updates the 1981 master index. There are more than 2 million citations that index 215 biographical dictionaries. A researcher can readily determine where to find biographical information on notable people in all fields, both living and dead. The cumulation and the master edition are essential research library tools.

O.E.S.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER: A RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS, 1984. *Edited by H. V. Hodson.* (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1985. 570 pages, chronology, maps and index, \$90.00.)

The register is a venerable yearbook; its first editor was Edmund Burke. It is an excellent source for quick background on the most important events of 1984. All the world's countries and regions are covered, and the articles are written by recognized experts. Various subject areas are also covered; however, the latter focus on British achievements (the book is published in Britain but distributed in the United States by Gale).

O.E.S.

ALSO RECEIVED

AUTHORITY, POWER AND POLICY IN THE USSR. *Edited by T.H. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 207 pages, notes and index, \$10.95, paper.)

RUSSIA: THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION. *By Robert V. Daniels.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. 411 pages, notes, annotated bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1980'S. *Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann.* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1984. 244 pages, notes and index, \$8.95.) ■

DISSENT AND THE CONTRA-SYSTEM IN EAST EUROPE

(Continued from page 356)

ticated public policy to cope with the challenges to party hegemony, including corrective accommodation, cooptation, coexistence, and containment. Corrective accommodation usually involves incremental change in the official definition of what constitutes approved art to accommodate concepts, themes and techniques introduced by the contra-culture.

Cooptation, a more ambitious policy approach, aims to wean young people from the counterculture by offering some of the same attractions under state control. In contrast, coexistence is an approach based on an official attitude of resignation: if the regime cannot eliminate a problem, it must tolerate it. Most regimes long ago adopted this stance toward all but the most egregious extremes of the second economy. In fact, the party leaderships have come to recognize the functional value of the second economy as a means of keeping consumer discontent within acceptable bounds without facing the politically disquieting prospect of economic reform. Hungary has gone even further by decriminalizing and coopting the consumer service area of the second economy.

Finally, repressive containment as a policy option was widely used against nearly all opposition in the formative years of the Communist regimes. However, since the 1970's containment has been confined for the most part to political dissent, ethnic nationalism, and underground religious activism. The style and severity of political justice vary. For instance, Romania tends to be far more repressive while Hungary tends to favor much less severe forms of containment. However, no East European regime hesitates to resort to mass repression when a serious threat to the system is perceived; witness Yugoslavia and Poland in 1981.

As for the future, opposition is growing while the official systems appear to be stagnating. More problems lie ahead as more and more crossborder television transmissions from the West¹² hook into the video revolution going on in virtually every East European country but Albania. The personal computer will soon transfer technology from West to East, connecting with the emerging countercultures to create the kind of systemic "subversion" that the police, law codes and repressive machinery cannot even begin to contemplate, no less cope with effectively. Time is on the side of the contra-system as cleavages grow wider between increasingly open opposition of all kinds and the closed state systems. The ideas of Lenin may still reign in the citadels of power of East Europe, but beyond the palace walls the public mood is probably better summed up by the irreverent graffiti, "Lennon is still with us," scrawled on a wall in Prague. ■

¹²See George H. Quester, "Transboundary Television," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 33, no. 5 (September-October, 1984), pp. 76-87.

ALBANIA'S NEW BEGINNING

(Continued from page 364)

over six million, will survive. Given the strong anti-Yugoslav tone of his addresses, Alia's statements on the fate of the nation give his immediate neighbors good cause to be concerned.

The fortress walls behind which Hoxha and other hardliners in Tirana retreated in 1948 and 1961 and again in the mid-1970's served their purpose well. For 40 years, the leadership of the APL could concentrate on the country's physical survival and on its plans to industrialize and modernize Europe's least developed corner. Today the walls in no way block the expansion or renewal of mutually beneficial trade agreements or diplomatic contacts with the West as well as the East. New doors, even those opening up the possibility of joint Albanian-American scientific projects, are no problem for Alia's "Stalinist bastion" on the Adriatic. Alia's continuing defense of Hoxha hardly prevents him from following any course of action that will bring Albanians closer to the goal envisioned by their revolutionaries a century ago. Enver Hoxha's "immortality," as one observer notes, in no way implies "immobility" for his successor.¹⁷ The principles of "democratic centralism" and the "right of revocation" have indeed surrounded Ramiz Alia with those "winners" whose loyalty leaves nothing to be desired.¹⁸

The new kapedan must follow any course of action that will turn back South Slav attempts to liquidate the Albanians as a people. Will Ramiz Alia follow a strategy aimed at the further destabilization of an area threatened with political as well as economic restructuring? It is not that Alia would open his fortress walls to a foreign military presence. The stability of the area would be threatened more by improved lines of communication between Tirana and Kosovo than by Soviet submarine lanes from the Black Sea to the Adriatic.

Destabilization of the area could bring one step closer the establishment of an independent ethnic Albanian state in the Balkans, or, given the hostility of its South Slav neighbors, another major disaster for the Albanian nation. Alia apparently finds himself caught between the centuries-old goal of the former and the continuing reality of the latter. For the time being, Kosovo's problems remain Belgrade's. Alia will have to ensure first his own country's economic and political stability, lest Albania in the year 2000 finds itself where Kosovo is today. Judging from what little information there is on its make-up after Hoxha, Albania's new leadership is off to a sure start, a new beginning. ■

¹⁷*The Economist*, April 20, 1985, p.49.

¹⁸One Politburo member perhaps worth watching closely is Hekuran Isai, who is in charge of the country's internal security forces. His rise to top-level positions in the party and the government since the early 1970's has kept pace with that of Alia. His Illyrian name (*hekur* or *iron*) could not be more appropriate.

THE WARSAW PACT

(Continued from page 360)

respect to partial disarmament. Roseate hopes of the self-liquidation of NATO have vanished and have been replaced by increasing emphasis on socialist unity, though Romania has kept up a steady drumbeat on the relevance of the military preconditions of European security. Bilateralism between East European states and capitalist states has been tolerated to a degree, provided it falls within the interests of socialist development, though recently bilateralism has been hit heavily over the head, and small nations have been told to mind their manners.

The reduction of United States military power in Europe has never ceased to be a Soviet objective, yet this has been pursued in a curiously contorted manner through negotiations over Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). These negotiations were designed to constrain the *Bundeswehr* and to tie in a constructive American link, working to put a brake on unilateral United States withdrawal, yet at the same time trying to maintain a form of mutual deterrence between West Germany and the Soviet Union. The overall Soviet-Pact campaign can register only mixed success. There have been gains on territorial issues, but on the system as a whole there has been no outright legitimization of the postwar European order (on the contrary, it has been increasingly called into question).

There has been no outright endorsement of Soviet hegemony; on the contrary, European reaction to the protracted Polish crisis and calls for a revision of the Yalta agreements evidence the jaundiced European view of Soviet hegemony. A Soviet campaign to demonstrate that Europe has no viable defensive option has failed dramatically. Now the only cause open to the Pact is *reculer pour mieux sauter*, which is indeed what Gorbachev has done in his pronouncements on the renewal of the Pact.

What, then, of the future? The dissolution of the Pact at this juncture is inconceivable; it will continue as a useful political framework, though there seems to be little encouragement to improve its performance as a natural alliance. On the contrary, the stringency of Soviet demands and requirements seems to preclude such a development. The recent Pact renewal papers over the cracks. But other shadows over the Pact will not be quickly dissipated, namely, the implications of the massive reorganization of the Soviet command and control systems, especially strategic management.¹⁵ Although the Joint Staff will retain its present features, the changes inherent in the Soviet system may well mean that the Joint Staff may be bypassed, with specific Pact elements drawn off to meet the requirements of Soviet theater warfare operations.

It would be a mistake to look for a quantitative regen-

eration of the Pact in terms of tanks, guns and missiles; the Soviet Union has made it clear that it will not bear the costs. To some extent, the Pact will have to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, but that has only a limited usefulness. Rather, there will probably be a wholesale revamping of the Pact as a command, control, and communications entity, beginning with reorganized air defense systems.

On the surface, the recent Pact renewal proceedings were seemingly intended to convey the message that the Pact is unchanged. But the possibility that Marshal Ogarkov is moving into the Pact command has other implications. He has succeeded to a large degree in revamping and reorganizing the Soviet military, much to the discomfit of many military incumbents. By "integration" Ogarkov means what he says, and his emphasis on the relevance of effective theater operations cannot go unobserved in the Pact.

The Marshal has designed a system that should carry the Soviet military machine through to the year 2000, integrating and coordinating strategic, theater and tactical systems. If he assumes command of the Pact, he will undoubtedly coordinate its command and control, leaving the shell intact but reshaping the system. Over to you, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. ■

BULGARIA

(Continued from page 383)

the Bulgarians in comparison to the non-Bulgarian inhabitants of the republic, particularly the gypsies and the Turks. Bulgarian families, especially urban families—and the postwar age has witnessed a rapid urbanization—tend to have only one or two children. The government has counteracted this trend by offering liberal maternal and child support benefits and programs encouraging fertility. Is it possible that the government is also mounting an assimilation drive among the Turkish population?

Consider the fate of the postwar Bulgarian Jewish community. Traditionally, Bulgarians have regarded Jews as a distinct nationality and both the monarchy and the republic have supported the community's ethnic separateness. There is an organization of Jews in Bulgaria. However, in 1948–1949 most of the community emigrated voluntarily to Israel, without much, if any, hindrance from the government (although a few years earlier, in 1945, the policy of the Communist party was to oppose emigration). Some 6,000 Jews out of 48,000 remained in Bulgaria.

Today, almost all the younger generation of Bulgarian Jews have been assimilated into the Bulgarian population. In fact, Jewish-Bulgarian marriages have been common and members of the younger generation tend to have only one Jewish parent. Most acknowledge their Jewish ancestry as part of their heritage but regard themselves as Bulgarian. A few are identifying themselves as Jews and some are even practicing their religion, but the majority

¹⁵For my own conclusions on Soviet restructuring and reorganization see "The Implications of Soviet Military Power," *Catalyst*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 11–18.

of Bulgarian Jews in the people's republic today are a non-Slavic population that has been voluntarily assimilated.

Whether there is now a parallel social policy for Turkish assimilation and if so, how much is forced and how much is voluntary, cannot yet be determined. But this issue will undoubtedly be a focus of attention in the immediate future. ■

HUNGARY

(Continued from page 368)

have committed themselves by treaty to building the dam. As a result, not merely the party's ability to lead but its wisdom is openly questioned. And although the party would like to lessen its unpopularity by endorsing some of the dissenters' demands, it fears international repercussions and Soviet opposition to its liberal domestic course if it allows dissenting activities to go unchallenged.

In the last analysis, Hungary's foreign policy over three decades was characterized by a near slavish adherence to the Soviet policy. Relying on the Soviet Union for energy and raw materials, defense and weapons systems, Hungary made little or no effort until recently to oppose Soviet initiatives. Yet, the chill in Soviet-American relations has damaged Hungary's economic relations with the Western powers, with whom trade has become a matter of national survival and economic progress.

As a result of these considerations, the Hungarian regime has changed some of its policies. In 1984-1985, Hungary's leaders supported a German-German rapprochement, even when the Soviet leadership was firmly against it.

The Soviet Union remains the dominant power in the region, but its own leadership transition has left the Hungarian elite in a quandary. When hard-line Soviet Politburo member Grigory Romanov seemed to be Chernenko's heir-apparent, the Hungarian leadership tried to promote its own domestic centralizer in the figure of Karoly Grosz. Romanov's abrupt ouster by Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, however, has left Kadar, Grosz and his followers adrift. The party thus seems unable to predict the course it should take.

To conclude, outwardly all is well in Hungary. There is a functioning economy, food in the stores and goods on the shelves; and the second economy has been fully institutionalized. There is a relatively liberal, politically stable social system. And yet there are signs of deep and serious problems. Whether the Hungarian regime will be able to solve these problems without reverting to a more centralized system, however, is not clear. ■

THE POLITICS OF DIVISION AND DÉTENTE IN EAST GERMANY

(Continued from page 372)

qué issued by Honecker and Kohl at the conclusion of their own Moscow meeting less than two months earlier, on the occasion of Chernenko's funeral.¹⁷

Obviously, the new Soviet leadership, preoccupied by considerations of global strategy, had determined to make short shrift of the special concerns of its East German clients, at least for the time being. Sooner or later, however, Soviet policymakers were bound to take a hard look at East Germany's domestic situation. And any realistic assessment would come up with a mixed balance sheet.

THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY

With respect to the East German economy, the scaffolding for the SED's domestic *Hauptaufgabe*, the picture is superficially rosy. The international credit crunch and the major domestic supply shortages experienced by East Germany have been substantially overcome, thanks in large measure to assistance from West Germany. Over the last several years East Germany has received five major hard currency loans, at least three of which were directly guaranteed by the West German government. Of the latter, the politically most spectacular was the DM1-billion (\$370-million) credit negotiated in June, 1983, by Franz Josef Strauss, the head of West Germany's right-wing Christian Social Union (CSU), long an outspoken critic of Bonn's *Deutschlandpolitik* and a *bête noir* of the SED's.

Currently the GDR enjoys a hard currency cushion estimated at \$5 billion. What the regime proposes to do with this windfall remains a mystery, the more so since it has yet to be utilized to effect any sizable reduction in East Germany's overall indebtedness to the West. The newly accumulated hard currency reserves may be intended as insurance to protect the GDR against another international credit crisis like the one that confronted the entire socialist bloc during the Polish debacle; the reserves may also be used to acquire high-quality Western consumer goods or, as seems most likely, to procure advanced Western technology for use at home and for transfer to the Soviet Union.¹⁸

All these possibilities illustrate the crucial importance of foreign trade for East Germany, a highly industrialized but resource-poor country. Long each other's leading foreign trade partner, the Soviet Union and East Germany derive mutual if uneven advantage from their myriad economic ties. But the trade component of the East German-West German economic relationship has always been of special value. It continues to flourish under arrangements in which East Germany enjoys unrestricted access to the European Common Market and is

¹⁷On the Honecker-Gorbachev meeting, see *Informationen*, no. 10 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, May 17, 1985), p. 7. The text of the Honecker-Kohl communiqué may be found in *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 18, no. 4 (April, 1985), p. 446.

¹⁸See B. V. Flow, "The GDR's Strange Hard Currency Cushion," *RFE Research*, RAD Background Report, no. 22 (December 28, 1984), and David R. Francis, "\$5 Billion Mystery in East Germany," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 22 1985.

entitled to draw upon interest-free overdraft credit, known as the "swing." Despite the chill evident in other areas, in July, 1985, East and West Germany concluded an agreement increasing the swing from DM600 million to DM850 million equivalents. East Germany's recent ability to record an occasional surplus in the periodic balance of inter-German trading accounts seems unlikely to diminish Soviet apprehension that East Germany may be tying its economic development too closely to West Germany.

The larger stakes become clearer in light of the impressive growth rate of East Germany's domestic economy. In 1984, it registered an increase of 5.4 percent in domestic net material product (the unit by which the socialist countries measure economic growth), with a dramatic rise of 8.5 percent in net industrial production; both figures greatly exceed planned targets.¹⁹ The 4.1 percent rate of overall economic growth for the first half of 1985, although slightly short of the goal for the entire year, bespeaks a continued strong performance. This all but assures the maintenance of existing levels of consumption but it does not necessarily guarantee a further rise in the standard of living. That may well elude the reach of planners already constrained by the regime's much publicized commitment to stable and relatively low prices for the basics.

Beyond such short-term considerations, there is the crucial question of whether East Germany's highly centralized planning system can cope adequately with the imperatives of intensive, as opposed to extensive, development, a fundamental issue that confronts all Soviet-style command economies. East Germany has thus far been able to overcome this problem, less by streamlining its internal planning techniques than by heightened dependence on external subsidies. Given the Soviet Union's reluctance or inability to bear the requisite costs, East Germany continues to look to Bonn but, in so doing, it courts renewed Soviet suspicions of ulterior motives verging on infidelity.

As for domestic innovations, like those adopted by Hungary, they might augment but could never really substitute for foreign economic aid; in any case, the East German leadership itself has consistently rejected any economic experimentation that might open East Germany's highly authoritarian political system to pressures from an increasingly self-assertive society.

Social attitudes are difficult to gauge with precision. The East German population has grown accustomed to a high standard of living and takes pride in some of the regime's social achievements, like its housing program, its

health care services, and the less blatantly political aspects of its educational policies. But as long as the standard of comparison is West Germany and not East Europe, it is doubtful that the East Germans can be fully appeased by appeals based on their relative well-being. Moreover, although friendly relations with West Germany remain enormously popular, *Abgrenzung* continues to rankle. Most East Germans hate the restrictions on their freedom to travel to the West. While the Berlin Wall stands as a symbol of this affront, the SED regime will never feel entirely confident about its social roots.

If the Wall were suddenly removed or if there were greater freedom of movement, the consequences might well prove devastating.²⁰ As an East German trade-off in inter-German relations, a record number of East Germans—approximately 40,000 during 1984—were allowed to emigrate to West Germany. But this only encouraged others, and the number of applicants for exit permits rose to close to half a million. More embarrassing, several groups of East Germans have encamped in foreign diplomatic quarters at home and abroad in a bid to gain passage to the West. Earlier this year, the regime felt obliged to launch a major propaganda drive aimed at discrediting emigration in an effort to curb a widespread popular movement toward what some West German commentators have cynically dubbed "reunification through depopulation."

NATIONAL IDENTITY

At the core of all societal concerns lies the problem of national identity. The first flush of the *Abgrenzung* campaign, in the early 1970's, stipulated the existence of a distinctive East German nationality. In the face of overwhelming popular disbelief, the regime retreated from this palpably absurd position, adopting instead the formulation enunciated by Honecker himself at the end of 1974—"citizenship: GDR; nationality: German."²¹ Thereafter, official discussion came to focus on the development of a "socialist German nation" with roots in German history as a whole as well as in the traditions of the German working class.

Under this dispensation, recent East German historiography has gone to great lengths to enlist the shades of historical figures like Martin Luther, Frederick the Great, and Otto von Bismarck in support of the SED's claims to legitimacy. This has also strengthened the feeling of common German nationhood in the ranks of the ruling party.

As a mass-based party, now numbering slightly over 2.2 million members (approximately 17 percent of the adult population) the SED can no longer be fully immunized against the currents that run through society. To be sure, a strict Leninist regimen precludes any direct infection from East Germany's emergent "counterpublic" sphere, made up of the unofficial peace movement, ecology groups and various countercultural rivulets, especially among youth. But the generation of true believers has largely passed from the scene. Although individual mem-

¹⁹"Eastern Europe in 1984," *RFE Research*, RAD Background Report, no. 1 (January 4, 1985), pp. 25–26.

²⁰For a recent suggestion that the GDR consider following the example of Hungary and open its borders to travel abroad, see Reinhard Meier, "Die allmähliche Auflösung der deutschen Frage," *Europa Archiv*, vol. 39, no. 21 (November 10, 1984), pp. 644–654.

²¹*Neues Deutschland*, December 13, 1974.

bers of the old guard are still entrenched and orthodox doctrinal rhetoric continues to rule, this cannot conceal a latent crisis of ideological conviction.

Honecker has always tried to stimulate the party's sense of special mission, incorporating in the process the themes of domestic economic development and international détente. The results have been unclear, especially with regard to the party rank and file; in any case, Honecker, now 73, is in the twilight of his career. It remains to be seen whether his successor will be able to reanimate the SED along lines other than those of self-interest.

In view of his own efforts to rejuvenate the Soviet political system, Gorbachev may develop a better understanding of Honecker's domestic dilemmas. More clearly than his predecessors, he may come to appreciate the fact that Honecker has always tried for the maximum gain at the minimum price in his pursuit of détente. With Gorbachev obviously trying to reactivate détente, the Kremlin may once again seek to woo West Germany on a whole range of issues, including opposition to the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" program.

In any peace campaign, Moscow may allow East Germany to resume its political dialogue with Bonn. However, judging by a recent authoritative Soviet pronouncement harshly critical of attempts by the "smaller [socialist bloc] countries" to mediate East-West relations,²² the Kremlin under Gorbachev will insist on coordinating efforts in order to preclude any repetition of the 1984 disalignment between East Germany and the Soviet Union. ■

²²*Pravda*, June 21, 1985.

STALEMATE AND APATHY IN POLAND

(Continued from page 380)

in tens of thousands of copies), but illegal publishers also produce 500-page books and, more recently, they have begun a line of contraband videotapes for the burgeoning VCR (videocassette recorder) market.¹⁹

This "second economy" in the mass media is an important source of information for Poles. Moreover, the official media, in competition with the unofficial, is forced to be more open and interesting and to address controversial issues. The result is that Poland, despite censorship, has the liveliest press in the Soviet bloc.

THE CHURCH

While popular support for the Solidarity underground has diminished, the popularity of the Roman Catholic Church has grown. According to both official and unoffi-

¹⁹See Teresa Hanicka, "Underground Publications in Poland," *RFER*, "Background Report," July 26, 1984.

²⁰For details and analysis of the Popieluszko affair, see Jane Cave, "The Murder of Father Popieluszko," *Poland Watch*, no. 7 (1985), and David Ost, "Now Solidarity Has a Martyr," *The Nation*, March 2, 1985, pp. 237-240.

cial public opinion polls, it is the most trusted and popular institution in the country. The Church hierarchy, and particularly Archbishop Jozef Glemp, the Primate of Poland, have lost some favor with staunch Solidarity supporters, who often complain of the Church's lack of direct support for the underground movement. But for most Poles, the Church is the main moral and political representative of the people, and perhaps the main outlet for creative and autonomous activity.

Since the imposition of martial law, Glemp has pursued a low-key and conciliatory policy, attempting, above all, to prevent societal or regime violence and to maintain and enlarge the Church's sphere of autonomy and activity. Until 1984, this strategy seemed to work, with relatively good relations between Church and state. The Joint Government-Episcopal Commission met regularly, and progress was reported on a number of key Church issues: the formalization of the legal status of the Church; the granting of permits to build new churches; and the development of the Church-sponsored agricultural fund, which is to raise funds abroad for the development of private agriculture in Poland. There were points of tension, for example, over the attempts by local authorities to remove crucifixes from school classrooms, but these conflicts were usually settled through compromise.

A turning point came in October, 1984, with the abduction and murder of the outspoken pro-Solidarity priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, by four officers of the security police. Popieluszko's funeral on November 3, presided over by Archbishop Glemp, attracted some 250,000 mourners.

The Jaruzelski government, at first apparently uncertain how to handle the situation, finally decided to allow a formal investigation of the incident. On December 27, the trial of the four security officers began in the city of Torun.²⁰ The trial was yet another Polish paradox: the Polish state was publicly trying members of its own internal security forces. The trial lasted more than a month, and was covered extensively by the mass media, including Polish television. During the trial, the chief government prosecutor frequently referred to Popieluszko's "extremism" as a cause of his death. Nevertheless, on February 7, 1985, all four officers were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 14 to 25 years.

The murder and the trial had a number of important consequences. First, it gave Poland a universal martyr. "Father Jerzy" symbolized the conflict between the Church and the Polish state, the unity of the Church and Polish society and, for many, the irreconcilability of the Catholic society and the Communist regime. Buttons, pictures and postcards of Popieluszko are in churches everywhere, and his church and burial site, Saint Stanislaw Kostka in Warsaw, has become a virtual shrine, with a constant stream of visitors and pilgrims.

The murder and trial also soured relations between the Church and the state. The trial led the Polish Episcopate to file a formal complaint against Polish radio and televi-

sion for manipulating trial information in an attempt to discredit the Church. But media attacks on the Church have continued, including an unprecedented attack on the Pope himself.²¹ In June, 1985, two priests were convicted after a one-day trial for "organizing and leading an illegal protest" over the removal of crosses from classrooms in the town of Wloszczowa.²² Shortly thereafter, Jaruzelski and Glemp met for the first time since January, 1984, but the joint communiqué following the meeting suggested little progress in church-state relations.

THE ECONOMY

The regime claims that the major problem facing Poland is economic, not political, and many Poles agree. After four straight years of economic decline (1979–1982), the economy has finally begun to grow again; national income rose about 6 percent in both 1983 and 1984. Still, national income has not yet recovered to 1978 levels, and in some areas (e.g., livestock) production is less than it was in the 1960's. Poles have suffered through six years of shortages, rationing, queuing and inflation. The cost of living increased 357 percent from 1980 to 1984, and three rounds of price increases in 1985 are expected to add another 3 percent over 1984.²³ In the past, food price increases have been met with strikes and demonstrations, but the recent increases have elicited little public response. Many Poles rely on the enormous "second economy" to satisfy household needs; for example, obtaining scarce medicines through friends who work in a hospital; purchasing meat (which is still rationed) from the "veal lady" who brings it door-to-door from the countryside; buying clothes in the unofficial but legal markets in almost any big city.

Poland faces a host of other economic problems: low levels of productivity, declining quality in manufactured goods, an outdated capital stock, a huge international debt, and economic sanctions and credit restrictions from the West. The debt has continued to grow and now amounts to \$26.8 billion to Western countries and 4.8 billion rubles to socialist countries. Partly because of Western sanctions, Poland has reoriented its trade toward the socialist bloc, making it that much more difficult to earn the hard currency necessary to repay the Western debts. The credit crunch may be easing somewhat, however; most United States sanctions were lifted in response to the July, 1984, amnesty, and Poland's 17 Western creditor countries (the "Paris Club") agreed in July, 1985, to reschedule much of Poland's debt repayment.

These problems have complicated the regime's efforts to implement economic reform. Developed during 1981,

²¹*Polityka*, March 30, 1985.

²²RFER, "Polish Situation Report," June 26, 1985.

²³*Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1985* (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1985).

²⁴See Stanisław Gomulka and Jacek Rostowski, "The Reformed Polish Economic System," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 36 (1984), pp. 386–405.

the reform plan is similar to the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism; it allows a greater role for the market and increased autonomy for enterprises, and it sharply reduces central controls and planning.²⁴ The political restrictions of martial law and the economic crisis have restricted the reform plan; most Polish economists admit the lack of positive results so far. The economic problem is compounded by the political one; the decentralizing reform depends on cooperation and hard work from a labor force that is sullen and withdrawn.

Nevertheless, the 1983 and 1984 increases in national income and gross industrial output are signs of an economic recovery. Nineteen eighty-four set a record for hard coal exports, an important source of foreign exchange for Poland. The agricultural harvests have been good for the last three years because of both favorable weather and a greatly increased share of government investment in private farms.

CONCLUSIONS

The Jaruzelski regime claims to have achieved a degree of stability and "normalization" since 1981, but it has not been able to achieve political legitimacy. The issues of democracy, political participation, and justice raised by Solidarity have not been resolved and continue to haunt the government. At the same time, Solidarity is unable to mount protests large enough to threaten the regime or force it to be more accommodating.

While Solidarity has been driven underground, its spirit lives on; the experience of 1980–1981 is now a permanent feature of the Polish national consciousness. Given Poland's history of rebellion—the years 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 have become almost a litany—there will probably be trouble again. The underground movement is biding its time, educating itself, studying the mistakes of the past, debating long-term strategy, and attempting to build an "underground society." When the time comes, this opposition will be a much more organized, disciplined and potent force than it was in 1980. But it will still have to deal with Poland's "geopolitical realities" and decide how to achieve greater measures of democracy and independence without threatening the leading role of the party and Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union.

In 1985, most Poles do not want to address such issues and have turned their attention to family and Church. The regime has capitalized on the apathy and divisions within society and the primacy of material and economic concerns. The authorities hope to regain political legitimacy through economic growth and a gradual improvement in the standard of living. Given Poland's economic problems, this is a difficult task. But the authorities must reckon with the axiom that revolutions occur not when things are at their worst, when people have neither the time nor energy for political activity, but when the situation is improving. Like the opposition, the authorities will also face a dilemma: how to expand political participation and control it without provoking a revolution. ■

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Continued from page 376)

sion for Scientific, Technical and Investment Development assigned a top priority to the environmental area for the next quinquennial plan (1986–1990), placing it on an equal footing with computerization, biotechnology, and apartment construction.

The Commission, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Jaromir Obzina, was created in 1983 and charged with the task of identifying and integrating science, technology, research and investment policy. Obzina's 1983 promotion from his post of minister of interior sparked rumors in Prague that he would succeed Lubomir Strougal, the Prime Minister, who is said to have cancer.

But whatever the government's intention and level of commitment, there are real limits to any currently available strategy to deal with the problem of environmental devastation. A vicious circle is at work. While a rise in energy production is a prerequisite for further economic growth, escalating oil costs dictate reliance on cheap domestic coal until nuclear power becomes available. Yet as we have seen, the coal mining industry, along with the fossil-burning plants, are major contributors to the pollution. At the same time, any substantial diversion of resources will impinge negatively on economic growth. There are ideological constraints as well, because one of the solutions to the agricultural pollution advocated by the Academy team is to break up the large state and collective enterprises into smaller, "relatively autonomous farms." Thus the environmental situation is likely to deteriorate further.

THE DILEMMAS OF "DEVELOPED SOCIALISM"

Clearly, Husak's 16-year rule is at a crossroads. Internal pressures for change have been mounting. In the 1980's, the gap between the promise and the performance of the economy has further eroded the regime's legitimacy. In 1983, the bitter campaign against new NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) missiles not only failed but, with the announcement of the stationing of Soviet missiles on Czechoslovak soil, it actually backfired. Two energy crises are under way. In addition to the shortage of kilowatts, there are indications of a widespread malaise in the society. A native returning to Prague is struck by the impatience and outright hostility displayed in routine and random encounters among people. As in the Soviet Union, only foreigners are exempt.

Unprecedented corruption in most areas of the service

industry, ranging from car repair to health care, is profoundly demoralizing, yet it involves virtually everyone. The party's new campaign against corruption and graft, inspired by a similar policy in Moscow, has so far produced only rhetoric. Nor is it likely to succeed, because "the second economy" has become endemic to the system: for those on the receiving end, bribery often provides an essential, if not the main, part of their income.

As elsewhere in East Europe, signs of alienation among the young multiply. A state that periodically cracks down on rock and jazz musicians can hardly hope to win the hearts of its youth.¹¹ Unburdened by the memories of war, the latter's expectations were shaped by the relatively prosperous 1970's. Educated and largely immune to the primitive language of party propaganda, young people are also indifferent to the regime's objectives. While most of them look to the West for cars, videos and role models, they face uncertain prospects at home. Of those who visit the West, an ever growing number choose to stay. Others have turned to the Church. For those who—often reluctantly—join the party, career objectives seem to be the main motive. How to accommodate the aspirations of today's youth may well prove to be one of the greatest challenges the party has yet faced.

CHARTER 77, CHURCH AND STATE

Though Charter 77 is not a social movement comparable to Solidarity, its survival and continued activity despite severe police harassment and persecution have earned it a permanent place in the struggle for human rights. Now in its ninth year, Charter 77 has acted as a repository of national conscience, conveying far more accurately than the official media the ailments and aspirations of the society. Over the years, the Charter's activists have issued several hundred documents, ranging from extensive analyses to petitions of protests.¹²

Most recently, the Charter has chronicled and protested the renewed attacks on religious freedom in Czechoslovakia, attacks evidently inspired by the growing appeal of religion to many young people, on the one hand, and by the apprehension in the ruling party about the spread of the Polish "disease." Paradoxically, the antireligious campaign has led to the adoption of a more defiant stand on the part of the Catholic hierarchy, especially Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek. Some 17,000 signatures were collected last year, petitioning for a papal visit in connection with 1985's 1,100th anniversary of the death of Saint Methodius. Needless to say, the government rejected the idea out of hand.

So long as the societal drift continues, there is no reason to expect a reversal in the current renewal of religious faith. And the same holds true for the dogged determination of Charter 77. As Vaclav Havel, one of the leaders of the courageous activists, has put it, Charter 77 is "a permanent appeal to the state power and a mirror of its work," and "a continuing challenge to fellow citizens."¹³

The leadership politics of the normalization era ha

¹¹For an insightful and well-informed treatment of the crusade against jazz and rock music in Czechoslovakia see Josef Skvorecky, "Hipness at Noon," *The New Republic*, December 17, 1984, pp. 27–35.

¹²For a comprehensive assessment of Charter 77, see H. Gordon Skilling, "Independent Currents in Czechoslovakia," *Problems of Communism*, January–February, 1985, pp. 32–49.

¹³Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 48–49.

generally been portrayed in terms of a “moderate” versus a “hardline” faction (with Husak and Strougal in the former camp, and Vasil Bilak in the latter); but the evidence is mixed and unreliable.¹⁴ Following an initial period of discord in the early 1970’s, the party leadership has found a common ground in the preference for hanging together over hanging separately. And whatever his true political colors, Husak has bent with the prevailing wind of hardline conservatism.

DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS

But in the past two years, Czechoslovakia’s domestic and foreign orthodoxy has appeared increasingly at odds with intrabloc tendencies, spearheaded by the minicoalition of Hungary, Romania and East Germany, which are seeking to enhance their autonomy and attempting to reach out to Europe.¹⁵ While Poland has been sidelined by the crisis of 1980–1981, even Bulgaria has shown less of a desire to embrace Moscow’s policies than the holier-than-thou Czechoslovaks. Under Soviet President Yuri Andropov, Prague occasionally censored Soviet publications that, in the view of the guardians of orthodoxy, touched a raw nerve. But the Gorbachev leadership seems even more impatient with economic stagnation, corruption and the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the Leonid Brezhnev era, all of which Czechoslovakia has adopted as its own. Having purged the word “reform” from their vocabulary, Prague’s hardliners may find themselves on the defensive for the first time since August, 1969.

In May, 1985, in a major address marking the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Prague and the end of World War II in Europe, Husak, the party’s General Secretary and the country’s President, recalled the Soviet–Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of December, 1943, as a fundamental turning point in the struggle for liberation.¹⁶ What he forgot to mention was the name of the initiator and the prime mover behind the treaty: President Edvard Benes. Husak also referred to the Slovak National Uprising in 1944—during which he

emerged as one of the Communist leaders—as a proud chapter in the national resistance and in the quest for independence. But he forgot to spell out his own attitude on the eve of the uprising, disclosed in a (still secret) 1944 report to Moscow, in which he had written: “We want to be a part of the USSR . . . Why seek a salvation with Benes, when Stalin has a proven recipe?”¹⁷ In 1985, Husak remembered the 360,000 Czechoslovak citizens who died during World War II, but he forgot to mention that a vast majority of them had perished because they were Jews.

His speech included a reference to some “mistakes” that had occurred in the early phase of the construction of socialism. But they were soon corrected, he said, thus skipping over the fact that in 1951 his comrades had him arrested and sent to prison in 1954 for life. While he warmly praised the act of “fraternal assistance” of August, 1968, for the blow it dealt to the forces of “right-wing opportunism,” he forgot all about his own stand at the time when, a week after the Soviet invasion, he told the fourteenth congress of the Slovak branch of the party:

I stand fully behind Dubcek’s platform; I was there during its formulation, I will support him fully, I shall either stand with him or I shall leave.¹⁸

Despite his vow, in April, 1969, he replaced Alexander Dubcek as the party leader. Clearly, for Husak, the future is certain; merely the past is continuously changing.

FIVE YEARS MORE

On May 22, 1985, Husak was “reelected” to a third five-year presidential term. The verdict of the 344 deputies to the Federal Assembly was unanimous and, as the party’s theoretical weekly jubilantly pointed out, the democratic process took less than an hour.¹⁹ Having served as the party’s General Secretary since April, 1969, at the age of 72 Husak is well on his way to being the longest serving leader in the history of modern Czechoslovakia—Tomas Masaryk held the position of the President for 17 years (1918–1935). The party’s seventeenth congress, scheduled for March, 1986, may provide a fitting occasion to mark Husak’s record of political survival. Whether or not the congress will inaugurate some personnel changes or policy initiatives remains to be seen.

While the hardliners are firmly entrenched, those advocating change can invoke the rising spirit of reform in Moscow. In early July, the news of Andrei Gromyko’s accession to the presidency of the Supreme Soviet added an element of irony to Husak’s reelection. Since Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech nominating Gromyko explained the move in terms of the “fulfillment of new tasks that require modifications in the content, as well as in the forms and methods of state and party activity,”²⁰ Prague may be out of step with the new norm. But whatever the length of his rule, Husak has already left his mark on Czechoslovakia. Undoubtedly, generations of readers of Milan Kundera’s novels will remember him as the President of Forgetting. ■

¹⁴This perspective is adopted, for example, by Jiri Valenta, “Soviet Policy toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia,” in Sarah Perry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). Valenta draws in part on the best-informed study of post-invasion Czechoslovakia, Vladimir Kusin’s *From Dubcek to Charter 77* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977). Some questions about Kusin’s analysis of the leadership conflict are raised in Michael Kraus, “The Thaw and Frost: The Prague Spring and Moscow Nights, Ten Years After,” *East Central Europe/L’Europe du Centre-Est*, no. 6 (1979), part 1, p. 63–75.

¹⁵See Charles Gati, “Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well,” *Problems of Communism*, March–April, 1985, pp. 73–86.

¹⁶*Tvorba*, May 15, 1985, p. 2.

¹⁷Published for the first time in *Svedectvi* (Paris), no. 58 (1979), pp. 367–382.

¹⁸*Pravda* (Bratislava), August 29, 1968.

¹⁹*Tribuna*, May 29, 1985, p. 2.

²⁰Quoted in *Tvorba*, July 10, 1985, p. 2.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of September, 1985, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 19—In Geneva, the U.S. and the Soviet Union begin a 3d 6-week negotiating session on nuclear and space weapons.
Sept. 21—The 90-nation conference reviewing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in Geneva criticizes the U.S., the Soviet Union and Great Britain for failing to halt the arms race and failing to work toward disarmament.

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 9—The foreign ministers of the 10 member nations and Spain and Portugal meet in Luxembourg to discuss a major reform of the EEC.
Sept. 10—Nine of the EEC members and Spain and Portugal agree to impose trade, cultural and military sanctions on South Africa; Britain, which disagrees, says it will continue to study the possibility of sanctions.
Sept. 25—Britain announces that it will impose the EEC anti-apartheid measures against South Africa.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

- Sept. 30—In Geneva, officials of the 90-nation group adopt an agenda that calls for the liberalization of trade in the service industry.

Group of Five

- Sept. 22—The 5 major Western industrial nations, the U.S., Britain, West Germany, France and Japan, announce in New York that they will work in concert to decrease the value of the dollar in international foreign exchange markets.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

- Sept. 24—The IMF reports its 1st net deficit in nearly 10 years.

Iran-Iraq War

- Sept. 28—Iraqi jets bomb Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal for the 5th time in 5 days; oil shipments were halted by attacks on September 26.

The Iranian navy has reportedly seized and released 3 foreign ships in the last two days after searching for war cargo bound for Iraq.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

- Sept. 14—The OPEC news agency reports that the Saudi Arabian oil minister, Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, told a conference in Oxford, England, that oil prices may fall between \$15 and \$18 a barrel by the spring of 1986 if a price war occurs among OPEC members.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 12—In The Hague, Netherlands, the International Court of Justice (World Court) begins hearing Nicaragua's claim that U.S. support for the contras (right-wing guerrillas) violates international law. The U.S. is boycotting the case.

- Sept. 16—David MacMichael, a former Latin America analyst for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), tells the Court that there is "no credible evidence" that Nicaragua has supplied large quantities of weapons to guerrillas in El Salvador in the last 4 years.

- Sept. 17—The 40th session of the UN General Assembly opens; Spain's Jaime de Pinies is elected president of the General Assembly.

- Sept. 23—Addressing the UN General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz says that the U.S. and the Soviet Union "now have an historic opportunity to reduce the risk of war."

In a speech before the General Assembly, Peruvian President Alan García Pérez threatens to take Peru out of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if changes are not made to ease Peru's foreign debt repayment schedule.

- Sept. 24—Eduard A. Shevardnadze, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, tells the UN General Assembly that if the U.S. banned space defense weapons, the Soviet Union would respond with "truly radical reductions" in nuclear weapons.

AFGHANISTAN

- Sept. 8—The Afghan guerrillas deny reports that on September 4 their forces shot down a civilian Afghan airliner with a U.S.-made missile.

- Sept. 21—Guerrilla sources say that a Soviet and Afghan army offensive to cut off guerrilla supply lines near the Pakistan border has ended.

ANGOLA

(See also *South Africa*)

- Sept. 20—Jonas Savimbi, the head of the guerrilla National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), says that government forces are staging the largest offensive against UNITA in 10 years.

- Sept. 30—The government says that South African jets have entered Angolan airspace and shot down 6 Angolan military helicopters, killing 50 soldiers.

ARGENTINA

- Sept. 11—The trial of 9 military leaders who governed Argentina for 6 years begins in Buenos Aires; the 9 are charged with killing, torturing and kidnapping more than 9,000 Argentines in an anti-insurgency campaign.

BELGIUM

- Sept. 2—King Baudouin dissolves Parliament.

BOLIVIA

- Sept. 19—The government imposes a state of siege to end a 16-day general strike; at least 600 people, including union leaders, are arrested.

BRAZIL

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BURKINA FASO

- Sept. 1—President Thomas Sankara reappoints most of the members of the Cabinet he dissolved in August.

CANADA(See also *U.S., Administration*)

- Sept. 10—Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark says that the government will enclose the entire Arctic archipelago within Canada's boundaries by January 1, 1986.
- Sept. 23—Fisheries Minister John Fraser resigns after criticism for approving the sale of 1 million cans of rancid tuna.
- Sept. 25—Minister of Communications Marcel Masse resigns because of allegations of electoral malfeasance in his district.
- Sept. 29—Pierre Marc Johnson is elected head of Quebec's Parti Québécois and premier of Quebec; he replaces Premier René Lévesque.

CHAD

- Sept. 11—Government radio says that fighting between guerrillas and their Libyan allies continues in Fada; the guerrillas say the reports are a fabrication.

CHILE

- Sept. 4—Thousands of people demonstrate in Santiago against the military government of President Augusto Pinochet; 6 people are killed and more than 200 are arrested.
- Sept. 7—Government forces arrest 64 people, including politicians and union leaders.
- Sept. 11—Leftist guerrillas take responsibility for last night's bombing of a power station that blacked out most of Chile.
- Sept. 16—The government announces the extension of the state of emergency; it renews limits on the press.

CHINA(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 4—Foreign Minister Ma Yuzhen says that China welcomes the resignation of Pol Pot, head of the Communist Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea.
- Sept. 6—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang nominates Ruan Chongwu as public security minister to replace Liu Fuzhi, and Jia Chunwang to replace Ling Yun as minister of state security. He shuffles 3 other Cabinet positions.
- Sept. 16—The Communist party announces the retirement of 10 members of the 24-member Politburo; it also confirms that 64 Central Committee members have been removed.
- Sept. 18—The Chinese Communist party meets in a special national conference, the 1st since 1955.
- Sept. 21—The government's statistical office reports that the 1985 trade deficit is expected to be more than \$18 billion, up from 1984's trade deficit of \$1.1 billion.
- Sept. 22—The party announces the names of 64 new members of the Central Committee; most of the newly appointed officials are middle-aged.
- Sept. 24—Five new members are appointed to the Politburo; they include Hu Qili, a member of the party Secretariat, and Li Peng, a Deputy Prime Minister.
- Zhou Ping, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, announces that China will allow international inspection of some of its civilian nuclear power plants.

CYPRUS

- Sept. 25—Three Palestinian terrorists demanding the release of about 20 Palestinians held by the Israeli government kill 3 Israeli citizens on a small yacht in Larnaca, Cyprus; the Palestinians are captured.

DENMARK(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**EGYPT**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 4—Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Ali resigns; President

Hosni Mubarak names Ali Lufti Prime Minister.

- Sept. 14—President Mubarak meets with Jordan's King Hussein in Cairo for talks on their separate, upcoming visits to the U.S.

EL SALVADOR(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Sept. 6—The U.S. embassy in San Salvador announces that the U.S. is sending 12 helicopter gunships to the Salvadoran army.
- Sept. 10—Inés Guadalupe Duarte Durán, the daughter of President José Napoleón Duarte, is abducted.
- Sept. 17—Government officials reveal that the Pedro Pablo Castillo Front says it is holding Duarte's daughter; the leftist group asks for the release from prison of at least 12 guerrillas in exchange for Inés Duarte's release.
- Sept. 29—Roberto d'Aubuisson resigns as head of the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA).

FRANCE(See also *Intl, Group of Five; New Zealand*)

- Sept. 10—André Chadeau, the president of France's railroads, resigns; he takes full responsibility for three recent train crashes that killed 83 people.
- Sept. 15—President François Mitterrand says that France will continue to test nuclear weapons in the South Pacific region "for as long as it is judged necessary."
- Sept. 17—*Le Monde*, the Paris newspaper, reports that French military divers associated with the General Directorate for External Security are responsible for the July 10 sinking of the environmentalist group Greenpeace's ship in Auckland, New Zealand, that killed 1 Greenpeace member; the paper says that Defense Minister Charles Hernu apparently approved of the action.
- Sept. 20—The government announces that it has dismissed Admiral Pierre Lacoste, the head of the General Directorate for External Security.
- Defense Minister Hernu resigns. Paul Quilès, the minister of urban affairs, housing and transportation, is named to replace Hernu.
- Sept. 22—Prime Minister Laurent Fabius admits that French intelligence agents sank the Greenpeace ship; he says the ship was destroyed for national security reasons. Greenpeace planned to protest a French nuclear test in the South Pacific.
- Sept. 26—The government indicts 4 intelligence agency officials and an army officer for supplying secret information to the press about the attack on the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior*.

New Caledonia

- Sept. 29—In today's election for a new executive council and a territory congress, pro-secessionist forces win a majority on the executive council; anti-independence conservatives win a majority of the 46 seats in the territory congress.

GERMANY, EAST

- Sept. 1—First Secretary Erich Honecker meets for an hour with West German Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss in Leipzig.

GERMANY, WEST(See also *Intl, Group of Five; Germany, East*)

- Sept. 17—Herta-Astrid Willner, a secretary in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's office, has reportedly defected to East Germany with her husband; government officials say that Willner did not have access to secret documents.
- Sept. 30—Police have arrested more than 300 people and 150

have been injured in street fighting between police and anti-Nazi protesters; the fighting began September 28.

GUATEMALA

Sept. 4—General Oscar Mejía Victores, the head of the military government, announces that price increases on basic goods have been frozen and bus fare increases have been rescinded.

HONDURAS

Sept. 3—*The New York Times* reports that Honduran army troops entered a UN camp for Salvadoran refugees last week and killed 2 refugees and wounded and beat 38 others; the U.S. embassy and the Honduran government say the camp was a guerrilla supply base.

Sept. 14—The Honduran army remains on alert after a clash with Nicaraguan troops; yesterday 6 Honduran jets shot down a Nicaraguan helicopter after Nicaraguan troops fired mortars into Honduran territory.

INDIA

Sept. 2—The Lok Dal party says it will boycott the September 25 Punjab state elections.

Sept. 4—Three terrorists kill Arjun Das, a New Delhi politician and member of the ruling Congress party.

Sept. 6—Police in Punjab say that they have arrested at least 600 Sikhs in an effort to avoid any disruption of this month's elections.

Sept. 15—Government officials report that they banned and seized a report critical of government actions in Punjab.

Sept. 23—Sikh terrorists explode 7 bombs in Punjab state; 3 children are killed in one of the bomb blasts.

Sept. 26—Results from yesterday's state election in Punjab show that the moderate Sikh party, Akali Dal, won 75 of 115 legislative districts; the Congress party won the remainder.

Sept. 30—The Press Trust of India reports a clash between Indian and Pakistani troops along the Kashmir border.

IRAN

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

Sept. 13—A U.S. State Department official confirms that Iraq is buying 45 U.S.-made helicopters; the U.S. says that the helicopters have no military purpose.

ISRAEL

(See also *Cyprus*)

Sept. 1—Military authorities on the occupied West Bank say that they have detained and ordered held without trial 14 more Arabs in a crackdown on "subversive" activity; since August 28, 46 Arabs have been detained.

Sept. 10—Israel releases the last 119 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees it held at Atlit prison.

ITALY

Sept. 16—Police report that 38 people were wounded by today's grenade attack on an outdoor café in Rome.

Sept. 18—Yalcin Ozbey, a witness for the prosecution in the trial of Mehmet Ali Agca and 7 others for conspiring to kill the Pope, says that the Bulgarians did not organize or pay for the assassination attempt.

Sept. 24—Agca says he no longer remembers how he received the gun he used to shoot the Pope.

Sept. 25—Police say that a Palestinian teenager has confessed to this morning's bombing of a British Airways office in Rome that wounded 14 people.

JAPAN

(See also *Intl, Group of Five; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 18—The government approves a 5-year, \$76.3-billion military spending program.

JORDAN

(See *Egypt; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KAMPUCHEA

(See also *China*)

Sept. 3—The Communist Khmer Rouge announces that Pol Pot is retiring as commander of the group. Pol Pot headed the Kampuchean government in the early 1970's.

KOREA, NORTH

(See *Korea, South*)

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 20—Fifty North Koreans and 50 South Koreans cross into South and North Korea in a limited border reopening.

Sept. 27—Riot police break up an antigovernment demonstration by 10,000 students in Seoul.

KUWAIT

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 26—Government officials reiterate that they will not release 17 convicted terrorists in exchange for 6 U.S. citizens held in Lebanon by a fundamentalist group.

LEBANON

(See also *Israel; Kuwait; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 7—Prime Minister Rashid Karami announces that Syria will be asked to send troops to Beirut to stop fighting between militia factions.

Sept. 8—Shiite Amal militiamen continue to shell Burj al Brajneh, a Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut.

Sept. 9—Elie Hobeika, the head of the Lebanese Forces (the Christian militia), arrives in Syria for talks with Syrian government officials about the violence in Lebanon.

Sept. 10—Nabih Berri, the president of the Shiite militia and political organization Amal, meets with a delegation from the Palestine National Salvation Front to discuss an end to the fighting at Burj al Brajneh.

Sept. 16—Twenty-four people are killed in fighting between 2 Muslim militias in Tripoli.

Sept. 17—Police in Beirut say that 18 people were killed and 88 wounded in fighting between rival militias in both Beirut and Tripoli last night.

Sept. 28—Syria announces that it is ending its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the fighting in Tripoli.

Sept. 29—Police in Tripoli report at least 130 dead as fighting continues between the Arab Democratic party and the Tawheed.

Sept. 30—In Beirut, 4 Soviet officials are kidnapped by unknown assailants in 2 separate incidents; this is the 1st time Soviet citizens have been kidnapped in Lebanon.

LIBERIA

Sept. 13—A military court sentences Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a former finance minister, to 10 years in prison after she is found guilty of sedition for calling the members of the military government "idiots."

Sept. 27—General Samuel K. Doe, the head of the military government, dismisses Labor Minister Frank Senkpeni; he also grants clemency to several political prisoners, including Johnson-Sirleaf.

LIBYA

(See also *Chad; Tunisia*)

Sept. 2—The semiofficial newspaper *Al Ahram* (Cairo) reports that some Libyan army and air force units mutinied yesterday after receiving orders to invade Tunisia; the units then tried to overthrow Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's government, but the coup attempt was crushed.

MEXICO

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 1—President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado says that Mexico will demand new negotiations to reschedule its foreign debt.

Sept. 19—An earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale strikes central Mexico; large sections of Mexico City are damaged and thousands are feared dead.

Sept. 20—Another earthquake that measures 7.3 on the Richter scale strikes Mexico City.

MOZAMBIQUE

(See also *South Africa; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 7—The Mozambique News Agency reports that government troops have destroyed the main headquarters of the Mozambique National Resistance guerrilla group.

Sept. 17—The South African Press Association reports that President Samora M. Machel met with South African President P. W. Botha and accused South Africa of "seriously and repeatedly" violating a South Africa-Mozambique nonaggression pact by arming guerrillas inside Mozambique.

NEW ZEALAND

(See also *France*)

Sept. 23—Prime Minister David Lange condemns France for using its intelligence agents to sink the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* and killing a crew member; he says he will ask for "very substantial" reparations.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, UN; Honduras; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 11—Contra leaders say that they will end human rights abuses.

Sept. 15—Brooklyn Rivera, a leader of the Miskito Indian group fighting the government, says his organization is receiving \$50,000 a month in aid from Europe.

NORWAY

Sept. 10—The coalition government of Conservative party leader Prime Minister Kaare Willoch is narrowly reelected to a 2d 4-year term; the party won less than 30 percent of the popular vote but received 78 seats in Parliament; it remains in power with the support of the right-wing Progressive party.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 21—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq promises to end 8 years of martial law on December 31.

PALAU

Sept. 1—Senator Lazarus Salii defeats President Alfonso Oiterong in a special presidential election.

PANAMA

Sept. 28—President Nicolás Barletta resigns under pressure from the military; Eric Arturo Delvalle is sworn in as President.

PERU

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Sept. 16—President Alan García dismisses the president of the Armed Forces Joint Command, General César Enrico Prael-

li, for misconduct of the war against the Shining Path Maoist guerrillas.

Sept. 18—The Joint Armed Forces Command announces that soldiers killed about 40 peasants last month in a massacre; two generals have been fired as a result.

PHILIPPINES

Sept. 20—In Escalante, soldiers fire on a group of antigovernment demonstrators, killing 14. Nearly 200 people are arrested.

Sept. 21—Tens of thousands of demonstrators march in Manila and other cities to mark the 13th anniversary of the declaration of martial law.

POLAND

Sept. 15—Catholic clerics pray for Solidarity leaders and openly praise the outlawed union in a mass for 50,000 industrial workers taking part in a pilgrimage to Czestochowa.

Sept. 28—In an interview with *The New York Times*, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Prime Minister, says that Solidarity no longer exists "as a real and organized force."

PORTUGAL

(See *Intl, EEC*)

SAUDI ARABIA

(See also *Intl, OPEC*)

Sept. 4—A secret report by the U.S. that is leaked in Washington, D.C., discloses that Saudi Arabia will allow the U.S. to use bases in Saudi Arabia if there is "aggression" by the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf region or if Saudi Arabia is unable to control a Persian Gulf crisis.

Sept. 15—The government says that the U.S. told Saudi Arabia that it would not object to the Saudi decision to buy \$4-billion worth of British jet fighters.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, EEC; Mozambique; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 1—The government announces a 4-month freeze on payments on the principal of the country's foreign debt.

The National Union of Mine Workers announces that black workers at 7 mines will strike today to demand higher wages.

Sept. 2—South Africa's stock exchange opens; the government ordered it closed last month.

Sept. 3—The National Union of Mine Workers calls off its strike because of intimidation from the mine owners.

Sept. 8—President P. W. Botha says that it would be "disloyal" to hold talks with the African National Congress (ANC).

Sept. 9—Botha says that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. yesterday will retard racial reforms.

Sept. 11—The government orders the deportation of a reporter for *Newsweek*.

Sept. 12—About 600 schoolchildren are detained in Soweto for not attending classes; in unrest around the country, 7 blacks are killed.

A government panel appointed by President Botha recommends the end of the pass laws; the laws prohibit blacks from living in urban areas except as temporary workers.

Sept. 13—South African businessmen and news reporters meet with the ANC in Zambia.

Sept. 17—Police stop a group of parents, teachers and students from reopening a high school in Athlone; over 400 schools were closed by police earlier this month.

Sept. 18—Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha admits that South Africa violated the nonaggression pact it signed with Mozambique by aiding guerrillas fighting to overthrow the Mozambican government.

Sept. 20—Defense Minister Magnus Malan says that South

Africa has been supporting the UNITA guerrillas in Angola.
 Sept. 22—The military says it has ended its weeklong invasion of Angola.

Sept. 25—In Port Elizabeth, a judge orders the police to stop physically assaulting prisoners held under the state of emergency decree.

Sept. 29—Afrikaans and English language newspapers carry a full-page advertisement by 91 heads of major domestic and foreign firms calling for the abolition of apartheid and negotiations "with acknowledged black leaders about power sharing."

Sept. 30—President Botha offers what he calls an agenda for racial reform; his plan would enfranchise blacks and mixed race people, but only within a federation or confederation of "units" based on geography and race. He also offers to include blacks in a 60-member legislative advisory panel.

SPAIN

(See also *Intl, EEC*)

Sept. 30—The government orders political representatives of the Polisario Front to leave after Polisario guerrillas kill 2 Spaniards in separate attacks off the Western Sahara.

THE SUDAN

Sept. 22—The military government bans street demonstrations after yesterday's protest march in Khartoum turned into a riot; 2 people were killed.

SWEDEN

Sept. 15—Prime Minister Olof Palme wins a 2d 3-year term when his Social Democratic party wins 45 percent of the vote and 173 parliamentary seats in today's general elections.

SWITZERLAND

Sept. 22—About 54.7 percent of Swiss voters approve a law that gives women equal rights in marriage.

SYRIA

(See *Lebanon*)

THAILAND

Sept. 9—A faction of the military tries to overthrow the government; after a brief battle in Bangkok that leaves 4 people dead, the dissidents surrender.

Sept. 17—In connection with the coup attempt, police issue arrest warrants for former Prime Minister Krangsak Chomanan and deputy supreme military commander General Serm na Nakorn.

TUNISIA

Sept. 4—Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali announces that Tunisia is recalling all its emigrant workers from Libya and suspending trade relations with Libya.

Sept. 26—The government breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya.

Four Libyan diplomats are expelled; the government accuses them of sending over 100 letter bombs to journalists.

UGANDA

Sept. 14—Head of State and chairman of the ruling Military Council General Tito Okello names 4 guerrilla leaders to the council after the guerrillas agree to cooperate with the military government.

Sept. 23—Jinja, Uganda's 2d largest city, is paralyzed by looting and rioting by government troops.

Sept. 26—Guerrilla forces of the National Resistance Army overrun the town of Masaka.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, UN; Afghanistan; Lebanon; United Kingdom, Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 1—General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev tells *Time* magazine that U.S.-Soviet Union ties have deteriorated in recent weeks because of an intensified U.S. "campaign of hatred" against the Soviet Union.

Sept. 3—Gorbachev meets with a visiting delegation of U.S. Senators; he tells them that the Soviet Union is prepared to make radical proposals on strategic weapons if the U.S. prohibits "the militarization of outer space."

Sept. 14—The government orders the expulsion of 25 British diplomats and other citizens in retaliation for Britain's September 12 expulsion of 25 Soviet citizens accused of espionage.

Sept. 18—Six more British citizens are ordered to leave; on September 16 the British ordered 6 Soviet citizens out of Britain in retaliation for the 25 expelled from the Soviet Union.

Sept. 27—Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov retires; Nikolai Ryzhkov is named Prime Minister.

In Washington, D.C., Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze outlines for U.S. President Ronald Reagan a Soviet proposal that would reportedly cut U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons by 50 percent.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, EEC, Group of Five; U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 2—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher appoints Norman Tebbit chairman of the Conservative party and reshuffles one-third of her Cabinet.

Sept. 5—The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) announces that a film on Northern Ireland that was withdrawn under government pressure has been revised and will be shown on British television next month.

Sept. 11—Rioting by Asian and Indian youths ends in Handsworth but continues in Birmingham, where police arrest 92 people and 30 are injured.

Sept. 12—The Foreign Office says that a ranking Soviet KGB (the state security agency) agent has defected; it says that based on his information, Britain is expelling 25 Soviet citizens for espionage.

Sept. 16—The government expels 6 more Soviet citizens.

Sept. 28—About 200 youths riot in the Brixton section of London after police accidentally shoot a black woman in a raid.

Sept. 29—Sporadic rioting continues for a 2d night in Brixton; 15 people are arrested.

Northern Ireland

Sept. 4—Irish Republican Army (IRA) guerrillas wound 31 people when they fire mortars into a police training station in Enniskillen.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Sept. 2—Speaking in Missouri, President Ronald Reagan attacks the present tax system as "unfair, unworkable and unproductive"; he calls for approval of his proposed "fair share" tax program.

Sept. 10—Acting under a law passed in October, 1984, President Reagan appoints a 7-member commission to establish uniform sentencing guides for federal judges.

Sept. 12—The Education Department rescinds a ruling requiring colleges to verify that male students receiving federal aid have registered for the draft. The ruling was to have become effective in the fall of 1985.

Sept. 13—Addressing New England governors and other invited officials, special presidential envoy Drew Lewis says that "acid rain" in the northeast U.S. and Canada is linked

to sulfur emissions from industry; he will suggest an economically feasible cleanup program.

Sept. 14—The Environmental Protection Agency reports that it will survey the hazards connected with the seepage of a radioactive gas, radon, from the Reading Prong, which runs underground in parts of Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, underlying some 100,000 homes.

Sept. 20—Bethesda Naval Hospital doctors report that President Reagan has made a "100 percent complete recovery" from his July surgery, which involved the removal of cancerous tissue from his intestines.

Sept. 23—In a White House speech, President Reagan outlines plans to set up a \$300-million fund for low-cost loans to support specific exports; he proposes other measures to open foreign markets to U.S. goods and to head off congressional efforts to pass protectionist legislation.

Sept. 25—Education Secretary William Bennett says that the \$1.2 billion spent thus far on bilingual education in the U.S. has not helped those for whom it was intended; he says that changes must be made to ensure that English is taught in American schools.

Sept. 28—President Reagan nominates Russell A. Rourke as secretary of the Air Force to succeed the retiring Verne Orr.

Sept. 30—President Reagan asks Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler to resign and become ambassador to Ireland.

Economy

Sept. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 6.9 percent in August, the lowest level since 1980.

Sept. 12—The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reports that 80 U.S. banks failed in the 1st 8 months of 1985; 79 banks failed in all 1984.

Sept. 13—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index declined 0.3 percent in August.

Sept. 16—The Commerce Department reports that by mid-1985 foreign investment and ownership of U.S. industries, real estate, stocks and bonds exceeded American ownership; the U.S. has become a debtor nation for the 1st time since World War I.

The Commerce Department reports that the nation's foreign trade deficit was \$33 billion in the 2d quarter of 1985.

Sept. 20—The Commerce Department reports that the country's gross national product (GNP) is rising at an annual rate of 2.8 percent in the 3d quarter of 1985.

Sept. 23—In reaction to yesterday's announcement by the finance ministers of the Group of Five leading industrial nations that they would "intervene" in an attempt to force down the value of the dollar, the Federal Reserve Board reports that today the dollar lost 4.29 percent of its value against foreign currencies, a 16-month low and the sharpest drop in 12 years.

Sept. 24—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.2 percent in August.

Sept. 27—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's foreign trade deficit declined to \$9.9 billion in August.

Sept. 29—David Stockman, former director of the Office of Management and Budget, says that a tax increase of at least \$100 billion a year is needed to reduce the U.S. deficit; he calls President Reagan's plan for tax revision "preposterous."

Sept. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.7 percent in August.

Foreign Policy

See also *Intl. Group of Five, UN; Canada; El Salvador; Iraq; Kuwait; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; U.S.S.R.*

Sept. 3—White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that

President Reagan is willing to meet Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev "halfway in an effort to solve problems."

In Moscow, a delegation of U.S. Senators meets with Gorbachev.

Sept. 6—President Reagan says that he "carelessly gave the impression" last month that segregation in public places in South Africa had been eliminated; he says he "didn't intend to say that."

Sept. 7—President Reagan orders chief trade negotiator Clayton Yeutter to "begin proceedings" against Japan, South Korea, Brazil and the European Economic Community (EEC) for "unfair trading practices." He reiterates his opposition to protectionist legislation.

The State Department announces that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will hold high-level talks in Moscow next week on their differences in the Far East and in Korea and Indochina.

Sept. 9—The Defense Department approves the sale of arms worth more than \$100 million to Pakistan and combat helicopters worth \$178 million to South Korea.

In an executive order, President Reagan adopts trade and economic measures against South Africa barring most loans to South Africa's government, banning the importing of the South African gold Kruggerand, and prohibiting the export of nuclear technology.

Sept. 10—U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Herman Nickel returns to his post; he was recalled "for consultation" some 3 months ago.

President Reagan meets with Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter at the White House.

Sept. 13—In a position paper, the State Department asserts that there is "a mountain of evidence" to show that Nicaragua continues to supply training, weapons and advice to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

Sept. 17—At his news conference, President Reagan rules out any deal with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that would end U.S. research and testing of his Strategic Defense Initiative, the space weapons defense plan (SDI).

Sept. 18—President Reagan announces that Benjamin Weir, a hostage in Lebanon for the last 16 months, has been released and has returned to the U.S.; 6 other Americans are still being held.

Sept. 19—Meeting at the White House with Mozambican President Samora Machel, President Reagan says he was "distressed" at South African violations of its nonaggression pact with Mozambique.

Clergyman Benjamin Weir reports that his captors in Lebanon are demanding the release of 17 terrorists held in Kuwait before they will release the 6 Americans they continue to hold.

Sept. 21—President Reagan advises Mexico that the U.S. will "stand ready to help in every way in the days and months ahead" to aid in a worldwide relief effort to mitigate the effects of the devastating September 19 earthquake.

Sept. 23—In Washington, President Reagan meets with Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak to discuss the Middle East.

Sept. 24—In a report to Congress, the nonpartisan congressional Office of Technology Assessment expresses doubts that a "Star Wars" defense system (SDI) could be made leakproof and reports that it might make nuclear war with the Soviet Union more likely.

Sept. 25—The U.S. diverts \$10 million originally intended for a UN-sponsored population control program in China because the program includes what the administration terms coercive abortion and sterilization measures.

Sept. 27—The White House reports that in his White House meeting with President Reagan, Soviet Foreign Minister

Eduard Shevardnadze delivered a letter from Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan purportedly proposing a 50 percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. nuclear offensive weapons.

President Reagan notifies Congress of his intent to sell Jordan between \$1.5 billion and \$1.9 billion in arms, including some 40 F-20 or F-16 advanced aircraft.

Sept. 28—The State Department proposes a 5-year program costing \$5.5 billion to improve security at U.S. embassies and to finance counterintelligence overseas.

President Reagan says "we welcome" Soviet proposals for drastic cuts in nuclear arms and are ready for "tough but fair" negotiations in Geneva.

Sept. 30—White House officials report that the formal Soviet proposal for arms reduction calls for a 50 percent reduction in U.S. long- and medium-range missiles and a 50 percent reduction only in Soviet long-range missiles.

President Reagan says he will meet with leaders of Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan in October before his November meeting with Gorbachev.

President Reagan meets at the White House with Jordan's King Hussein to discuss Middle East peace prospects.

The Defense Department notifies Congress that it has offered to sell China plans and equipment for a munitions plant.

Labor and Industry

Sept. 27—The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) fines American Airlines \$1.5 million for violations of safety regulations on maintenance and inspection.

The Philip Morris Company agrees to buy General Foods Corporation for nearly \$5.8 billion.

Legislation

Sept. 4—The House votes 260 to 96 to fund the Economic Development Administration and the Appalachian Regional Commission, originally established 20 years ago, and sets a financing ceiling of \$182.8 million for the economic development program and \$118.7 million for the Appalachian program in fiscal 1986.

Sept. 12—The House votes 307 to 102 for a bill that will provide \$10.1 billion for the continued financing of mass transit systems in fiscal 1986. The Senate has not yet acted.

Sept. 19—The Senate, voting 69 to 30, passes a bill that is intended to curb illegal immigrants, particularly farm workers.

Sept. 25—In a voice vote, the Senate passes a continuing resolution for a temporary budget that will permit government fiscal operation through November 14.

Sept. 26—Voting 86 to 13, the Senate approves the \$7.3-billion Superfund Improvement Act of 1985 to provide funds over the next 5 years for hazardous dump cleanup. The House will vote on the measure in October.

Sept. 30—Both Houses of Congress vote to extend the tax on cigarettes and to extend dairy price supports, due to expire at midnight, for 45 days.

Military

Sept. 13—The U.S. Air Force reports that a heat-seeking anti-satellite missile launched in space by a F-15 fighter plane has destroyed an Air Force satellite orbiting at 17,000 miles per hour in space.

Sept. 20—The Air Force admits that Solwind, the target of the anti-satellite missile destroyed September 13, was "marginally" operable when it was destroyed.

Politics

Sept. 27—Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (R., Md.) announces that he will not seek reelection in 1986.

Science and Space

Sept. 3—The space shuttle *Discovery* lands after a 7-day mission in space; it deployed 3 new satellites and repaired a malfunctioning satellite.

Sept. 11—The International Cometary Explorer, a U.S. satellite, flies successfully through the tail of the Giacobini-Zinner comet some 44 million miles from earth.

Sept. 26—Scientists associated with Harvard Medical School report the discovery and production in minute quantity of a small protein that stimulates the production of human blood vessels.

Supreme Court

Sept. 18—In an unsigned order, the Court refuses the Justice Department's requests that the Department be allowed to advance oral arguments as a friend of the Court in 2 cases to be heard in the coming term; the cases involve abortion and affirmative action.

VIETNAM

Sept. 14—The government announces the 2d devaluation of the Vietnamese dong in less than 6 months.

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685). 1. Title: CURRENT HISTORY. A. Publication No. 0011350. 2. Date of filing: September 24, 1985. 3. Frequency of issue: Monthly except June, July, and August. A. No. of issues published annually: 9. B. Annual subscription price: \$21.00. 4. Location of known office of publication: 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127. 5. Location of the headquarters or general business offices of the publishers: 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127. 6. Names and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Editor, Carol L. Thompson, R.R. 1 Box 132, Furlong, Pa. 18925; Managing Editor, William W. Finan, Jr., R.R. 1 Box 132, Furlong, Pa. 18925. 7. Owner (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock): Current History Inc., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 4225 Main St., Phila., Pa. 19127; Shelby Cullom Davis, 70 Pine St., N.Y.C., N.Y. 10005; Vera N. and Daniel M. Redmond, 1642 Monk Rd., Gladwyne, Pa. 19035; Calvin P. Redmond, 5 West 20th St. N.Y.C., N.Y. 10011. 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds mortgages or other securities (If there are none, so state): None. 10. Extent and nature of circulation: A. Total No. copies printed (Net Press Run) (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 25,498; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 27,016. B. Paid circulation: 1. Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 336 (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): none. 2. Mail subscriptions: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 23,869; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 23,591. C. Total paid circulation (Sum of 10B1 and 10B2) (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 24,205; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 23,591. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means samples, complimentary, and other free copies: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 125; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 125. E. Total distribution (Sum of C and D): (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 24,330; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 23,716. F. Copies not distributed: 1. Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 1,168; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 3,300. 2. Returns from news agents: (Not Applicable). G. Total (Sum of E, F1 and 2—should equal net press run shown in A) (average no. copies each issue during preceding 12 months): 25,498; (actual no. copies of single issue published nearest to filing date): 27,016. 11. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Signature and title of editor, publisher, business manager or owner: D.G. Redmond, Jr., Publisher.

EAST EUROPE

0 100 200 300
Miles



Current History

SPECIAL DISCOUNTS FOR BULK PURCHASE

Save One Third!

Current History is now offering special discounts for orders of 10 or more copies of the same issue, and for 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address.

Property of
AMBASSADOR COLLEGE LIBRARY
Big Sandy, Texas

Academic Year 1985–1986

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1985 (9/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Central and South America, 1986 (1/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1985 (10/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1986 (2/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> East Europe (11/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> India and South Asia (3/86) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Japan (12/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> East Asia (4/86) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1986 (5/86) |

Still Available

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> North Africa (5/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1984 (2/84) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa South of the Sahara (4/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1984 (1/84) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Central America and the Caribbean (3/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico (12/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1985 (1/85) | <input type="checkbox"/> Japan (11/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia (12/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1983 (10/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1984 (10/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1983 (9/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1984 (9/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet-American Arms Race (5/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Canada (5/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia (4/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (4/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1983 (3/83) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa South of the Sahara (3/84) | <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (12/82) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> East Europe (11/82) |

Quantity Discount Price: 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$1.95 per copy—savings of one-third (single copy price, \$2.95).
Copies more than two years old: \$3.75 per copy.

Quantity Subscription Price: 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address: \$18.50 per 1-year subscription.

One-year subscription: \$21.00 **Two-year subscription:** \$41.50 **Three-year subscription:** \$62.00

CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hardcover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

- ☐ 1 year US\$21.00
☐ 2 years US\$41.50
☐ 3 years US\$62.00
☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated in the quantities I have marked.

☐ Current History Binders at US\$7.95

Name

Address

City

State

Zip Code

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add US\$2.00 per year for Canada; US\$2.00 per year for foreign.

All these offers are good only on new orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

AMBASSADOR COLLEGE
LIBRARY
P.O. Box 111
BIG SANDY, TX 75755

11/85